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 Executive Summary 
 Innovation and technological change are integral to the energy system transformations described in the Global 
Energy Assessment (GEA) pathways. Energy technology innovations range from incremental improvements to  radical 
breakthroughs and from technologies and infrastructure to social institutions and individual behaviors. This Executive 
Summary synthesizes the main policy-relevant findings of  Chapter 24 . Specific positive policy examples or key  take-
home messages are highlighted in italics. 
 The innovation process involves many stages – from research through to incubation, demonstration, (niche) market 
 creation, and ultimately, widespread diffusion. Feedbacks between these stages influence progress and likely success, 
yet innovation outcomes are unavoidably uncertain. Innovations do not happen in isolation; interdependence and 
complexity are the rule under an increasingly globalized innovation system. Any emphasis on particular technologies or 
parts of the energy system, or technology policy that emphasizes only particular innovation stages or processes (e.g., 
an exclusive focus on energy supply from renewables, or an exclusive focus on Research and Development [R&D], or 
 feed-in tariffs) is inadequate given the magnitude and multitude of challenges represented by the GEA objectives. 
 A first, even if incomplete, assessment of the entire global resource mobilization (investments) in both energy  supply 
and demand-side technologies and across different innovation stages suggests current annual Research, Development 
& Demonstration (RD&D) investments of some US$50 billion, market formation investments (which rely on directed 
public policy support) of some US$150 billion, and an estimated US$1 trillion to US$5 trillion investments in mature 
energy supply and end-use technologies (technology diffusion).  Major developing economies like Brazil, India and 
above all China, have become significant players in global energy technology RD&D, with public- and private-sector 
investments approaching US$20 billion, or almost half of global innovation investments, which is significantly above the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries’ public-sector energy RD&D investments 
(US$13 billion). Important data and information gaps exist for all stages of the energy technology innovation 
investments outside public sector R&D funding in OECD countries, particularly in the areas of recent technology-specific 
private  sector and non-OECD R&D expenditures, and energy end-use diffusion investments. 
 Analysis of investment flows into different stages of the innovation process reveals an apparent mismatch of resource 
allocation and resource needs. 
 Early in the innovation process, public expenditure on R&D is heavily weighted toward large-scale supply-side 
 technologies. Of an estimated US$50 billion in annual investment globally, less than US$10 billion are allocated to 
energy end-use technologies and energy efficiency. 
 Later in the innovation process, annual market (diffusion) investment in supply-side plant and infrastructure total 
roughly US 2005 $0.8 trillion, compared with a conservative estimate of some US$1–4 trillion spent on demand-side 
 technologies. These relative proportions are, however, insufficiently reflected in market deployment investment 
 incentives of technologies, which almost exclusively focus on supply-side options, to the detriment of energy end use in 
general and energy efficiency in particular foregoing also important employment and economic growth stimuli effects 
from end-use investments that are critical in improving energy efficiency.  The need for investment to support the 
 widespread diffusion of efficient end-use technologies is also clearly shown in the GEA pathway analyses. The demand 
side generally tends to contribute more than the supply-side options to realizing the GEA goals. This apparent  mismatch 
suggests the necessity of rebalancing public innovation expenditure and policy incentives to include smaller-scale 
demand-side technologies within innovation portfolios . 
 Given persistent barriers to the adoption of energy-efficient technologies even when they are cost competitive on 
a life cycle basis, technology policies need to move toward a more integrated approach, simultaneously stimulating 
the  development as well as the  adoption of energy efficiency technologies and measures.  R&D initiatives that fail to 
 incentivize consumers to adopt the outcomes of innovation efforts (e.g., promoting energy-efficient building designs 
without strengthened building codes, or Carbon Capture and Storage [CCS] development without a price on carbon) risk 
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not only being ineffective but also precluding the market feedback and learning that are critical for continued improvements in 
technologies. 
 Little systematic data are available for private-sector innovation inputs (including investments), particularly in developing 
 countries. Information is patchy on innovation spillovers or transfers between technologies, between sectors, and between 
 countries. It is also not clearly understood how fast knowledge generated by innovation investments may depreciate, although 
policy and investment volatility are recognized as critical factors. Technical performance and economic  characteristics 
for  technologies in the lab, in testing, and in the field are not routinely available. Innovation successes are more widely 
 documented than innovation failures. Although some of the data constraints reflect legitimate concerns to protect intellectual 
property, most do not. Standardized mechanisms to collect, compile, and make data on energy technology innovation publicly 
available are urgently needed. The benefits of coupling these information needs to public policy support have been clearly 
demonstrated.  A positive policy example is provided by the early US Solar Thermal Electricity Program, which required formal, 
non-proprietary  documentation of cost improvements resulting from public R&D support for the technology. 
 The energy technology innovation system is founded on knowledge generation and flows. These are increasingly global, but 
this global knowledge needs to be adapted, modified, and applied to local conditions. The generation of knowledge requires 
 independent and stable institutions to balance the competing needs and interests of the market, policy makers, and the R&D 
community.  The technology roadmaps and the policy regime that characterize innovation in end-use technologies in the 
Japanese Top Runner program are a good example of the actor coordination and knowledge exchange needed to stimulate 
 technological innovation. 
 Generated knowledge needs to spread through the innovation system. Knowledge flows and feedbacks create and strengthen 
links between different actors. This can take place formally or informally. Policies that are overly focused on the  development 
of technological “hardware” should be rebalanced to support interactions and learning between actors.  The provision of 
test facilities in the early years of the Danish wind industry is a good example of how policy can support knowledge flows 
and the strengthening of collaborative links within networks of actors in an innovation system (energy companies, turbine 
 manufacturers, local owners). 
 Long-term, consistent, and credible institutions underpin investments in knowledge generation, particularly from the private 
sector, and consistency does not preclude learning. Knowledge institutions must be responsive to experience and adaptive to 
changing conditions. Although knowledge flows through international cooperation and experience sharing cannot presently be 
analyzed in detail, the scale of the innovation challenge emphasizes their importance alongside efforts to develop the capacity 
to absorb and adapt knowledge to local needs and conditions.  The current global cooperation in energy technology  innovation 
is well illustrated by the International Energy Agency (IEA) technology cooperation programs reviewed in  Section 4.4 ; all 
 invariably show a sparse involvement from developing countries. 
 Clear, stable, and consistent expectations about the direction and shape of the innovation system are necessary for  innovation 
actors to commit time, money, and effort with only the uncertain promise of distant returns. To date, policy support for 
the  innovation system has been characterized by volatility, changes in emphasis, and a lack of clarity.  The debilitating 
consequences on innovation outcomes of stop-go policies are well illustrated by the wind and solar water heater programs 
in the United States through the 1980s, as well as the large-scale (but fickle) US efforts to develop alternative liquid fuels 
(Synfuels). The legacy of such innovation policy failures can be long lasting. The creation of a viable and successful Brazilian 
ethanol industry through  consistent policy support over several decades, including agricultural R&D, guaranteed ethanol 
purchase prices, and fuel  distribution infrastructures, as well as vehicle manufacturing (flex fuel cars), is a good example of a 
stable, aligned, and systemic technology policy framework. It is worth noting that even in this highly successful policy example, 
it has taken some three  decades for domestic renewable ethanol to become directly cost competitive with imported gasoline. 
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 Policies need also to be  aligned . Innovation support through early research and development is undermined by an absence 
of support for their demonstration to potential investors and their subsequent deployment in potential markets. Policies to 
support innovations in low-carbon technologies are undermined by subsidies to support carbon-intensive technologies.  Fuel 
efficiency standards that set minimum (static) efficiency floors fail to stimulate continuous technological advances, meaning 
innovations in efficiency stagnate once standards are reached. As a further example of misalignment, the lack of effective policies to 
limit the demand for mobility mean efficiency improvements can be swamped by rising activity levels. 
 Policies should support a wide range of technologies. However seductive they seem, “silver bullets” do not exist without the benefit of 
hindsight. Innovation policies should use a portfolio approach under a risk-hedging and “insurance policy” decision-making  paradigm. 
Portfolios need to recognize also that innovation is inherently risky. Failures vastly outnumber successes.  Experimentation, often for 
 prolonged periods (decades rather than years), is critical to generate the applied knowledge necessary to support the scaling up of 
innovations to the mass market. 
 The whole energy system should be represented in innovation portfolios, not only particular groups or types of technologies; the entire 
suite of innovation processes should be included, not just particular stages or individual mechanisms. Less capital-intensive, smaller-scale 
(i.e.,  granular ) technologies or projects are less of a drain on scarce resources, and failure has less serious consequences.  Granular projects 
and technologies with smaller scales (MW rather than GW) therefore should figure prominently in any innovation portfolio. 
 Finally, public technology policy should not be beholden to incumbent interests that favor support for particular technologies that either 
 perpetuate the lock-in of currently dominant technologies or transfer all high innovation risks of novel concepts to the public sector. 
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 24.1  Introduction 
 24.1.1  Welcome to  Chapter 24 
 Unlike resources found in nature, technological and social innovations 
are human-made resources that can be generated and expanded as a 
matter of social choice but come with costs and with uncertain outcomes. 
Energy-technology innovations not only encompass new inventions and 
improvements in the performance or attributes of technologies like coal 
gasification, solar thermal electricity, batteries, or energy-efficient win-
dows or light bulbs, but also in how firms develop and markets and users 
relate to and utilize such technologies. Social innovations that result in 
changes in behavior of technology suppliers as well as users can there-
fore be just as important as improvements in technological efficiency or 
emissions performances of individual technological artifacts. 
 Innovations do not fall like manna from heaven; they need to be created 
through a multistage process. The stages include research, development, 
demonstration, market formation, and finally, the culminating perva-
sive diffusion of successful innovations. In the most general definition, 
energy technology change is the capital-embodied result of institutional-
ized R&D and collective learning processes 1 between developers/suppli-
ers and users of technologies, operating within specific innovation and 
adoption environments that are strongly shaped by policies. This chapter 
therefore adopts a systemic view of an Energy Technology Innovation 
System (ETIS) and focuses on the particular role of policy in the energy 
innovation process and the functioning of ETIS. 
 Chapter 24 is both theoretical and deeply empirical: it provides the first 
ever quantitative estimate of global investments in energy-technology 
innovation ( Appendix I ), as well as a rich set of new case studies (sum-
marized in  Appendix II ). These case studies trace the evolution of indi-
vidual energy technologies, describe often neglected aspects of energy 
technology innovation, and assess the role of policies in influencing 
energy technology innovation. Throughout, this chapter emphasizes the 
importance of understanding the energy-technology innovation system 
in its entirety, including its many feedbacks. Because the energy-technol-
ogy innovation system is complex and remains incompletely understood, 
readers are advised to use caution when seeking precise mathematical 
formulations for models or simple policy recipes. Nonetheless, despite 
its limitations, a systems perspective on energy technology innovation – 
particularly one that integrates supply and demand aspects – offers new 
insights that complement and improve upon traditional views and result-
ing fragmented technology policy approaches. 
 Chapter 24 provides guidance to policy makers about how to positively 
influence energy innovation, as well as how policy can be harmful and 
counterproductive. Common myths are explicitly examined. Refraining from 
being overly prescriptive about particular individual policy instruments, 
 Chapter 24 instead offers broad guidelines drawn from the case stud-
ies for improved innovation policies that recognize both the inevitable 
uncertainty in the innovation process and its systemic nature. The chapter 
concludes with research and information/data needs and summary find-
ings. Space limitations preclude a full presentation of the 20 case studies 
drawn upon in  Chapter 24 . They are presented in one-page summaries as 
an appendix to this text and are available upon request. 2 
 24.1.2  Roadmap of  Chapter 24 
 Figure 24.1 shows a roadmap of  Chapter 24 . After the introduction 
( Section 24.1 ),  Chapter 24 moves to the assessment of ETIS, which con-
sists of three main parts. 
 Section 24.2 characterizes ETIS. The review is necessarily selective, but 
identifies key components and themes. Features of ETIS are organized 
around knowledge and learning ( Section 24.2.2 ); attributes of energy 
technologies and their industries and drivers of changing technology 
characteristics, such as economies of scale and scope ( Section 24.2.3 ); 
and the functions of actors and associated institutions ( Section 24.2.4 ). 
These are the distinct mechanisms of innovation described in the engin-
eering, economics, management, and sociological literature and include 
knowledge accumulation (and depreciation), economies of scale and 
scope, and various learning processes. This part concludes with an 
integrative representation of ETIS and its components according to 
the “functions of innovation systems” literature. This emphasizes the 
dynamic, evolving nature of an ETIS over time ( Section 24.2.5 ). 
 Section 24.3 identifies ways of assessing ETIS. The breadth of assess-
ment metrics are reviewed in detail in the  Assessment Metric case study 
 1  Excellent historical studies on oil-reﬁ ning (Enos, 1962) and gas turbines (Watson, 
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 2  Available at www.globalenergyassessment.org. 
Chapter 24 Policies for the Energy Technology Innovation System (ETIS)
1673
(see summary in  Appendix II ). The discussion then proceeds to a quanti-
tative commensurate assessment of current investment inputs into ETIS, 
as summarized in  Section 24.3.2 . In order to assess ETIS in terms of out-
comes ( Section 24.3.3 ),  Chapter 24 draws upon 20 case studies, which 
are summarized in  Appendix II .  Section 24.3.3 provides an overview of 
the case studies, their rationale, and selected illustrative examples of 
ETIS outputs across a variety of energy technologies. 
 Section 24.4 then examines the question of how to influence the direction 
and effective functioning of the ETIS. The policy community is a key con-
stituency for the findings in  Chapter 24 . The ETIS framework presented is 
an integrative conceptual framework that neither can nor should be used 
to generate policy prescriptions. Therefore, after an overview of actors and 
rationales for technology policy ( Sections 24.4.1 and  24.4.2 ), policy mod-
els and instruments ( Section 24.4.3 ) and their increasingly international 
dimension ( Section 24.4.4 ) are outlined.  Chapter 24 abstracts generaliz-
able  policy design guidelines and criteria that should support innovation 
success and mitigate against innovation failure ( Section 24.4.6 ). 
 Chapter 24 culminates in a discussion of the research, data, and infor-
mation needs identified in this assessment ( Section 24.5.1 ), as well as 
overall conclusions ( Section 24.5.2 ). 
 As noted, this chapter is written to provide a practical guide for pol-
icy makers concerned with supporting the effective functioning of the 
ETIS in the context of the GEA objectives on climate, access, security, 
and health. To develop policy guidance,  Chapter 24 also reviews some 
key characteristics and metrics of ETIS. These sections (24.2.2 to 24.2.5) 
are written with greater technical depth and language, and are aimed 
also at those in the research and business communities interested in 
understanding the fundamentals and mechanisms of innovation in an 
energy context. Readers more interested in policy aspects can move on 
to  Section 24.3 , revisiting the more technical material of  Section 24.2 at 
a later stage. Given the range of potential audiences, considerable effort 
has been made to define key terms (see Table 24.1 and also the GEA 
Glossary), use consistent terminology, and support conceptual argu-
ments with empirical details from the case studies. 
 24.1.3  Technological Change in Energy Systems 
 Technological and congruent institutional and social changes have been 
widely recognized as main drivers for long-run economic growth ever since 
Solow (1957), and for broader societal development as well (Freeman and 
Perez, 1988). In terms of causality, caution is advised as technology and 
institutional/social setting co-evolve, mutually depending on and cross-
enhancing each other. Technological change in energy systems to a large 
degree determines how efficiently energy services can be provided, at 
what costs, and with which associated externalities. Scholars agree on the 
importance of technological change in past and future energy transitions 
(e.g., Smil, 1994; Grubler, 1998; Nakicenovic et al., 2000; Grubler, 2008; 
and the literature review in Halsn æ s et al., 2007). 
 The  Grand Designs case study (summarized in  Appendix II , see also 
Wilson and Grubler, 2011) provides a synthesis of major patterns driving 
historical energy transitions and contrasts this historical perspective by 
examining also the scenario literature on the importance and patterns 
of technological change in alternative futures. The transformative power 
of technology arises from: (1) combinations of interrelated individual 
technologies (clustering) and applications of technologies outside their 
 Table 24.1 |  List of key terms 
Key Term  Definition as Used in  Chapter 24 
ETIS Energy Technology Innovation System: the innovation systems approach applied to the energy system. In this approach, innovation is understood as an 
interactive process involving a network of ﬁ rms and other economic agents that, together with the institutions and policies that inﬂ uence their innovative 
behavior and performance, bring new products, processes, and forms of organization into economic use
Invention origination of an idea as a technological solution to a perceived problem or need (usually codiﬁ ed via a patent)
Innovation putting ideas into practice through an (iterative) process of design, testing, and improvement, including small-scale demonstration or commercial pilot 
projects, and culminating in the establishment of an industrial capability to manufacture a given technological innovation
Diffusion widespread uptake of a technological innovation throughout the market of potential adopters
R&D (Research and Development) knowledge generation by directed activities (e.g., evaluation, screening, research) aimed at developing new or improving on existing technological 
knowledge
Demonstration construction of technology prototypes or pilots demonstrating technological feasibility
RD&D (Research, Development 
and Demonstration)
 integration of the required upfront stages in a technology life cycle (invention-innovation) 
 related terms: RDD&D (i.e., RD&D + deployment) 
Market Formation  application of a technology in a speciﬁ c limited market setting (or niche) by harnessing either a speciﬁ c comparative advantage (e.g., PV electricity in 
remote areas without grid connections) or via public early deployment incentives (e.g., feed-in tariffs) 
 related terms: market creation, niche markets, deployment, early commercialization 
Learning improved (technological) knowledge derived from production experience (learning-by-doing) and/or user experience (learning-by-using) that leads to 
performance improvements, including cost reductions
Knowledge Spillovers knowledge transfer between different innovation actors and technology application ﬁ elds through mechanisms such as imitation, trade, licensing, foreign 
direct investment, and/or movement of people
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initial sector/use (spillovers); (2) the continued improvements of tech-
nology performance and costs as a result of innovation efforts and mar-
ket growth (learning and economies of scale effects, among others); (3) 
energy end-use and technology users/consumers are particularly critical; 
and (4) generally, rates of capital turnover and technological change in 
the energy systems remain slow. These four “grand” patterns of energy 
technological change are addressed in more detail below. 
 (1) No individual technology, as important it may be, is able to transform 
whole energy systems that are large and complex. The importance of tech-
nology arises in particular through  clustering (combinations of interrelated 
individual technologies) and  spillover (applications outside the initial sec-
tor/use for which a technology was initially devised) effects. The concept 
of general purpose technologies (GPT) (e.g., Lipsey et al., 2006) captures 
this notion that some technologies, like steam power or electricity, find 
multiple applications across many sectors, industries, and energy end-uses. 
Technologies operate more effectively as families or as “gangs” rather than 
as individuals. Strong interrelatedness conditions major innovations in the 
energy sector to a multitude of complementary changes, including also new 
business and financing models, as demonstrated in the history of electric 
light and power (Hughes, 1983) or the emergence of oil-based individual 
motorized mobility with automobiles (Freeman and Perez, 1988). Once a 
technology is adopted, a number of related technologies, derived products, 
and business models become established. Improvements and knowledge 
about possibilities and applications accumulate, generating further learn-
ing economies as the application range grows (Watson, 2004). Combined, 
these processes create powerful self-reinforcing mechanisms that make it 
very difficult to dislodge a dominant technological regime, a fact referred 
to in the technology literature as “path dependency” or “technology lock-
in” (e.g., Frankel, 1955; Arthur,  1988a ;  1988b ; 1989; Unruh, 2000). As a 
result, new technologies, even when economically feasible, face higher 
short-term adoption costs compared to established technologies (Cowan 
and Hulten, 1996; Unruh, 2000). 
 (2) Generally, when new technologies are introduced, they are initially 
crude, imperfect, and very expensive (Rosenberg, 1994). Incumbent tech-
nologies are generally more advanced in their respective technology life 
cycle and thus enjoy an associated learning and deployment advantage 
(Cowan, 1990). Therefore, performance (the ability to perform a partic-
ular task or deliver a novel energy service) of a new energy technology 
initially dominates economics as a driver of technological change and 
diffusion. Only after an extended period of experimentation, learning, 
and improvements, and the establishment of a corresponding industrial 
base (in many cases, profiting from standardization, mass production, 
and scale economies of a growing industry) do new technologies become 
capable of competing with existing ones on a pure cost basis. In other 
words,  attractive beats cheap , at least initially. Policy intervention can 
short-cut this evolutionary pattern and are justified when “attractive-
ness” is defined by lower externalities (e.g., emissions, energy security, 
etc.). However, such policy interventions come at a price: either costly 
direct public subsidies or changed economic incentives (via levies, fees, 
taxes imposed on incumbent, undesirable technologies – and paid for 
by consumers). There is also a risk of policy-induced premature “lock-in” 
in technologies that ultimately turn out to be either socially undesirable, 
too expensive, or risky for unregulated markets (cf. the  French Nuclear 
case study in  Appendix II ), or pose unanticipated social/environmental 
challenges, e.g., land competition with food production or greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with fertilizer use and land-use changes in the 
case of first generation biofuels (Plevin et al., 2010). 
 (3) The history of past energy transitions highlights the critical import-
ance of end-use services (i.e., consumers, energy  demand ). Historically, 
energy supply has  followed energy demand in technology applications, 
and energy end-use markets have been the most important market out-
lets for new energy technologies (as quantified in the  Grand Designs 
case study. See also  Appendix I for a quantification of current energy 
end-use versus energy supply investments). In other words, new energy 
technologies generally need to find consumers (users), preferably many. 
This holds important implications for both modeling future energy tran-
sition scenarios and technology innovation and diffusion policies alike, 
where energy end-use technologies are often underrepresented. 
 (4) The process of technological change (from innovation to widespread 
diffusion) takes considerable time, usually many decades. In addition, 
rates of change become slower the larger the energy system or its com-
ponents, and when consequences of those changes are more disruptive. A 
novel approach that quantifies the historical scaling dynamics of energy 
technologies and illustrates this conclusion is reported in the  Scaling 
Dynamics case study. The historically slow rates of change of energy tech-
nologies and systems, which span from several decades up to a century 
(for a review, see Grubler et al., 1999), arise from four phenomena:
 Capital intensiveness: investments in energy technologies are among  •
the most capital-intensive across industries, characterized by high up-
front costs, a high degree of specificity of infrastructure, long payback 
periods, and strong exposure to financial risk (IEA, 2003). Capital 
intensiveness, therefore, ceteris paribus slows technology diffusion. 
 Longevity of capital stock: the lifetime of the capital stock of energy  •
systems in many end-use applications (buildings), conversion tech-
nologies (refineries, power plants), and above all, infrastructures (rail-
way networks, electricity grids), is generally long compared to other 
industrial equipment or consumer products (Smekens et al., 2003; 
Worrell and Biermans, 2005). Longevity of capital stock tends to slow 
capital turnover and thus the diffusion speed of new technologies. 
 Learning/experimentation time: extended time is required for experi- •
mentation, learning, and technology development from invention 
to innovation, to initial specialized niche market applications, and 
finally, in case of success, to pervasive adoption across many sectors, 
markets, and countries. 
 Lastly, considerable time is also required for technology clustering  •
and spillover effects to emerge. 
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 Only in exceptional cases does the diffusion of new technologies pro-
ceed via a premature retiring of existing capital stock, as is the case 
in current cell phone markets or with information and communication 
technologies (ICT) in general. In view of the generally slow rates of 
change in large technology systems like energy, pervasive technological 
transformations require a long-term view, and it is better for transition 
initiatives to start sooner rather than later. 
 The above characteristics of technological change in energy systems 
are important for policy, as they suggest that approaches must be sys-
temic, long-term, and cognizant of inevitable innovation uncertainties. 
Short-term, piecemeal efforts to stimulate innovation and speed tech-
nology diffusion are unlikely to result in the kind of major technological 
transformations needed to achieve more sustainable energy systems as 
called for throughout the GEA. 
 24.2  Characterizing Energy Technology 
Innovation Systems 
 24.2.1  Introduction to the Energy Technology 
Innovation System 
 24.2.1.1  From Linear Models to Innovation Systems 
 The evolution of technology is often conceptualized through a life cycle 
model that proceeds sequentially from birth (invention, innovation), to 
adolescence (growth), maturity (saturation), and ultimately senescence 
(decline due to competition by more recent innovations). Models of 
innovation describe the drivers and mechanisms behind this technol-
ogy life cycle. These have evolved substantially and continue to evolve 
further. The intellectual history of innovation concepts reaches back 
into the nineteenth century (e.g., Marxist economic theories and their 
conceptualization of technological innovation). Still influential today 
are the theories of Joseph A. Schumpeter (1942), who emphasized the 
importance of radical or disruptive technological and organizational 
changes, the role of entrepreneurship, and competition. In contrast to 
Schumpeter’s emphasis on radical “breakthrough” innovations, the 
importance of the compounded effects of numerous, smaller (incremen-
tal) innovations is also now widely recognized. Concepts formulated 
by Vannevar Bush in his 1945 report to the US president,  Science the 
Endless Frontier , were influential on early models of innovation (Bush, 
1945). These are often referred to as “linear” models. These models 
emphasize the role of basic, 3 largely publicly funded science in a linear 
innovation process from basic research to applied development, dem-
onstration, and concluding with the diffusion process (see the upper 
part of  Figure 24.2 ). 
 In truth, it is well understood that the innovation process is neither 
linear nor unidirectional (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Landau and 
Rosenberg, 1986; Freeman, 1994). Rather, the stages of the innovation 
process are linked, with feedbacks between each stage, giving rise to the 
term “chain-linked” model (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Brooks, 1995). 
This is illustrated in the lower part of  Figure 24.2 . The linear knowledge 
flow direction from basic science to applied technology as implied by 
the old “linear” model is now recognized to be more complex because it 
can also go in the opposite direction, with applied technologies enabling 
breakthroughs in basic science. 4 Likewise, research has identified the 
importance of knowledge spillovers and networks in collective learning 
processes, as there is no quasi-automatic “trickle down” from basic sci-
entific knowledge to industrial applications of that knowledge. 
 Figure 24.2 represents the main modifications and additions to this 
“chain-linked” model of the innovation process. In this improved model 
there are multiple feedbacks among the different stages and their inter-
action, combining elements of “supply push” (forces affecting the  gen-
eration of new knowledge) and “demand pull” (forces affecting the 
 demand for innovations) (see the review in Halsn æ s et al., 2007). Indeed, 
the stages often overlap with one another and the more interaction 
among the various stages, the more efficient the innovation process as 
offering more possibilities for learning, and knowledge and technology 
spillovers. And, of course, some technologies are successful without pro-
ceeding through each step in the innovation process (Grubler, 1998). 
 The distinction between supply-push and demand-pull has tradition-
ally been important, especially as they imply different technology policy 
instruments – e.g., public R&D expenditures or incentives for private 
R&D as classical technology “supply” instruments versus government 
purchase programs, mandated quantitative portfolio standards, regu-
lated feed-in tariffs, or subsidies as classical technology “demand”  3  The term “basic research” refers to study and research in pure science that aims to 
increase the scientiﬁ c knowledge base. This type of research is often purely theoret-
ical and has the intent of increasing the basic understanding of certain phenomena 
or behaviors; it does not seek to identify concrete applications of phenomena stud-
ied or to solve particular applied problems. 
 Figure 24.2 |  The Evolution of Thinking on Innovation Processes. 
 4  For example, satellite measurements leading to the discovery and subsequent 
explanation of previously unrecognized environmental problems such as strato-
spheric ozone depletion. 
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policy instruments. As argued here, from the perspective of a systemic 
innovation model characterized by multiple feedbacks, this technol-
ogy supply-demand dichotomy is artificial to a degree. Transformative 
technological change generally requires the simultaneous leveraging of 
all innovation stages, processes, and feedbacks, and thus a combination 
of both supply- and demand-side technology policy instruments. 
 In an additional improvement over previous models, a market formation 
stage 5 has been added in explicit recognition of the so-called “ valley 
of death” 6 observed in this innovation process between technology 
demonstration and diffusion. Many technologies fail at this or a similar 
hurdle between development and demonstration if they are too expen-
sive, otherwise uncompetitive, too difficult to scale up, or lack perceived 
market demand. Market formation activities support new technologies 
that can struggle to compete with incumbent technologies that enjoy 
economies of scale and the learning advantages resulting from their 
more mature technology life cycle. In some cases, natural market niches 
exist that value the relative advantages of the new technology and offer 
a price premium. In other cases, it is important to create new niches 
(Kemp et al., 1998). 7 
 The importance of the institutional context in which innovation occurs 
is also increasingly emphasized (Nelson, 1993; Geels, 2004). This points 
to the need for a more systemic approach to innovation, extending 
beyond the technology-focused “hardware” innovation process to also 
include analysis of actors, networks, and institutions. 
 Finally, the broader context of the innovation system matters. 
Technological, national or geographical factors affect the relative 
importance, roles, and relationships between components of the inno-
vation system or the specific incentives structures in place. The concept 
of “national systems of innovation” (Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 2009) 
describes this specificity. As a result, innovation systems for specific 
energy technologies vary substantively in their details, involving dif-
ferent sets of actors (e.g., incumbents or new entrants), interacting in 
different ways (e.g., research or market development), focusing on dif-
ferent problems (e.g., problem solving or learning by doing), and act-
ing at different spatial scales (e.g., national or global) (Jacobsson and 
Lauber, 2006; Hekkert et al., 2007). 
 24.2.1.2  The Innovation Systems Approach 
 Taken together, the different elements described in the preceding section 
comprise the innovation systems approach used as the conceptual frame-
work for this chapter. This is represented in the lower part of  Figure 24.2 . 
The different traditions of innovation and energy technology research 
outlined above (from linear to systemic) are drawn upon to support this 
chapter’s integrative perspective. The innovation systems approach cent-
ers on the set of factors that drive and direct innovation  processes. From 
a systemic perspective, innovation is understood as an interactive process 
involving a network of firms and other economic agents (most notably 
users) who, together with the institutions and policies that influence their 
innovation and adoption behavior and performance, bring new products, 
processes, and forms of organization into economic use (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Freeman and Perez, 1988; Lundvall, 1992). 
 The innovation systems approach emphasizes that the life cycle of a 
particular technology must develop in tandem with its corresponding 
innovation system (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000). For new technolo-
gies that are incremental improvements to existing ones, innovation 
systems are already in place. For example, the development of a more 
efficient gas turbine occurs within a mature innovation system com-
prised of large firms with high R&D spending, strong networks between 
suppliers and users of the technology, established markets and well-
aligned institutional infrastructures. In contrast, innovation systems 
need to be built up for radically new or disruptive innovations that 
strongly deviate from existing technologies and practices (van De Ven, 
1993). Current examples of radical innovations in the energy domain 
are solar photovoltaic (PV) and electric vehicles. Innovation systems 
emerging around such technologies may be characterized by poorly 
developed markets, misaligned institutional settings, poorly structured 
knowledge networks, and small firms with limited resources to develop 
and market the new technology (Alkemade et al., 2007). 
 It takes time to build up an innovation system, particularly for radical 
innovations whose initial development typically takes place over dec-
ades (see the  Scaling Dynamics case study). Weak or immature innova-
tion systems may delay the progress of an innovation, or decrease the 
likelihood of its success (van De Ven, 1993). In the initial stages of the 
innovation process, only a few actors are involved in developing a new 
technology. Over time, other actors enter, the knowledge base starts to 
grow, often the legitimacy of the new technology increases, and more 
financial resources become available (although sometimes creating exu-
berant expectations that can lead to investment bubbles). Through this 
“formative phase,” the innovation system around a new technology is 
built up (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). At a certain point, the innovation 
 5  Traditionally, market formation policies have been used in the defense (e.g., jet 
engines) and space sectors (e.g., photovoltaic [PV] technology) to kick-start a min-
imum level of technology demand for a nascent industry or technology. 
 6  The “valley of death” describes a situation where a successful R&D project either 
cannot attract funding for further development, or, once developed, cannot attract 
funding for large-scale demonstration of the new technology. It can also occur when 
the capital intensiveness of a project exceeds the ﬁ nancial resources of an otherwise 
willing investor (e.g., venture capital) or when promised public support does not 
materialize. For instance, the US FutureGen “clean coal” (advanced coal gasiﬁ ca-
tion, combined cycle, electricity generation plant combined with CCS) demonstration 
project was discontinued mid-stream after the US Department of Energy stopped 
funding due to substantial cost overruns (Rapier, 2008). 
 7  Examples of “natural” market niches include the ﬁ rst applications of PV in instru-
ments (calculators) and toys in the Japanese electronics industry that did not need 
any public policy support and incentives, see the  Solar PV case study in  Appendix II . 
For an example of “created” niche markets, consider the case of Switzerland, where 
regulation requires electricity back-up systems for all public and technological infra-
structures. This has created niche markets for microturbines and fuel cell applications 
for onsite electricity generation in hospitals, supermarkets, or cell phone towers. 
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system becomes large and developed enough for technology diffusion 
to take place during a “growth phase” (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). 
 24.2.1.3  The Energy Technology Innovation System (ETIS): 
What is it? Why is it needed? 
 ETIS is the application of this systemic perspective on innovation to 
energy technologies. In terms of the innovation system, this means 
the synthesis and analysis of data on the various stages of the inno-
vation process; on different inputs, outputs and outcomes; on actors 
and institutions; and on the key innovation processes. In terms of the 
energy system, this means the synthesis and analysis of data on both 
the energy supply side and the energy demand side; on different energy 
technologies; and on both developed and developing countries. ETIS is 
thus an integrative approach that aims to comprehensively cover all 
the components of energy technology innovation systems, in terms of 
innovations, mechanisms of change and supporting policies, and energy 
technologies (supply and end-use), as well as in terms of geographical 
and actor network coverage. 
 Why is such a systemic approach needed? The GEA sets out clearly the 
magnitude of the challenge facing the global energy system. The GEA 
transition pathways – described in  Chapter 17 – illustrate that a sub-
stantive and pervasive technological transformation in energy systems 
towards vastly improved efficiency and decarbonization is needed. This 
holds regardless of the ongoing debate over whether it is possible to 
improve existing technologies incrementally, with the primary challenge 
one of diffusion (Pacala and Socolow, 2004), or whether breakthroughs 
with radically new technologies are needed with the main challenge 
being basic and applied research (Hoffert et al., 2002; Hoffert, 2010). 
 It is the magnitude of the challenge that most clearly points to the need 
for a systemic perspective rather than a piecemeal approach focused 
on particular technologies (e.g., PV or CCS) or particular drivers (R&D 
or feed-in tariffs). This is fully supported by the accumulating body of 
knowledge on innovation processes and innovation histories, both 
successful and failed. New research carried out for this chapter adds 
to these findings. All point to the interrelationships and dependencies 
within effectively functioning innovation systems. This too necessitates 
a systemic approach. 
 ETIS has certain key characteristics which emerge repeatedly through 
the literature and are worth emphasizing. These include interdepend-
ence, uncertainty, complexity, and inertia. Interdependence means that 
different components of ETIS influence one another; moreover, the 
strength and direction of these influences may change. The outcomes 
of the innovation process are irreducibly uncertain, and it is  not pos-
sible to ensure  ex ante success for technology A if recipe B is followed. 
Complexity arises inevitably from the number and variety of innovation 
system components and their shifting interdependencies. This is fur-
ther exacerbated by context-dependence in the application of the ETIS 
framework to specific energy technologies. Inertia also arises from 
interdependencies, and is exacerbated by the long-lived capital stock 
and infrastructures in the energy system, as discussed above. 
 From these characteristics follow certain key implications for efforts 
to intervene in ETIS to support its effective functioning. Again, these 
emerge repeatedly in the literature and include coherence, alignment, 
consistency, stability, and integration. “Effective functioning” is used 
here in a qualitative sense. ETIS that demonstrate the full complement 
of drivers, mechanisms, actors, and institutions described in this chapter 
are more likely to be successful than ETIS that are lacking in one or more 
areas. Failure and success are not defined in absolute terms. Innovation 
system success could be interpreted most simply as widespread diffu-
sion of new technologies and practices and when innovation benefits 
outweigh costs (in a large societal context). This is the ultimate outcome 
of interest for innovation processes in the context of energy system 
transformation required by the GEA objectives. Conversely, innovation 
system failure can be dramatic, as in a technology which fails in the 
“valley of death,” or relative, as in a technology which diffuses slowly, 
to a low extent, or in a stop-start manner. 
 24.2.1.4  Strengths and Weaknesses of the ETIS Perspective 
 A systemic approach to innovation in an energy context is largely novel 
and challenges some established wisdoms. This is a recurring theme 
throughout  Chapter 24 and is explicitly noted in the final policy guidance 
section, which directly questions certain policy myths, and in the quan-
titative assessment of financial inputs into ETIS presented in  Appendix 
I . The systemic perspective necessitates an integrative analysis: from 
large-scale supply-side technologies to dispersed end-use technolo-
gies within the energy system and from early stage R&D through mar-
ket formation to diffusion activities. Conventional data collection and 
analysis (as well as the formation of public and commercial institutions) 
has tended to focus on one piece of this puzzle. This chapter’s compar-
ative assessment makes (within the limitations of available data) com-
mensurate what have to date largely been apples, oranges, pears, and 
peaches. Certain patterns emerge from this commensuration that have 
direct implications for the ETIS and its effective functioning. An example 
is an apparent mismatch between the target of innovation investments 
and the need for diffusion investments. This is explained and discussed 
at length below. Here, it suffices to note that the implications of the 
systemic perspective offer a challenge to prevailing practice and think-
ing. One example is the question of whether the technological, market, 
and institutional differences between the supply side and demand side 
of the energy system mean an integrative comparison is worthwhile or 
even meaningful. The ETIS perspective contends that it is, as the result-
ing insights are both important and potentially transformative. 
 Despite the strengths of the systemic perspective, its weaknesses and 
limitations should also be acknowledged. Though rich and detailed 
in certain areas, ETIS research is weaker in others, such as feedbacks 
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between components of innovation systems. Studying innovation 
from a systemic perspective in the energy domain is a relatively young 
endeavor, with an empirical bias toward national, sustainable, and 
supply-side energy technologies. Policy experiments and field experi-
ence are largely still ongoing, particularly in a Northern European 
context that, together with Japan, provides many of the innovation 
histories from which the ETIS framework has been inductively derived. 
Studies in developing countries are particularly lacking, although this 
assessment begins to fill the gap with specific case studies on R&D 
expenditures in emerging economies, energy technology innovation in 
China, and lessons from solar PV market deployment in rural Kenya. 
Data are partial, incommensurate, or otherwise limited, as discussed 
below in the context of assessing ETIS (see  Section 24.5.1 on data and 
information needs identified in this assessment). The understanding of 
mechanisms and linkages is incomplete. As a result, the ETIS perspec-
tive should not be interpreted as a full systemic dynamics model that 
can support quantitative modeling, simulation, or optimization. Rather, 
ETIS as developed in this chapter is a conceptual framework with the 
necessary generality to apply across the entire energy domain. 
 24.2.1.5  Empirical Basis of the ETIS Perspective 
 ETIS integrates current understanding of innovation processes within 
the energy system, their interlinkages, and the roles and influence of 
different actors and institutions including public policy. This systemic 
perspective is founded upon empirical work on technology histories 
such as wind power, processes such as learning, actor networks such 
as advocacy coalitions, social institutions such as expectations, and so 
on. This empirical work is covered in extensive literatures, which are 
referenced throughout the text. In addition, this chapter contributes 
a series of new empirical studies that are summarized in  Appendix II , 
published in full in a companion volume, and referenced throughout 
the text. These are also summarized in Tables 24.2, 24.3, and 24.4 
below and discussed further in the  Assessment Metrics case study, 
summarized in  Appendix II . 
 It is important to emphasize this empirical basis for the ETIS perspective. 
The various components of the ETIS described here characterize what is 
understood about successful innovation, as well as what may be missing 
 Table 24.2 |  Chapter 24 case studies (innovation histories): demand-side technologies. 
Short Name Summary Description Example of Relevance for ETIS
Chapter 
Section
Hybrid Cars Development of hybrid electric vehicles in Japan, United States, and 
China, emphasizing the role of public policy.





Early success and later failure of the solar water heater industry, 
particularly in the United States.
Lasting legacies of industry failure, including knowledge depreciation. 
Alignment of innovation system actors.
24.7.10
Heat Pumps Different stages of heat pump diffusion in Sweden and Switzerland, 
emphasizing the role of public policy.
Interactions between supply of, and demand for, innovation. Importance of 




The “CAFE” standard for vehicle efﬁ ciency in the United States, and its 
inﬂ uence on technological change.





The “Top Runner” program to improve end-use efﬁ ciencies in Japan, and 
the role of dynamic incentives.
 Flexible policies creating dynamic  incentives within a clear overall strategic 
direction. 
24.7.13
 Table 24.3 |  Case studies (innovation histories): supply-side technologies. 
Short Name Summary Description Example of Relevance for ETIS Chapter Section
Wind Power Evolution of innovation stages and strategies in different wind 
power markets worldwide.
Need to integrate RD&D support with market formation. Interaction 
and feedback between innovation actors.
24.7.14
Solar PV Development of solar PV in different markets worldwide, focusing 
on drivers of cost reduction.
Long-term R&D support complemented by market formation activities 
to stimulate commercial learning.
24.7.15
Kenyan PV Market dynamics in the solar PV market in Kenya, emphasizing 
product quality issues.
Local institutions to set and enforce standards for quality control and 
assurance.
24.7.16
Solar Thermal Early experience of solar thermal electricity in the US, and 
spillovers to later stage production.
Codiﬁ cation of knowledge. Interaction between R&D and learning to 
support cost reductions.
24.7.17
US Synfuels History of US government investment in synthetic fuel production 
as oil substitute, and ultimate innovation system “failure.”
Over-exuberant expectations in the context of changing market 
conditions. Public/private roles in innovation system.
24.7.18
French Nuclear Review of pressurized water reactor (PWR) program in France, 
including cost escalation.
Interaction between learning effects and institutions, including 
standards and regulatory stability. Limitations of learning paradigm in 
technology cost reductions.
24.7.19
Brazilian Ethanol History of ethanol production and developments in automotive 
technologies in Brazil, focusing on supporting role of policy.
Coalitions and shared expectations among innovation system actors, 
and interactions between related technologies.
24.7.20
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in cases of failed innovation. In this way, it should be treated as descrip-
tive, induced, and interpreted  ex post from available evidence; it should 
not be treated as normative. Partly for this reason, we use the ETIS per-
spective in the concluding section to abstract some general guidance for 
policy makers rather than offering more specific, universal prescriptions. 
As noted, the ETIS perspective is not sufficiently developed nor detailed 
to support a quantified system dynamics model. Nor is it necessarily 
appropriate to generate formalized, testable hypotheses which are rep-
licable in both form and method across different technologies and con-
texts. Clearly, further work is needed in this direction. Testing, critiquing, 
and improving the ETIS perspective is of critical importance, given the 
magnitude of transformation needed in the energy system as captured 
by the GEA. 
 24.2.2  Characteristics of ETIS (I): Knowledge 
 24.2.2.1  Sources and Generation of Knowledge 
 “The most fundamental resource in the modern economy is knowledge 
and, accordingly, the most important process is learning” (Lundvall, 1998). 
Knowledge is a ubiquitous and powerful driver of technological change. 
Technological knowledge can be basic (“know-why”) or applied (“know-
how”), as well as publicly available (e.g., through scientific or engineering 
journals) or entirely tacit (e.g., resting with accumulated experience of 
a production engineer in manufacturing). Understanding the process of 
generation, reproduction, and diffusion of knowledge and the constraints 
to knowledge flows is therefore critical for innovation policy. 
 Knowledge is generally largely a public good. Once produced and 
disclosed, it is difficult to control or restrict its use. For activities 
organized around reward systems based on reputation and primacy 
of discovery, like science, this poses less of a problem (Dasgupta and 
David, 1994). As more basic knowledge becomes integrated into 
technological solutions and into the realm of private production, the 
public aspect of knowledge which makes it expensive to generate, 
but cheap to reproduce, is generally classified as a source of mar-
ket failure. This results in underinvestment in knowledge production 
(Arrow,  1962a ). This is the traditional argument for encouraging pub-
lic sector support for the generation of basic knowledge and allowing 
knowledge appropriability of private R&D through systems of prop-
erty right protection. 
 Knowledge is generated at several different levels of innovation systems, 
through several distinct processes of knowledge exchange and trans-
formation within and between agents and institutions. It is, therefore, 
a powerful source of feedback, correction, and advance in innovation 
systems. Basic science is, of course, a strong component of innovation in 
energy systems (Ausubel and Marchetti, 1997) and the disciplines that 
support it are numerous. However, technical change in energy systems 
tends to be based dominantly in engineering practices and disciplines, 
and the origins of major innovations have often come from outside 
basic energy science proper. (The best historical example is the devel-
opment and application of steam engines much before the discovery 
of the Laws of Thermodynamics.) These specialized sources of know-
ledge outside classical basic science are crucial for energy technology 
innovation. Technology knowledge is also spawned during productive 
experience and a result of producer-user collaborations in technology 
development and of producer-producer collaborations in technology 
production at the manufacturing stages (von Hippel, 1988; Lundvall, 
1992; see also Fridlund, 2000 for a case study on user-producer learning 
in the electric power sector in Sweden). Experience in production and 
use, as well as knowledge exchange between different types of produ-
cers and users, are important sources of specific knowledge that cannot 
be generated by scientific research (i.e., cannot be predicted from gen-
eral principles or comparable technologies). This feedback process from 
 Table 24.4 |  Case studies (innovation processes and metrics). 
Short Name Summary Description Example of Relevance for ETIS Chapter Section
Grand Designs Review of patterns, drivers, and dynamics of energy systems, both 
historically and in future scenarios.
Knowledge spillovers and inter-dependence between innovations 
creating inertia and path dependence.
24.7.1
Scaling Dynamics Comparison of rates and extents of growth in 8 energy technologies 
historically.
Experimentation with small-scale units takes place during 




Tools to guide the selection of innovation portfolios under conditions 
of uncertainty.
Formal tools to support portfolio selection and diversiﬁ cation. 




Loss or obsolescence of knowledge, with examples in the context of 
energy innovation.
Importance of stable, sustained inputs to knowledge generation. 




Quantitative metrics and qualitative approaches for assessing 
innovation.
Assessment of inputs, outputs, or outcomes, but not typically 
innovation systems as a whole. Data limitations.
24.7.5
Chinese R&D Overview of R&D investments in China, with relevant institutions 
and mechanisms.
Substantive and growing R&D, dominated by industry but with 




Review of RD&D investments in 6 major emerging economies, by 
technology type and source.
Increasing importance of emerging economies in global energy 
technology innovation system. Supply-side technology emphasis.
24.7.7
Venture Capital Trends and targets of venture capital investments in energy 
technology innovation.
Rapidly growing venture capital investments in energy innovation. 
Non-fossil supply-side emphasis.
24.7.8
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application experience to redesign and engineering has been particu-
larly important in energy technologies (see the  Wind Power ,  Solar PV , 
and  Kenyan PV case studies summarized in  Appendix II ) and highlights 
the importance of market applications as main knowledge and learning 
feedbacks enhancing R&D efforts that require appropriate incentives 
beyond R&D. 
 Applied energy research and development on the supply side has been 
oriented and guided by four main sets of goals, or “focusing devices” 
(Rosenberg, 1982):
 harnessing new energy sources and carriers with special qualities  •
like energy density, abundance, transportability, but also flexibility, 
convertibility, and modularity; 
 increasing efficiency, both in thermodynamic as well as in economic  •
terms (cost reductions); 
 improving control, security, and stability of energy conversion and  •
delivery infrastructures; and 
 improving adverse social and environmental impacts of energy  •
systems. 
 Whereas the first three goals can be considered endogenous for the 
energy system, the goal of improved social and environmental perform-
ance has historically been triggered by regulation. R&D intensity (R&D 
expenditures per unit of value added) in the energy sector is strongly 
differentiated between energy supply (e.g., electric utilities) and energy 
demand (e.g., manufacturing of electricity using equipment such as TVs 
or computers) industries. At least in developed countries, energy supply 
industries have lower R&D intensity levels than the manufacturing aver-
age, similarly low as in the textile industry (see  Figure 24.3 ). Conversely, 
electrical machinery, transport equipment and motor vehicles exhibit 
higher than average R&D intensities, although no information is avail-
able to differentiate their R&D into energy- and non-energy-related 
components (e.g., more fuel efficient engines versus safety improve-
ments in motor vehicles). 
 24.2.2.2  Characteristics of Knowledge: 
Codiﬁ cation and Spillovers 
 Knowledge possesses a number of unique characteristics. It is  nonrival 
(the use of knowledge by someone does not preclude its uses by some-
one else);  nonexhaustible (can be used/reproduced without paying for 
an additional copy);  combinatorial (knowledge is combined from differ-
ent specific knowledge bases); and  cumulative (builds on pre-existing 
knowledge). These features of knowledge can generate very high social 
rates of return and call for minimizing or even eliminating access costs 
to knowledge if social welfare is to be maximized (Foray, 2004). Indeed, 
much knowledge relevant in an industry is routinely shared and used by 
private actors through nonmarket mechanisms, a phenomenon referred 
to as knowledge “spillover.” 
 Knowledge spillovers across sectors and across countries have been 
considered key engines of technological development and economic 
growth. The most salient sources of knowledge spillovers explored (e.g., 
Falvey et al., 2004) are universities and R&D centers; personnel train-
ing; scientific publications and patents; personnel movements, inter-
firm turnover; formal and informal networks of scientists, engineers, 
and technicians; licensing and technology transfer agreements; foreign 
direct investment; international research collaboration and research; 
reverse engineering, and international trade in final, intermediate, and 
capital goods. 
 The literature is vast and not free of controversies. In general, it has been 
shown that knowledge spillovers positively impact growth and product-






















































 Figure 24.3 |  R&D intensity (expenditures per value added, in percent) for selected sectors and OECD countries in 2002. Source: The OECD Research and Development 
Expenditure in Industry database and STAN Database. 
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geographical effects (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999). It has also been 
shown that the extent of international knowledge spillovers depends 
on national R&D efforts (Mancusi, 2008; Unel, 2008). Thus, knowledge 
spillovers depend critically on the assimilative capacity of the recipient 
country. There are very few studies focusing specifically on knowledge 
spillovers in the energy sector (an exception being Bosetti et al., 2008). 
Measuring knowledge spillovers poses many challenges, for knowledge 
is highly heterogeneous, unobservable, and difficult to define in quanti-
tative terms (Mohnen, 1997; van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1997). 
 However, there are other important barriers to learning and knowl-
edge advancement through spillovers, which are more relevant for 
innovation policy design. Knowledge implies more than simply infor-
mation such as data and formulas; it also implies the cognitive capa-
bility to interpret, process, and articulate information. Similarly, in 
order to understand a problem and make sense of knowledge pro-
duced elsewhere, firms require a minimum threshold of accumulated 
knowledge or absorptive capacity, derived from their direct involve-
ment in R&D, production experience, or training (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). In many cases, it has been shown that firms engage in R&D 
not only to produce new knowledge, but to be able to learn knowl-
edge produced elsewhere (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). In other words, 
enforcing knowledge appropriability (i.e., knowledge access) is insuf-
ficient for knowledge generation and learning (Foray, 2004). Policies 
are therefore also needed to further absorptive (assimilative) capacity 
to facilitate learning in firms, but also in the public sector and society 
at large. For energy technology innovation policy, this implies that an 
exclusive focus on technology transfer (knowledge appropriability) is 
entirely insufficient to guarantee technology diffusion, as the latter 
critically depends on sufficient local knowledge or assimilative capac-
ity. Local knowledge is needed to first decide which globally available 
technologies offer local diffusion potentials, which requires capacity 
building for technology assessment both in the public and private sec-
tors. Local knowledge is also needed to import/manufacture, adapt, 
install, and above all  use a new energy technology effectively (see 
e.g., the  French Nuclear case study, which illustrates the importance of 
local technological capability in the successful scaling up of imported 
reactor designs, or the  Kenyan PV case study as an illustration of the 
problems arising if local capacity for testing and evaluating technical 
characteristics [and defects] of imported PV cells are unavailable). 
 It also important to note that not all technological knowledge is 
embodied in artifacts or codified in blueprints, manuals, and sets 
of instructions; much knowledge remains tacit (uncodified) in the 
form of personal or institutional knowledge and skills. In this case, 
knowledge generation implies practicing and accumulation of experi-
ence (Nelson and Winter, 1982), which needs to be achieved locally 
and cannot be substituted by “imports.” Generally, new knowledge 
tends to be less codified and articulated, which makes it more dif-
ficult to reproduce, memorize, recombine, and learn, which in turn 
makes it costly to transfer in a usable form (von Hippel, 1994). For 
new energy technologies, this implies above all a need to develop a 
local industrial base (either in manufacturing or in using/marketing 
a new technology) and to promote partnerships that can further the 
transfer of tacit knowledge. For example, the  Wind Power case study 
illustrates the importance of public testing facilities for new wind 
turbine designs that furthered localized learning and tacit knowledge 
transfer among firms. 
 Knowledge is also highly dependent on local conditions and environ-
ments and on market structures, and therefore tends to be dispersed by 
the division of labor and specialization, which raises difficult coordina-
tion and communication problems (Machlup, 1984; Smith, 2002). The 
public sector therefore has an important role to play in furthering formal 
or informal coordination mechanisms, e.g., technology development 
“roadmaps,” 8 and setting dynamic technology performance standards 
(see the Top Runner program described in the  Japanese Efficiency case 
study). 
 Lastly, knowledge can depreciate rapidly if it is not continuously replen-
ished. This depreciation occurs through personnel turnover and retire-
ment, technological obsolescence, and institutional inertia (see  Section 
24.2.2.4 ). 
 For all these reasons, knowledge cannot simply be assumed to generate 
automatic “spillover” effects. A (local) enabling learning environment 
is as important, as is the generation of knowledge (elsewhere) in the 
first place. 
 The nature of spillovers also depends on the type of knowledge, on 
the type of industry, and, finally, on the life cycle stage of a technol-
ogy. In the early phases of the technology life cycle, disembodied 
knowledge tends to be predominant. As learning experience accumu-
lates, 9 underlying phenomena are better understood and measured, 
practices and procedures become increasingly codified, and hard-
ware is adapted and developed. The more codified and embodied 
(in artifacts) technological knowledge is, the easier it is to capture 
spillovers. 
 Empirical studies have shown evidence on the importance of know-
ledge spillovers in new energy technologies, particularly in the cases 
of PV (Watanabe et al., 2002) and wind energy (Kamp et al., 2004; 
Lako, 2004). 
 In Watanabe et al. (2002), a virtuous cycle between R&D, know-
ledge spillovers, market growth, and price reduction is thoroughly 
illustrated for the case of the Japanese PV industry. By stimulating 
public and private R&D on a broad base of industrial sectors and 
by simultaneously creating incentives for niche market deployment, 
 8  Successful examples of technology roadmaps can be found especially in the semi-
conductor industry. 
 9  The concept of learning via knowledge spillovers is sometimes referred to as “learn-
ing-by-interacting” (Lundvall, 1992). 
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the Japanese Sunshine Program triggered a range of mutually enhan-
cing positive feedback mechanisms. The technology knowledge stock 
increased rapidly both from proprietary R&D and knowledge spill-
over effects among Japanese PV R&D and manufacturing firms (even 
after accounting for knowledge depreciation). Next to innovation, 
learning contributed to important cost reductions in PV cells, which 
further induced increases in demand and production; market growth 
in turn further increased R&D expenditures, closing a positive feed-
back loop between knowledge generation and market development. 
As shown in the  Solar PV case study, PVs also benefited importantly 
from inter-industry learning spillovers and scale economies, among 
other factors. The  Wind Power case study confirms this conclusion: 
knowledge spillovers have been important sources of innovation and 
design improvements, including knowledge spillovers between indus-
tries (materials, aerodynamic simulations, and designs) and between 
manufacturers nationally (facilitated by testing stations), as well as 
internationally. Denmark’s success involved not just R&D, but also 
the facilitation of feedback between users and producers of wind 
turbines (Garud and Karnoe, 2003). This positive feedback process, 
based upon inter- and intra-firm knowledge spillovers in which learn-
ing and absorptive capacity production are mutually reinforced, can 
potentially augment an industry’s capability of knowledge production 
(Foray, 2004). The  Solar Thermal case study shows how interactions 
between researchers and firms commercializing technologies create 
feedbacks so that real world problems can stimulate improvements 
in design. This “learning-by-doing” can be more important for tech-
nology development than R&D, and is discussed further below. The 
 Kenyan PV case study shows how interactions between firms and 
users are important to communicate how users adapt technologies 
into their daily practices, thereby revealing potential quality and 
technology problems that in turn form the basis for further design 
improvements. 
 24.2.2.3  Knowledge Creation through Learning-by-Doing 
and Learning-by-Using 
 Processes of learning are essential for the development and intro-
duction of new technologies and comprise a complex set of actors 
( who ) and processes ( what and  how ). Learning results in improved 
and standardized production processes and products, which in turn 
can often result in cost reductions. In order to highlight that learn-
ing processes require dedicated efforts rather than just the passage 
of time, resulting cost reductions are often illustrated by so-called 
“learning curves,” i.e., curves that describe the cost development as a 
function of cumulative production (as a proxy for learning). 10 In reality 
however, it is not the act of production per se that provides a source 
of learning but rather a complex set of interrelated processes that 
include learning at the individual and organizational scale, classical 
economies of scale in manufacturing, knowledge spillovers, market 
conditions and structure (e.g., raw material prices, degree of compe-
tition), etc. Common to all is that they exercise their impact on costs 
and cost reductions via accumulated production/market deployment 
and/or growing industry size. 
 The learning curve originates from observations that workers in 
manufacturing plants became more efficient as they produced more 
units (Wright, 1936; Alchian, 1963; Rapping, 1965). The roots of these 
microlevel observations can be traced back to early economic theo-
ries about the importance of the relationship between specialization 
and trade, which were based in part on individuals developing exper-
tise over time (Smith, 1776). Drawing on the concept of learning in 
psychological theory, Arrow ( 1962b ) formalized a model explaining 
technical change as a function of learning derived from the accumu-
lation of experiences in production: Arrow’s “learning by doing” (LbD) 
model. Accumulating experience in the early stages of an innovation’s 
life cycle can be a powerful strategy both for maximizing the profit-
ability of firms (BCG, 1972) and for the societal benefits of technology-
related public policy. 
 In its original conception, the learning curve referred to the changes 
in the productivity of labor that were enabled by the experience of 
cumulative production within a manufacturing plant. It has since 
been refined. For example, Bahk and Gort (1993) make the distinction 
between “labor learning,” “capital learning,” and “organizational 
learning.” Subsequently, the Arrow model was complemented by an 
analogous concept, that of “learning by using” (LbU), referring to 
learning effects from the perspective of technology users (e.g., plant 
and equipment operators or consumers as opposed to technology 
producers). 
 Often, the term “experience curve” is used in the literature to provide 
a more general formulation of the learning concept, including not just 
labor but all manufacturing costs (Conley, 1970) and aggregating entire 
industries rather than single plants (Dutton and Thomas, 1984) or entire 
technological “trajectories” rather than individual technology gen-
erations. Though somewhat different in scope, each of these concepts 
is based on Arrow’s explanation that “learning-by-doing” provides 
 10  In the functional form of: C t = C0 * X 
−ε  where the costs at  t are a function of the 
costs at  0 multiplied by the cumulative production volume X to the exponent of the 
so-called learning rate  ε . Thus a learning rate  ε =0.2 indicates a cost reduction by 
20% per doubling of cumulative production. A related concept used in the literature 
is the so-called progress ratio PR = [P 0 * (2X) 
−ε ]/[P 0 * X 
−ε ]=2 − ε . Hence a progress 
ratio of 0.8 (1- ε ) indicates that costs are at 0.8 of their original value after a doubling 
 of cumulative production. A speciﬁ c characteristic of learning curves is that costs are 
reduced by a constant percentage with each doubling of output. As the doubling of 
cumulative production is more rapid in the early phases of an industry compared to 
mature ones, cost reductions invariably are steeper in early industries and tend to 
decline with increasing maturity as the doubling of cumulative production volume 
requires ever longer time. The observed cost reduction for different technologies 
analyzed in the literature covers a range up to 40% cost reductions for each doub-
ling of the total number of units produced (e.g., Argote and Epple, 1990). There are 
also well-documented cases in the aircraft and nuclear reactor industries that exhibit 
“negative” learning, i.e., costs increase rather than decrease with accumulated pro-
duction volumes. (See the  French Nuclear case study in  Appendix II .) 
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opportunities for cost reductions and quality improvements and the 
following discussion will therefore refer to this phenomenon simply as 
“learning” 11 or “learning curve.” 
 There have been a number of misconceptions about how to use and 
interpret learning curves (see Neij, 2004; Nemet, 2006) that have 
resulted in certain pitfalls in communicating with policy makers. For 
instance, a popular misinterpretation of learning (or experience) curves 
is that policies can simply “buy down” (e.g., Brennand, 2001) technol-
ogy costs through, for example, one-sided demand-pull policies without 
due regard to the equally needed supply-side technology innovation 
policy aspects. A second pitfall of cost “buy down” policy approaches 
is the assumption that the extent of possible “learning” can be  ex ante 
anticipated (i.e., “forecasted”), which evidently is not possible. Evidence 
from the descriptive case studies performed within  Chapter 24 is used to 
inform the general insights for policy design covered in  Section 24.4 . 
 Learning phenomena and curves are frequently evoked in cost trend 
analysis of nonstandardized products produced globally or nationally. 
The resulting uncertainties and variation in estimates/projections need, 
however, to be assessed critically (van der Zwaan and Seebregts, 2004). 
Variations in calculated learning (or experience) curve parameters as a 
function of different levels of spatial aggregation, observational period, 
or the use of price data as a proxy for cost information are examples 
of important uncertainties. Future prices may not only be reduced as a 
function of “learning,” but may also increase as a result of escalating 
input prices, quality improvements of the product, or lack of competition 
in quasi monopoly markets, especially under rapid demand growth. The 
example of wind turbines illustrates this point nicely. Whereas prices fell 
in line with the “learning curve concept” until the late 1990s, prices have 
risen since the early 2000s. A recent study reviewed cost estimates in off-
shore wind projects in the United Kingdom and found a real-term cost 
escalation of a factor of two since 2000 to some £3000/kW, or US$5000/
kW (UKERC, 2010). Similar trends have been observed in the VS as well 
(Bolinger and Wiser, 2012). The reasons for such cost escalation are var-
ied and include rising material prices, much larger wind turbines, and 
component supply bottlenecks, among others. It also appears that policy 
(favorable feed-in tariffs) stimulated rapidly increasing demand growth 
for wind turbines and enabled opportunistic pricing strategies of wind tur-
bine manufacturers. The rapidly growing demand led to significant supply 
bottlenecks, further reducing competition in this oligopolistic industry. 
 Secondly, the driving forces of the cost reductions remain unexplained 
by such aggregate analyses. In order to develop scenarios of possible 
future technology cost trends as a guide for policy, the sources of cost 
reduction must be identified and analyzed separately – be they charac-
teristics of innovations (radical or incremental), knowledge generation 
and spillovers, the importance of economies of scale effects, or other 
factors. Such detailed analyses are increasingly becoming available (see, 
e.g., Krawiec et al., 1980; Hall and Howell, 1985; Nemet, 2006; van den 
Wall Bake et al., 2009; see also the  Solar PV and the  Brazilian Ethanol 
case studies). 
 R&D investments or other sources of knowledge generation are now 
increasingly recognized as not being simple substitutes for the accumu-
lation of actual production experience (see the discussion in Halsn æ s 
et al., 2007). These two sources of technological learning are therefore 
more usefully conceptualized as complementary to each other. 
 24.2.2.4  Knowledge Depreciation 
 It is important to recognize that technological knowledge – like all 
knowledge – can be accumulated (learned) but equally lost (unlearned). 
Knowledge depreciation particularly affects settings in which knowledge 
remains largely tacit, residing in individuals or organizational entities 
(e.g., managers) and needs to be acquired again in case of staff turno-
ver or stop-and-go production schedules. A second type of depreciation 
occurs as old knowledge becomes obsolete. Knowledge can depreciate 
because of an insufficient “recharge” (Evenson, 2002) of knowledge 
in cases where innovation proceeds rapidly such that old technologi-
cal knowledge is no longer relevant for updated processes/techniques, 
but new learning cannot proceed quickly enough because of financial 
constraints. It is the latter type of unlearning that is of particular concern 
in energy technology innovation systems – when rapid rates of innova-
tions coincide with erratic funding and policy support, for which history 
provides ample examples. 
 Both knowledge gained from experience through market deployment and 
knowledge gained from R&D depreciate. The  Knowledge Depreciation 
case study ( Appendix II ) discusses the case of R&D knowledge depreci-
ation of nuclear power (and energy efficiency) R&D in the member coun-
tries of the International Energy Agency (IEA), but there is also evidence 
of nuclear knowledge depreciation beyond R&D, such as in the ability 
to construct nuclear power plants illustrated in the recent disappointing 
experiences (substantial costs and construction time overruns) at the 
two construction sites of the European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR). 
(See also the  French Nuclear case study.) 
 The particular vulnerability of tacit knowledge to depreciation implies 
that learning by doing is prone to especially high rates of knowledge 
depreciation, since experience in production is less likely to be codified 
than research and development activities and may thus be “unlearned” 
rather quickly. 
 11  Often the literature refers to “experience curves” to describe cost reductions in 
aggregate costs over entire industries and across a whole series of technological 
generations and thus includes the effects of product design changes and improve-
ments as well as manufacturing economies of scale in cost reductions, which were 
initially excluded in “learning curve” analyses (for a discussion of these two concepts 
see Nemet,  2009b ). However, this terminological distinction has not become stand-
ardized and aggregate cost reductions over entire industries continue to be referred 
as “learning curves” as well. To add to the confusion, the ensuing cost reductions 
of learning processes are also deﬁ ned differently in the literature, either as percent 
cost reductions per doubling of cumulative output (or manufactured units), or as the 
percent original costs remaining after a doubling of cumulative output (cf. the dis-
cussion in footnote 10). 
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 As an example of the first source of knowledge depreciation, it has long 
been recognized in the management literature that in service industries 
(e.g., pizza franchises) organizational and production knowledge can be 
lost quickly, especially under high rates of staff turnover (that may be up 
to 300%/year). Argote et al. (1990) and Darr et al. (1995) report know-
ledge depreciation rates of between 25–50% month in service indus-
tries. Such high rates of knowledge depreciation basically imply that 
after a year only between 0–5% of the original knowledge of an organ-
ization remains. Kim and Seo (2009) arrive at similarly high depreciation 
rates of some 26%/month in their analysis of Liberty ships manufac-
ture during World War II, even if earlier studies on the same case (e.g., 
Thompson, 2007) estimate much lower rates of 4–6%/month. 
 A classic technological un-learning case discussed in the literature is 
that of the Lockheed L1011 Tri-Star aircraft (Argote and Epple, 1990). 
The experience in aircraft industries suggests a significant reduction in 
manufacturing costs as more production experience (output volumes) 
is accumulated (learning by doing). The only exception seems to be the 
Lockheed Tri-Star aircraft. When production resumed after an extended 
production halt, manufacturing costs were much higher and also did 
not decline, reflecting lost experience or unlearning. The reason for 
this knowledge depreciation was basically the same as for pizza fran-
chises. During the production halt, the entire staff of the manufacturing 
plant was fired, including managers who, according to Michina (1992; 
1999), are the main locus of organizational learning and knowledge 
accumulation in aircraft manufacturing. Benkard (2000) reports corre-
sponding knowledge depreciation rates of typically 40%/year in aircraft 
manufacturing. 
 In innovation-intensive industries, estimates of knowledge depreciation 
are extremely limited. Hall (2007) provides one of the few comprehen-
sive efforts to estimate knowledge depreciation across various industry 
sectors, relating the market value of firms to patent data to estimate the 
R&D knowledge depreciation in six US industry sectors. Hall finds know-
ledge depreciation to vary significantly over time and across industries, 
with median R&D knowledge depreciation rates of between 15%/year 
(drugs and instruments) to 36%/year (electrical). Watanabe et al. (2002) 
provide one of the few estimates for energy technologies. By construct-
ing a knowledge stock model for the Japanese PV industry that includes 
both R&D by firms and knowledge spillovers from other firms (measured 
via patent citations), he estimates a mean PV knowledge depreciation 
rate of some 30%/year (Watanabe et al., 2002). This implies that with-
out continuous recharge (R&D), an existing technology knowledge stock 
is reduced to some 25% of the original value after five years and to 
less than 5% after 10 years. Nemet ( 2009a ) provides an illustration for 
the US wind turbine industry by analyzing a set of “highly cited” wind 
energy patents. He finds that 40% of all (cumulative) citations occur 
during the first five years, after which citations decline to basically zero 
after 25 years. This declining trend in patent citations after year five 
reflects their decreasing significance and can be used as a proxy for R&D 
knowledge depreciation, which corresponds to a rate of approximately 
10%/year after the fifth year. 
 The available literature thus suggests typical knowledge depreciation 
rates of 10–40%/year in industries comparable to energy (i.e., where 
innovation and R&D play a significant role). Given such high rates of 
obsolescence of technological innovation knowledge, continuous knowl-
edge recharge becomes extremely important. In case of erratic stop-
and-go policy support for knowledge generation, e.g., through R&D, 
knowledge depreciation rates can outweigh knowledge recharge rates, 
as discussed in the  Knowledge Depreciation case study for nuclear. The 
nature of knowledge generation support (stable versus erratic) is thus 
as important as the absolute levels of resources made available, which 
provides an important argument for stability and gradual expansion of 
inputs to ETIS over “crash” programs that may not be sustained over 
any significant time periods. 
 In their study of knowledge depreciation of professional services, Boone 
et al. (2008) conclude that the extremely low rates of knowledge depreci-
ation found in engineering design firms are explained by comprehensive 
knowledge documentation (earlier designs are documented and kept 
for subsequent use), as well as much lower staff turnover rates (3%), 
particularly among senior engineers. As such, the study provides valu-
able lessons for improved knowledge management in ETIS, highlight-
ing the importance of documentation, codification, and preservation of 
knowledge, as well as the need for a minimum degree of continuity in 
senior staff that are the living memory of organizations. 12 
 24.2.3  Characteristics of ETIS (II): Economies of 
Scale and Scope 
 A discussion of the sources of technological advance is not complete 
without reference to the rich body of literature on sources for cost 
improvements beyond product and process innovation and new know-
ledge application discussed above, including in particular economies of 
scale and economies of scope. While economies of scale are recognized 
as particularly powerful drivers in the historical evolution of energy 
industries such as electric power (e.g., Lee and Loftness, 1987) or petrol-
eum refining (Enos, 1962), economies of scope merit discussion here for 
their potential impact on future energy systems. 
 24.2.3.1  Economies of Scale 
 What are Economies of Scale? 
 Economies of scale describe reductions in average unit costs as out-
put or production increase over the long run, assuming all factors of 
 12  It is signiﬁ cant that private ﬁ rms practicing comprehensive reassignment (job-
 rotation) policies frequently lack any institutional memory of earlier corporate strat-
egies and corresponding innovation successes and failures. For instance, a group of 
managers at a major oil company attended a workshop with one of this chapter’s 
authors. At the workshop, these managers contemplated possible investment strat-
egies into renewables, entirely unaware that the company had invested previously in 
solar PV and biofuels and had already sold these activities. 
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production are variable. They are often conflated with technical returns 
to scale, which describe a more than proportional increase in output for 
a given increase in inputs. For examples, see  Table 24.5 . For further dis-
cussion and theory, see  Chapter 4 of Rosegger (1996). 
 Economies of scale can act at different levels (see  Table 24.5 ). Cost 
reductions associated with scaling at the unit level of a technology (e.g., 
size of wind turbines) or at the level of manufacturing plants (size/out-
put of a manufacturing plant producing wind turbines) are all important 
drivers of change in energy technologies. 
 Unit and Manufacturing Level Economies of Scale 
 Figure 24.4 illustrates the increasing unit scales of energy technologies 
over the twentieth century (for other graphical examples, see Smil, 1994; 
2008). The graph on the top shows average unit capacities; the one 
on the bottom shows unit scale frontiers (maximum size of units pro-
duced/installed) with characteristically concentrated periods of scaling 
up (note the log-scale y-axis on both graphs). Increases in unit scales 
have been a pervasive phenomenon for energy technologies throughout 
the twentieth century. 
 Observed increases in unit capacities of energy technologies are strongly 
linked to falling costs driven by economies of scale, particularly for large 
capacity energy supply and conversion technologies. For example, over 
a 50-year period, beginning with World War II, the average cost/unit 
output of a performance optimized fluid catalytic cracking unit in a US 
oil refinery fell by around 4%/year on a compounded basis (close to 
an absolute cost reduction by a factor of seven). These continuous cost 
improvements were driven by capital and labor productivity gains asso-
ciated with an order of magnitude increase in unit capacity from 15,000 
to 140,000 barrels/day (Enos, 1962). 
 Additional examples of unit-level economies of scale are presented in 
the  Solar PV, Solar Thermal, and  French Nuclear case studies. Distributed 
energy conversion and end-use technologies are more likely to be char-
acterized by manufacturing scale economies. The exemplar is the car, 
beginning with the Model T Ford produced from 1908–1927. Bywords 
of Fordist manufacturing include  specialization of machine tools,  rou-
tinization of labor tasks,  standardization of output, and sequencing of 
manufacturing along  assembly lines (Raff, 1991). These technical, pro-
cess, and organizational innovations allowed a scaling of manufacturing 
output from a single plant at Highland Park near Detroit, with remark-
able increases in labor productivity. In a 12-month period between 1913 
and 1914, the labor requirements for assembly of a single Model T fell 
from 12.5 to 1.5 man-hours. This, in turn, contributed to the price of a 
Model T falling by two-thirds over its 20-year production run (Ruttan, 
2001). 
 Further examples and discussion of manufacturing level economies of 
scale are presented in several of the case studies, including  Solar PV , 
 Hybrid Cars ,  Heat Pumps , and  Brazilian Ethanol . 
 Drivers of Economies and Diseconomies of Scale 
 Table 24.5 summarizes some common drivers of scale economies. The 
examples given above further emphasize the relationship between scale 
and technical efficiency (e.g., wind power), labor productivity (e.g., cars), 
and capital productivity (e.g., refineries). Demand growth and stand-
ardization are two other important factors. 
 Table 24.5 |  Economies of scale at different levels, using wind power as an example. 
 Level of 
 Scale Economy 
 Example of 
 Scale Economy 
Outcome of Scale Economy using Wind Power as an Example
unit level increases in wind turbine blade length and tower height
cf.  technical returns to scale : outputs increase proportionally more than 
inputs, e.g., inputs = f(area), outputs = f(volume)
ﬁ xed balance of system components spread
 lower $/MW for 
 larger MW wind turbines 
higher MWh/MW for larger MW wind turbines (no reference to costs)
lower $/MW for
 plant level 
 (also facility or installation level) 
over larger numbers of units operating larger MW wind farms
 manufacturing level 
 (also production level) 
capital productivity improved by spreading ﬁ xed input costs over higher 
output volumes
lower $/turbine for larger turbine manufacturing facilities
 organizational level 
 (also ﬁ rm level) 
 labor productivity improved by specialization; 
 lower cost volume purchases of capital equipment* 
lower $/MW or $/turbine for larger turbine manufacturers or wind farm 
developers
industry level political economic inﬂ uence (rent-seeking) securing, e.g., increased subsidy 
or price support*
lower cost or higher revenue as contribution of industry to GDP or job 
increases
 inter-industry level 
 (also external or system 
level)** 
 development of enabling infrastructure (e.g., distribution networks) and 
institutions (e.g., forward contracts); 
 development of complementary industries (e.g., materials or equipment 
suppliers) 
lower cost or higher revenue as share of total electricity production 
increases
 *Rosegger (1996) refers to these as “pecuniary” economies of scale, which are nontechnical and associated with input costs or output revenues. 
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 Figure 24.4 |  Increasing unit of scale of energy technologies, average (top) and scale frontier (bottom). Unit scales are expressed as MW capacities and plotted on 
log-scale y-axes. For details, see: Wilson, 2009. 
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 For energy technologies with perceived social benefits, consistent govern-
ment policies to support market demand are needed to underwrite the 
scaling up of unit and/or manufacturing capacities. Conversely, stop-start 
market-based policies undermine manufacturers’ confidence, increase the 
risk of investing in scaling up production, and ultimately can result in mar-
ket collapse. This is clearly demonstrated in the  Solar Thermal case study. 
 Alongside demand growth, technology standardization has proven 
important for manufacturing scale economies at the unit or plant levels. 
The more successful growth of nuclear power in France in comparison 
to the United States can be attributed in part to the standardization of 
reactor and plant design and to knowledge spillovers, both profiting 
from a well-tested US Westinghouse reactor design. Later in the French 
nuclear program, scaling of unit capacities from the standardized 900 
MW reactor to more bespoke or “Frenchified” 1300–1500 MW reactors 
led to marked cost increases (see the  French Nuclear case study). 
 These cost increases also demonstrate the possibilities of diseconomies 
of scale – not lower, but higher $/MW or $/MWh – associated with an 
increase in the complexity of designing, building, and operating inte-
grated technologies close to the unit scale frontier (Rosegger, 1996). For 
large-scale power plants in the late 1970s, complexity led to additional 
borrowing costs during the construction phase due to delays (Koomey 
and Hultman, 2007) and foregone revenues during the operating phase 
due to an increase in the frequency and duration of unforced outages 
(Ruttan, 2001; Lovins et al., 2002). Increasingly stringent health, safety, 
and environmental regulations also impacted larger scale plants more 
severely. The transition through the 1980s and 1990s from large-scale 
coal and nuclear power plants to smaller scale, more flexible and less 
capital-intensive natural gas-fired units (better suited for increasingly 
deregulated markets) illustrates well that the availability of economies 
of scale are contingent on both technical and market factors. 
 Isolating Economies of Scale as a Source of Cost Reduction 

















 with a scale factor less than one indicating economies of scale. A study 
of wind turbines in Germany during the 1990s found that a scale factor 
of 0.84 described the observed fall in wind turbine investment costs per 
MW installed capacity by 11% for a doubling of turbine size from 0.3 to 
0.6 MW, and by a further 18% for a subsequent unit size increase from 
0.6 to 1.5 MW (Grubler, 2010). 
 However, observed average cost reductions during the development and 
commercialization of an energy technology commonly conflate unit and 
manufacturing level scale economies as well as learning effects. Isolating 
the contribution of economies of scale at different levels, therefore, 
requires models that disaggregate the various influences on cost. 
 Econometric approaches typically use a Cobb-Douglas functional form 
(linear in log-transformed variables) to explain unit cost as a function 
of scale. Models fitted to data on coal power plants built in the United 
States from 1960–1980 showed that a doubling of unit scale reduced 
the cost per unit capacity by 12–24%, controlling for learning effects, 
compliance with environmental regulation, and changes in productivity 
and input prices (Joskow and Rose, 1985; McCabe, 1996). It is worth 
noting that the data period to which these models were fitted describes 
the rapid growth phase of unit scale during which unit scale economies 
might be expected to be most evident (see  Figure 24.4 above). 
 More sophisticated engineering models control for the effect of non-
scale related drivers of cost reductions over time. A good example is pre-
sented in the  Solar PV case study for the United States. Manufacturing 
scale economies were found to explain 43% of observed cost reduc-
tions in solar PV module cost ($/W peak ) between 1980 and 2001 (Nemet, 
2006). During this period, manufacturing plant output had scaled by 
two orders of magnitude, from 125 kW/year to 14 MW/year. 
 24.2.3.2  Economies of Scope 
 Whereas economies of scale describe the reduction in unit costs with 
increasing scale of production of a standardized good/commodity, 
economies of scope describe the reduction in unit costs that can be 
achieved by producing more products jointly as opposed to individually 
(see Panzar and Willig, 1975; Teece, 1980, for an exposition). 
 The traditional manufacturing economic literature draws the following 
contrast: whereas economies of scale describe production processes 
where the focus is on quantity and the emphasis is on reducing unit 
costs, the focus in economies of scope is on product variety. Economies 
of scope are realized through the effective sharing of knowledge, facil-
ities, equipment, and other inputs such as marketing and design ser-
vices. In addition, machinery and production processes were designed 
to facilitate and speed-up the process of change-over between products. 
Economies of scope can also be realized when there are cost savings 
arising from byproducts in the production process. 
 In the energy field, the literature on economies of scope is somewhat 
limited (examples include Mayo, 1984; Kwon and Yun, 2003; Farsi 
et al., 2008; Shum and Watanabe, 2008). A concept used to describe 
energy plants that reap economies of scope from the production of 
an array of multiple energy carriers is sometimes referred to as energy 
“combinates.” The prime example of economies of scope in energy are, 
therefore, cogeneration systems, i.e., the joint production of electricity 
and heat in power plants (combined heat and power [CHP] plants), 
where the waste heat can be used for heating purposes, e.g., via dis-
trict heating systems. More recently, such schemes also include district 
cooling systems, such as using steam generated in electricity plants to 
drive chillers and the distribution of chilled water for air conditioning 
purposes. 
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 A necessary condition for the realization of economies of scope in 
cogeneration systems are either an appropriate co-location of indus-
trial and end-use applications with energy conversion facilities or the 
possibility to interconnect these diverse users and energy uses through 
district heating/cooling pipeline systems. Given the usually large scale of 
electricity generating plants, such schemes are generally only economic-
ally viable if generation and demand are not too distantly located (e.g., 
cogeneration from power plants located within larger cities) or have a 
sufficiently high energy demand density to justify the high investment 
costs of heat pipeline systems. Conversely, the advent of decentral-
ized distributed energy systems can increase cogeneration potentials. 
Examples of applications include natural gas microgeneration (with 
waste heat recovery for heating of commercial and larger residential 
buildings and sales of electricity back to the grid), 13 or biomass gasifica-
tion coupled to gas engines for joint production of electricity and heat. 
 24.2.4  Characteristics of ETIS (III): Actors and 
Institutions 
 24.2.4.1  Introduction 
 Innovation processes take place within an environment that consists 
of actors and institutions (Edquist, 2001). Collectively, this makes up 
the innovation system at the heart of the ETIS perspective. Models of 
innovation typically highlight the various stages of innovation, and the 
interactions and feedback loops between these phases (see  Figure 24.2 
above). The systemic approach emphasizes that innovation is also a col-
lective activity involving many actors, and that innovation processes are 
influenced by their institutional settings and its corresponding incentive 
structures (Edquist and Johnson, 1997; Lundvall, 2007). 
 Institutions are not only organizations and formal structures like rules 
and regulations, but also established habits, practices, routines, and 
norms of the various actors within the system. In this sense, institutions 
can be seen as learned patterns of behavior and interaction, marked by 
the historical specificities of a particular system and moment in time. 
As such, their salience and strength may shift as conditions change. 
Learning and unlearning on the part of actors in the innovation sys-
tem are thus essential to the evolution of a system in response to new 
challenges. 
 There are many different actors and institutions in ETIS. Many have 
been covered in preceding sections. An example in the section on 
knowledge feedbacks and spillovers are the networks of interacting 
and cooperating innovation system actors that enable and mediate 
this knowledge exchange (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). Three 
examples not covered previously are considered below in more detail. 
These are entrepreneurs and experimentation, shared expectations, 
and advocacy coalitions. 
 Another key set of actors and institutions influencing the innovation 
system relate to public policy. Policies can reinforce or support broader 
institutional change within the innovation system with regard to 
learning, collaboration, risk taking, consumer preferences, and so on. 
While some measure of policy stability is necessary, adaptive policy 
making in response to feedback from policy dynamics (the interaction 
of policies and the traditional habits and practices of the actors) are 
important for stimulating innovation under conditions of uncertainty 
(Mytelka, 2000). 
 Policies to support market formation have proven important in encour-
aging renewable energy technologies through their early commerciali-
zation. Such policies might involve subsidies, tax incentives, regulated 
feed-in tariffs, procurement policies, minimum production quotas, and 
exemptions from regulation, among others (Raven, 2007). The  Wind 
Power case study shows the importance of early market creation efforts 
by the Danish government for small-scale wind turbines. The  Solar 
Thermal case study and the  Kenyan PV case study illustrate the impor-
tance of niche markets for building the capacity to construct, operate, 
maintain, and assure quality control of a new technology. 
 The roles and importance of different actors and institutions varies 
between innovation systems, and also changes over the life cycle of 
an innovation. For example, a wide range of both public and private 
actors can be involved in mobilizing resources to support ETIS, and in 
developing their skills and competences as a result of this resource 
mobilization (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). Typically, as innovation 
systems increase in maturity, the importance of private actors increases 
(Suurs and Hekkert,  2009a ). Various case studies profile the changing 
importance of public and private actors. In the  US Synfuels case study, 
for example, a hybrid approach to public-private roles was ultimately 
undermined by how mobilized resources were used. 
 24.2.4.2  ETIS Actors and Institutions (I): Entrepreneurs 
 There is no such thing as an innovation system without entrepre-
neurs (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). Entrepreneurial risk-taking 
is essential to cope with the large uncertainties surrounding new 
combinations of technological knowledge, applications, and markets 
(Meijer and Hekkert, 2007). Above all, entrepreneurship is needed 
for bringing new technologies, products, and practices to markets. 
Experimentation is integral to the process of knowledge generation 
and learning described earlier, allowing for the evaluation of the 
reactions to new applications on the part of consumers, governments, 
competitors, and suppliers. The role of the entrepreneur is therefore 
to turn the potential of new knowledge, networks, and markets into 
concrete actions that both generate and take advantage of new busi-
ness opportunities. Entrepreneurs can either be new entrants who 
see new market opportunities (e.g., university spin-offs) or incum-
bents who diversify their business strategy to take advantage of new 
developments.  13  See for example, www.lichtblick.de/h/index.php. 
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 In most innovation processes, a period of variety creation driven by 
experimentation takes place before a dominant design emerges and 
is further developed. The  Wind Power case study shows how entrepre-
neurial experimentation led to a large variety of wind turbine designs 
from which the three-blade vertical axis turbine eventually emerged as 
the dominant design. The  Hybrid Cars case study shows the importance 
of entrepreneurial experimentation among Japanese car manufacturers 
for initiating the buildup of an innovation system. The  Scaling Dynamics 
case study emphasizes the importance of experimentation during the 
formative phases of many different energy technologies, whereas 
the  French Nuclear case study illustrates the consequences of “short-
 cutting” extended experimentation in the interest of rapid upscaling of 
a dominant technological design. 
 24.2.4.3  ETIS Actors and Institutions (II): Shared Expectations 
 Innovation is always characterized by uncertainty. The expected merits 
of a new technology in terms of performance or costs cannot be known 
 ex ante as being shaped by the agency at play in ETIS (R&D strate-
gies and funding levels, niche market developments, extent of possible 
learning effects, etc.) as well as by exogenous factors (such as oil prices, 
as illustrated in the  US Synfuels case study). Strategic decisions on the 
direction of the innovation process and the more promising technologi-
cal avenues can be important to sustain innovation system develop-
ment. Note, however, that trying to force technology development over 
short timeframes risks disappointing high initial expectations, as is dem-
onstrated in the  US Synfuels case study. 
 Shared or collective expectations are an important means of reducing 
uncertainty and stimulating entrepreneurial activity (van Lente and Rip, 
1998; Borup et al., 2006). This is clearly demonstrated by the  Solar PV 
case study. Shared expectations help guide the search of actors within 
the innovation system by selecting technological alternatives from the 
variety created by knowledge generation activities. As such this func-
tion is equivalent to the “visioning” step advanced in the technological 
transition literature (Smith and Stirling, 2010; see also  Chapter 16 for a 
more detailed discussion). 
 Guidance functions can be provided by a variety of actors, including 
individual firms, actor networks, or governments, as has been the case in 
Japan (see  Japanese Efficiency case study). Policies can shape changing 
societal preferences to reflect public policy objectives like greenhouse 
gas emission reduction. The  Hybrid Cars case study clearly shows how 
zero-emission vehicle regulations and large-scale R&D programs affected 
the research direction of car manufacturers. The  Brazilian Ethanol case 
study shows that strong political leadership can be another important 
means of guiding the search within an innovation system. Long-term 
technology roadmaps are another important means of establishing 
shared technological innovation expectations, as are credible long-term 
policy signals – for instance, in the form of pollution (e.g., carbon) taxes 
that rise over time at pre-announced, predictable rates. 
 24.2.4.4  ETIS Actors and Institutions (III): Advocacy Coalitions 
 New energy technologies face resistance from actors with interests 
vested in incumbent systems. To build up an innovation system, actors – 
usually from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and industry – 
must counteract this inertia through, for example, political lobbying 
and building advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1987; Sabatier, 1988). Public 
institutions may also contribute (Fligstein, 1997), as in the case of plan-
ning agencies advising regional or national governments to develop sup-
porting policies for emerging technologies. In all such cases, innovation 
system actors try to convince other actors to take particular actions that 
they cannot conduct themselves. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized 
that incumbent technology systems often have great lobbying power to 
resist changes. 
 24.2.5  Changing Dynamics Over Time in Effectively 
Functioning ETIS 
 Researchers in the “functions of innovation systems” tradition have 
identified seven key processes in emerging innovation systems that 
are needed for a successful maturation through the formative phase 
(Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Bergek et al., 2008). These key processes 
interact strongly and all can potentially be supported by policy mak-
ers. Although networks between actors in an energy innovation system 
tend to be international, national policies can strongly influence how 
the formative phase in specific countries occurs.  Table 24.6 summarizes 
the seven key processes and references the earlier sections in which 
they were discussed. 
 Positive interactions and feedbacks between the key processes shown 
in  Table 24.6 are integral for the successful build up of an innovation 
system (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004; Hillman et al., 2008). These posi-
tive feedback loops are referred to as “motors of innovation” (Suurs and 
Hekkert,  2009b ). 
 In the first phase of innovation system development, a “science and 
technology push motor” is characterized by knowledge development 
and the creation of positive expectations about the new technol-
ogy by scientists and engineers to help guide the search and stimu-
late funding that supports further knowledge development in and 
beyond R&D. 
 The science and technology push motor can turn into an “entrepre-
neurial motor” if entrepreneurial experimentation leads to knowledge 
exchange between the entrepreneurs and the research community. 
Next, a “system building motor” involves a wide range of actors 
involved in the development and production of a technology lobbying 
for market formation and an alignment of institutional structures with 
the needs of the new technology. If successful, this collective activ-
ity can overcome the resistance to change of incumbent actors with 
vested interests. 
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 Finally, a “market motor” may emerge once market formation has taken 
place and a technology has started to diffuse with a concomitant build 
up of production capacity. Overcoming resistance to change and guid-
ance of the search now become less important. The succession of these 
four motors of innovation is represented stylistically in  Figure 24.5 (bot-
tom panel), alongside the S-shaped curve describing a technology’s life 
cycle (top panel). The build up of the innovation system can be measured 
in terms of the number of actors involved, the extent and complexity of 
the networks between these actors, and the specific institutions aligned 
with the innovation. However, such indicators are specific to individ-
ual technologies and innovation system contexts and cannot be gen-
eralized.  Figure 24.5 shows how the innovation processes (represented 
as circles) and the interactions between them (represented as arrows) 
increase through the formative phase prior to the technology’s diffusion 
into the market (Phases I-II). As market diffusion accelerates (Phase III), 
the innovation system grows to its maximum (Phase IV). 
 24.3  Assessing Energy Technology 
Innovation Systems 
 24.3.1  Introduction 
 There is no uniform simple metric to describe ETIS in terms of commen-
surate measures of needed inputs and corresponding system outputs. 
Unlike in macroeconomics, it is not possible to develop a simple pro-
duction function of ETIS. The  Assessment Metrics case study reviews in 
detail the literature on innovation metrics from which  Chapter 24 draws 
to structure this section. 
 In terms of assessing the inputs to ETIS,  Section 24.3.2 (see also 
 Appendix I ) provides a comprehensive overview of ETIS in terms of cur-
rent (as of 2005) investments into energy technologies across the entire 
life cycle phases of ETIS, from knowledge generation to market forma-
tion (niche market investments), to technology diffusion (in both energy 
supply and end-use technologies). The choice of this metric arises from 
three considerations:
  • Novelty : Such an overview assessment has to date been absent in 
the literature, which invariably has focused only on pieces of the 
entire system, like public energy R&D expenditures, or investments 
into renewables. 
  • Commensurability : The metric needs to be comparable across all 
technologies, across all ETIS activities/processes, and across differ-
ent sectors and markets (regions); hence the use of the US dollar as 
a core metric. 
  • Centrality : Investments are a central element of ETIS, constitut-
ing a core input to knowledge generation and any embodiment 
of technological change. They are a key process in ETIS (resource 
mobilization) and also constitute an important constraint for ETIS 
in their own right. 
 Figure 24.5 |  Stylized life cycle of a new technology over time (Phases I to IV, top) 
and corresponding build up of the technology’s innovation system and the seven key 
processes involved (circles) and their interactions (arrows) (bottom). See Table 24.6 
for a deﬁ nition of the key processes. 
 Table 24.6 |  Seven key processes in innovation systems. 
# Key Process Summary Description  Relevant Sections in  Chapter 24 
1 Entrepreneurial experimentation Taking risks, creating variety, “ﬁ eld” testing, developing 
business opportunities.
Knowledge Generation; Learning; Actors (Entrepreneurs)
2 Knowledge development and 
exchange in networks
Generating and sharing knowledge to improve performance, 
learn from experience, etc.
Knowledge Generation; Knowledge Spillovers; Learning; Actors 
(Exchange)
3 Guidance of the search Strategic directioning of the innovation process to reduce 
uncertainty.
Economies of Scale and Scope; Institutions (Expectations)
4 Market formation Creating, protecting or supporting niches for innovations to 
enter the market.
Innovation Models;Niche Markets
5 Resource mobilization Allocating ﬁ nancial, material and human capital to the 
innovation process.
Economies of Scale and Scope; Metrics and Assessment
6 Counteract resistance to change Overcoming systemic inertia and vested interests. Actors (Advocacy)
7 Materialization Building up production or manufacturing capacity. Innovation Models; Economies of Scale; Metrics and Assessment
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 The adoption of a single metric to assess current inputs into ETIS does 
not suggest that readers should ignore the multidimensionality of met-
rics proposed in the literature on ETIS (see the  Assessment Metrics 
case study) but rather to allow to put the relative weight of different 
stages of ETIS and currently revealed preferences (in terms of resource 
mobilization) into a quantitative perspective. As such,  Section 24.3.2 
also provides a baseline against which the needed redirection of ETIS 
investment flows as described by the GEA transition pathways scenarios 
( Chapter 17 ), for which these numbers served as important input, can be 
assessed (see in particular  Section 17.3.5 ). 
 The assessment in terms of outputs of ETIS is necessarily more eclectic 
and illustrative as there is no single common metric for describing techno-
logical change (the “output” of ETIS) across all technologies, life cycle 
stages, and markets.  Section 24.3.3 therefore provides salient illustra-
tive examples drawn from  Chapter 24 ’s case studies. The focus is on two 
core dynamic metrics: technology diffusion and costs, which evolve over 
time to illustrate both their dynamic nature as well as their mutual inter-
dependence. Falling costs drive expanding market applications which, in 
turn, provide yet further cost reductions, e.g., through economies of scale 
effects in manufacturing and learning (by doing and using) processes. 
 24.3.2  Quantitative Assessments of Inputs (Investments) 
 24.3.2.1  Introduction and Overview 
 This section attempts a first ever quantitative overview of financial 
resources that constitute a fundamental input to energy technology 
innovation in terms of required resource mobilization. Evidently, money 
is not the only resource that needs to be mobilized: the development 
of knowledge, skills, supporting institutional settings, etc. is important 
too. Financial investment data, however, are more readily available than 
other ETIS input, output, or outcome metrics. In addition, they are a 
useful tool for policy makers, as budgets are a key policy tool in govern-
ments and industry alike. Finally, even if the information provided below 
is still relatively scarce, investments in innovation give a sense of the 
scale of the energy innovation enterprise. 
 The key messages of this section are as follows. First, there are formida-
ble data problems associated with the need to describe energy technol-
ogy innovation, which highlights important areas of future research and 
renewed initiatives to provide better technology-specific data for informed 
policy choices. In addition, consideration of institutions needed to collect and 
share these data at the national and international levels is badly needed. 
 Second, this section illustrates the increasing scale of resource mobiliza-
tion across successive stages of ETIS, from research, development, and 
demonstration (~50 billion 14 ), to market formation investments (~150 
billion), and finally to the dominant diffusion investments (>1000 bil-
lion). If large-scale technological change is on the agenda, changes in 
the diffusion environment and associated incentives for technology 
adoption and diffusion – e.g., through changes in relative prices – are 
key in addition to developing improved technologies in the upstream 
stages of ETIS. 
 Third, this analysis reveals that the structure of current investments in 
ETIS is highly asymmetrical between the dominance of diffusion invest-
ments in energy end-use technologies, and their under-representation 
in the investments in the earlier stages of ETIS. In other words, this 
overview helps elucidate the relatively large support for supply-side 
technologies such as fossil fuels and nuclear energy in RD&D. This is dif-
ficult to reconcile with the energy innovation needed to respond to the 
multitude of challenges of current energy systems, ranging from energy 
access to energy security and climate change mitigation, all of which 
call for vastly improved energy end-use efficiency. 
 Fourth, six major emerging economies – Brazil, the Russian Federation, 
India, Mexico, China, and South Africa, known collectively as BRIMCS 
countries – now account for a significant fraction of global ETIS. 
However, significant regional imbalances, particularly in the support for 
energy RD&D, persist. The increasing globalization of ETIS in general and 
of energy technology RD&D in particular suggests that new mechanisms 
for international technology cooperation and coordination might be 
called for, which again raises the question of the need of an appropriate 
institutional (re)design, as existing institutions such as the IEA are lim-
ited in scope and membership (mostly oil-importing OECD countries). 
 Innovation inputs are quantified in this chapter by the associated 
financial resource mobilization per broad technology class and by 
stage of the technology life cycle. The definition of the innovation 
stage is straightforward, as characterized by RD&D expenditures, 
which are a well-defined expenditure category in macroeconomic and 
corporate accounts. The subsequent phase of market creation invest-
ments is defined by either relying on special funding mechanisms such 
as venture capital or special (government-induced) market incentives 
such as feed-in tariffs, production tax credits, and the like, but the 
definitional boundaries are necessarily more blurred. Finally, diffusion 
investments are those that represent commercialization of mature 
technologies and that need no special policy incentives to mobilize 
the required investment in markets. Evidently, all investments across 
the entire technology life cycle will always be influenced by the overall 
incentive environment, as characterized by relative prices, taxes, etc., 
i.e., by numerous nontechnology-specific policies. What differentiates 
market creation from diffusion investments is the degree to which 
investments rely on dedicated technology policy support for their early 
 14  R&D expenditures represent aggregates of national statistics, which are mostly avail-
able only in International $ (i.e., in PPP terms). When expressed in US$ (i.e. at market 
 exchange rates, MER), R&D expenditures would be lower by some $10 billion. As pri-
vate sector R&D is signiﬁ cantly underreported, a global order of magnitude estimate 
of $50 billion energy R&D can be considered commensurate with the subsequent 
niche market and diffusion investment numbers that are expressed in US$ (i.e., MER-
based). 
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market deployment. A tentative, albeit incomplete, attempt at a glo-
bal overview is provided in  Table 24.7 . Further details are provided at 
 Appendix I . 
 24.3.3  Case Study Assessments of Innovation Outputs 
 As part of this assessment,  Chapter 24 conducted 20 case studies. This 
section discusses the rationale for conducting these case studies, as well 
as the rationale for selecting this particular set of cases. All 20 assess 
the innovation system and are intended to complement the quantitative 
overview described above. The implications for understanding energy 
innovation and for public policy are described in  Sections 24.4.5 and 
 24.4.6 below. Some illustrative results from the assessment of innov-
ation processes that emerge from the case studies are included here as 
well (see  Section 24.3.3.3 ). Space limitations precluded the full pres-
entation of all case studies in this chapter; they are summarized in 
 Appendix II . The full case studies will be published separately quot are 
also reported on the GEA  Chapter 24 website. 15 
 24.3.3.1  Rationale and Logic of Case Studies 
 The rationale for conducting case studies arises from the need to comple-
ment quantitative evaluations with richer descriptive characterizations 
of innovation systems. This assessment uses evidence from descriptive 
case studies to further illustrate the general insights for policy design 
covered in  Section 24.4 . The complexities of the dynamics of the innov-
ation process are often ignored in quantitative models. While a growing 
body of work on quantitative evaluation improves understanding, their 
explanatory power has so far proven limited. 
 15  For more information, see www.globalenergyassessment.org. 
 Table 24.7 |  Summary of current global public and private ETIS investments (in billion US 2005 $) by stage and type of technology application (ﬁ rst order estimates and 
ranges from the literature). 
Innovation (RD&D) market formation diffusion
End-use & efﬁ ciency >>8 1) 5 8) 300–3500 15)
Fossil fuel supply >12 2) >>2 9) 200–550 16)
Nuclear >10 3) 0 10) 3–8 17)
Renewables >12 4) ~20 11) >20 18)
Electricity (Gen+T&D) >>1 5) ~100 12) 450–520 16)
Other* and unspeciﬁ ed >>4 6) <15 13) n.a.
 Total >50 7) <150 14) 1000–<5000 19)
 Notes: * hydrogen, fuel cells, other power & storage technologies, basic energy research 
 1) Public RD&D 1.8 billion (IEA, 2009a; BRIMCS case study); private RD&D >>6 billion (WEC, 2001; BRIMCS case study). 
 2) Public RD&D 2 billion (IEA, 2009a; BRIMCS case study); private RD&D: >10 billion (WEC, 2001; BRIMCS case study). 
 3) Public RD&D >6.2 billion (IEA, 2009a; BRIMCS case study); private RD&D >3.4 billion (WEC, 2001; BRIMCS case study). 
 4) Numbers also include renewable electricity. Public RD&D (excl. electricity): 2 billion (IEA, 2009a; BRIMCS case study); private RD&D (includes electricity): 7 billion. 
 5) Only public RD&D (IEA, 2009a; BRIMCS case study). 
 6) Only public RD&D (IEA, 2009a; BRIMCS case study). 
 7) Lower bound estimate (rounded number) 
 8)  NEF/SEFI, 2009 includes 2 billion asset ﬁ nance p.13, plus estimated 2 billion from venture capital (based on 15 billion total VC in 2008 and assuming category proportion in 
cumulative VC investments over the 2002–2008 period). 
 9)  Estimated 2 billion from venture capital only (based on 15 billion total VC in 2008 and assuming category proportion in cumulative VC investments over the 2002–2008 
period). 
 10) Classiﬁ ed as mature technology and reported under diffusion investments. 
 11)  Biomass and biofuels total of 24.8 billion (NEF/SEFI, 2009, p.13) minus 8 billion Brazilian ethanol (accounted for as diffusion investment) plus 2.4 billion estimated VC 
investments. 
 12) ~90 billion asset ﬁ nance (NEF/SEFI, 2009, p.13, including wind, solar, geothermal, marine and small hydro plus estimated ~8 billion from VC). 
 13) Unaccounted for technology categories. 
 14) Rounded number, estimated market formation investments ~140 billion derived from NEF/SEFI, 2009. 
 15)  Chapter 24 ﬁ rst order estimate, rounded numbers, cf.  Appendix I ; lower bound: central estimate of energy-using components of end-use investments (297 billion), upper bound: 
upper range of total end-use investments (3549 billion). 
 16) Source:  Table 24.5 in  Appendix I . 
 17) Estimate for 2–3 GW reactor completions per year (IAEA-PRIS, 2010) at assumed costs between 1500–2500 $/kW. 
 18) Source:  Table 24.5  Appendix I , fuels only. 
 19) Rounded numbers. 
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 Attempts to econometrically identify the effects of demand-pull and 
technology-push – e.g., Kouvaritakis et al. (2000); Watanabe et al. 
(2000); Miketa and Schrattenholzer (2004); Klaassen et al. (2005) – 
have provided limited claims in the available studies because of their 
sensitivity to assumptions about the depreciation of R&D knowledge 
stock and about the lags between policy signals and decisions to innov-
ate. Both of these parameters have proven difficult to estimate empir-
ically. Using the observation that most technologies tend to decline 
in cost over time, the notion of the “learning (or experience) curve” 
has been widely used to simulate the cost reductions that can be 
expected from programs that subsidize demand (Duke and Kammen, 
1999; Wene, 2000; IEA, 2008b). However, observed discontinuities in 
learning rates, perhaps resulting from omitted variable bias, limit their 
reliability. Moreover, large dispersion in observed learning rates, even 
including negative rates, complicates choices of which point estimates 
to apply (Nemet,  2009b ). 
 The relationship between R&D investments and technical change is 
even more difficult to model, in part due to the inherent stochasticity 
of the R&D process. One notable approach has been to measure the 
value of the commercialized projects that emerged from federal R&D 
programs (NRC, 2001). This cost-benefit valuation approach has been 
used to evaluate the US Department of Energy’s wind and PV R&D 
investments. Key shortcomings in this approach center on the assump-
tions needed to construct a counterfactual case in which one must 
characterize outcomes in the event that the R&D investment was not 
made. Prospectively, another approach common to R&D management 
has been employed in which decision analytic techniques are often 
used to obtain the necessarily subjective judgment of experts who 
are most familiar with the specific technologies (Peerenboom et al., 
1989; Sharpe and Keelin, 1998; Clemen and Kwit, 2001). A report by 
the National Research Council (NRC, 2007) recommends that the US 
Department of Energy adopt a process including expert elicitations. 
They provided prototype elicitations for carbon storage, a vehicle tech-
nologies program, and four other programs. Examples of such assess-
ments include studies of PVs and carbon capture (Baker et al., 2009). 
 More generally, quantitative assessments of innovation systems may be 
biased toward the selection of cases for which detailed data are avail-
able. This may explain the lack of empirical work on energy end-use 
technologies relative to supply technologies. Also, it may limit compari-
sons across countries, as there may be insufficient variables for compar-
ing the results of heterogeneous studies across countries. Finally, the 
reduction of the complex process of innovation to a few factors may 
omit important aspects of the system and contribute little in mechanis-
tically explaining causality. 
 The qualitative descriptions in case studies provide an avenue for 
incorporating explicit considerations of the innovation system’s com-
plexities and feedbacks, which would otherwise be ignored. It is 
important to note that generalizing from case studies is limited by the 
specifics of context and technical characteristics, which are described. 
Selection bias is also discussed. Policy conclusions take these limita-
tions into account. 
 24.3.3.2  Summary of Case Studies 
 The selection of case studies was based on the following criteria. 
First, in many cases the focus was on individual technologies. For 
these  technology-focused studies, technologies were selected that 
had a dynamic aspect – for example, technically, economically, or in 
terms of deployment. Second, many of the cases included a situation 
in which public policies played an important role in affecting the pro-
cess of innovation and diffusion. The case studies were particularly 
interested in describing the activities of governments. Third, to the 
extent that data availability allowed, an effort was made to include 
international diversity and include cross-country comparisons. Fourth, 
care was taken to also include from the available case studies illus-
trations of innovation failures or imperfections (e.g.,  US Synfuels , 
 Solar Thermal , or  French Nuclear ). Finally, some case studies were 
conducted because they illustrate specific attributes of the innovation 
system, as described above. In selecting studies under this criterion, 
a special effort was made to evaluate ETIS characteristics that are 
poorly explained in the literature (e.g.,  Knowledge Depreciation or 
 Scaling Dynamics ). 
 This chapter’s assessment includes 20 case studies, which can be cat-
egorized in several ways ( Table 24.8 ). Six of the case studies expli-
citly address innovation in developing countries. Fifteen include some 
assessment of government actions affecting the innovation system. At 
least 12 include a discussion of knowledge feedbacks in the innovation 
system – or in some cases, the lack of feedbacks. The case studies can 
also be categorized by whether they were conducted in order to illus-
trate a particular aspect of the innovation process described above, 
or whether they were focused on evaluating the innovation system 
for a particular technology. The latter category was divided into cases 
that examined end-use technologies and those that examined supply-
side technologies. Emphasis was placed on achieving a rough balance 
between these two technologies to address the exceptionally weak 
empirical basis for understanding innovation in end-use technologies. 
 Table 24.8 categorizes the 20 case studies as (1) illustrations of spe-
cific characteristics of innovation systems; (2) energy end-use tech-
nologies; and (3) energy supply technologies. 
 24.3.3.3  Illustrative Examples of Innovation Outputs from 
Case Studies 
 Six examples illustrate the types of work that can be used to evalu-
ate the outcomes of the innovations process, particularly in response 
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to public policy. Common to all is the adoption of the perspective 
of technology diffusion, as well as costs. In terms of ETIS outputs, 
the dynamics of widening market applications, as well as costs and 
their interdependence, serve as core metrics in these six illustrative 
examples. 
 Figure 24.6 illustrates one possible outcome of ETIS in terms of acceler-
ated diffusion of new energy technologies in later adopting regions via 
spillover and learning effects ( Scaling Dynamics case study). 
 Figure 24.7 illustrates the response to policy, in this case the introduction 
of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard in the United 
States, in terms of diffusion of the induced technological innovations in 
the automotive sector ( US Vehicle Efficiency case study). 
 Figure 24.8 illustrates the components in cost reductions of sugarcane 
production in the Brazilian ethanol industry as a twin example of an 
analytical opening up the “black box” of technology cost improve-
ments and an example of technology responsiveness to an exemplary 
decades-long sustained public policy effort ( Brazilian Ethanol case 
study). 
 Figure 24.9 shows cost reductions and technical improvements in early 
solar thermal electricity generation in the United States, from 1982–
1992. A virtuous cycle (i.e., a positive, self-reinforcing feedback loop) 
of unfolding of ETIS came abruptly to an end with the discontinuation 
of policy support, illustrating the pitfalls of erratic policies and the key 
importance of continuous policy support ( Solar Thermal case study). 
 Figure 24.10 shows the declining cost of PV associated with the Japanese 
subsidy program from 1994–2004 and provides the positive example of 
the responsiveness of ETIS outputs to a sustained and predictable policy 
environment ( Solar PV case study). 
 Finally,  Figure 24.11 summarizes the cost trends of non-fossil energy 
technologies analyzed in the  Chapter 24 case studies. These data have 
been updated with most recent cost trends (2010) available in the lit-
erature for PV Si Modules (IPCC SRREN, 2011) and US onshore wind 
turbines (Wiser and Bolinger, 2011). Note that the summary illustrates 
comparative cost trends only and is not suitable for direct economic 
comparison of different energy technologies due to important differ-
ences between the economics of technology components (e.g., PV mod-
ules or heat pumps [only]) versus total systems installed, cost versus 
 Table 24.8 |  Innovation case studies conducted for  Chapter 24 . 





 1. Illustrations of Speciﬁ c Characteristics of  Innovation Systems 
Grand Designs 24.7.1 Grand Designs: Historical Patterns and Future Scenarios of Energy Technological Change  √ 
Scaling Dynamics 24.7.2 Historical Scaling Dynamics of Energy Technologies  √ 
Technology Portfolios 24.7.3 Technology Portfolios  √ 
Knowledge Depreciation 24.7.4 Knowledge Depreciation  √ 
Assessment Metrics 24.7.5 Metrics for Assessing Energy Technology Innovation  √  √ 
Chinese R&D 24.7.6 China Energy Technology Innovation Landscape  √  √ 
Emerging Economies R&D 24.7.7 Energy R&D in Emerging Economies (BRIMCS)  √  √ 
Venture Capital 24.7.8 Venture Capital Investments in the Energy Industry  √ 
 2. Energy End-use Technologies 
Hybrid Cars 24.7.9 Hybrid Cars  √  √ 
Solar Water Heaters 24.7.10 Solar Water Heaters  √  √ 
Heat Pumps 24.7.11 Heat Pumps  √ 
US Vehicle Efﬁ ciency 24.7.12 Role of Standards – Example: CAFE  √ 
Japanese Efﬁ ciency 24.7.13 Role of Standards – Example: Japanese Top Runner Program  √ 
 3. Energy Supply Technologies 
Wind Power 24.7.14 Comparative Assessment of Wind Turbine Innovation and Diffusion Policies  √ 
Solar PV 24.7.15 Comparative Assessment of PV (European Union, Japan, United States)  √ 
Kenyan PV 24.7.16 Solar Innovation and Market Feedbacks: Solar Photovoltaics in Rural Kenya  √ 
Solar Thermal 24.7.17 Solar Thermal Electricity  √ 
US Synfuels 24.7.18 The US Synthetic Fuels Program  √ 
French Nuclear 24.7.19 French Pressurized Water Reactor Program  √ 
Brazilian Ethanol 24.7.20 Ethanol in Brazil  √  √ 
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price data, and also differences in load factors across technologies (e.g., 
nuclear’s electricity output per kW installed is between a factor three 
to five larger than that of PV or wind turbine systems). Despite a wide 
range in cost trend experiences across technologies, two important 
observations stand out: (1) there is a marked contrast between nuclear 
showing persistent cost escalation versus the other non-fossil tech-
nologies, that generally show declining costs/prices with accumulated 
market deployment experience. (2) Improvement trends are highly vari-
able across technologies and also over time. For some technologies (e.g. 
wind in the United States and Europe) historical cost improvements 
were temporarily reversed after the year 2003/2004 suggesting possible 
effects of ambitious demand-pull policies in the face of manufactur-
ing capacity constraints and rising profit margins that (along with ris-
ing commodity and raw material prices) have led to cost escalations in 
renewable energy technologies as well. 
 24.4  Energy Technology Innovation Policy 
 24.4.1  Public vs. Private Actors: Roles and Differences 
 There are a multitude of actors involved in ETIS that either can be dif-
ferentiated with respect to their role in a technology’s life cycle (tech-
nology research, development, or adoption, i.e., the supply of and the 
demand for technology innovation) or with respect to their nature as 
public or private sector institutions (governments, firms, associations), 
or individuals (entrepreneurs, consumers). Moreover, the innovation 
actor landscape that has traditionally be defined within a national con-
text is becoming increasingly globalized, considering the increasing 
role of multinational firms and direct foreign investments as sources 
of technological change, and the role of multilateral institutions (World 
Bank, GEF) and NGOs, which are increasingly involved in ETIS. 
 The role of these actors can vary considerably. A firm can be a devel-
oper of a particular technological innovation while at the same time 
an adopter for another innovation; their respective role as actors over 
a technology life cycle also changes. Actors are also extremely het-
erogeneous in terms of their technology knowledge and competence 
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 Figure 24.6 |  Diffusion rate or  Δ t – time to grow from 10–90% of installed cumula-
tive capacity – between innovating  Core regions and later adopting rim (graduated 
between  Rim1 and  Rim2 ) and  Periphery regions for a range of energy technologies 
(CFLs denoting compact ﬂ uorescent light bulbs). Note that the geographical diffusion 
categorization is based on technology adoption rates rather than country aggregates. 
Source: Wilson, 2009. 
 Figure 24.7 |  Diffusion of automotive technologies during implementation of US Fuel 
Efﬁ ciency (CAFE) standards. Source: Lutsey and Sperling, 2005. © National Academy 
of Sciences. Reproduced with permission of the Transportation Research Board. 
 Figure 24.8 |  Decomposition of cost components and their improvements for Brazilian 
ethanol (cane production only). Source: van den Wall Bake et al., 2009. 
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base and the resources they can mobilize for innovation (development 
or adoption), as well as in their characteristics (e.g., different discount 
rates applied to energy efficiency investments). 
 For the purpose of this chapter, the differentiation between public and 
private sector actors is of particular importance. Whereas private sec-
tor actors are the main actors of technological innovation in terms of 
performers of R&D, technology developers, and in manufacturing and 
marketing of technological innovation, they cannot influence associ-
ated (knowledge or environmental) externalities nor the incentive 
environment in which innovation takes place. This accords a special 
role to the public sector with respect to technology innovation policy 
and is reflected in traditional areas of public policy concern (see  Section 
24.4.2 ), including public R&D funding, incentives for private R&D, the 
setting of technology or environmental performance standards, and the 
general area of economic incentives for technology adoption (e.g., via 
taxes or subsidies). 
 Lastly, the literature on institutional innovation (e.g., Ruttan, 1996) is 
relevant here. Evolving institutional settings can be interpreted by them-
selves as forms of social “techniques” or innovation that can help to 
overcome knowledge asymmetries or split incentives that can hinder 
 Figure 24.9 |  Causal link model diagram for cost reductions and technical improvements in early solar thermal electricity generation in the United States, 1982–1992. Source: 
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 Figure 24.10 |  Japan subsidies and applications for rooftop PV systems versus aver-
age 3 kW module price. The 2005 data correspond to speciﬁ c investment costs of 
US 2005 $5816/kW and the 2.6 billion yen subsidy to US 2005 $23 million. Source: based 
on J ä ger-Waldau, 2006. 
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socially desirable technological innovation. For instance, energy ser-
vice companies (ESCOMs) are an example of an institutional innovation 
in the form of new actors who can assist households or public sector 
entities, like schools, in the adoption of energy efficiency innovation. 
 24.4.2  Rationale for Public Policy 
 When considering the rationale for investments in energy technology 
innovation (ETI), there are two main questions to be answered: why 
should anyone – the government or private companies – engage in ETI? 
And, what is the particular rationale for government policy and invest-
ments in ETI? 
 A private firm would endeavor to innovate in response to a perceived need 
in the marketplace or to create a new product to market to the world. 
Such profit-maximizing behavior is obvious and important because the 
global energy marketplace is indeed very large. The IEA estimates that 
investments in energy supply alone will cumulatively total US$22 trillion 
globally between 2006 and 2030 (IEA, 2007). Thriving businesses in the 
energy domain translates into economic development, economic growth, 
the maintenance and creation of jobs, high-technology domestic sales, and 
perhaps exports. ETI can also reduce the costs of delivering energy services 
to consumers, freeing them to save or spend money on other goods and 
services in the economy. An important question is whether or not the pri-
vate sector invests sufficiently in ETI, and unfortunately the data do not yet 
exist to answer that question satisfactorily. Companies are not required to 
disclose information about their investments, and even if they did, it would 
be difficult to determine what fraction of the private-sector expenditures 
by automobile companies and other manufacturers of energy-consuming 
goods can be counted as efforts to improve the energy efficiency of prod-
ucts. It is also hard to define energy technology. Information on private-
sector expenditures in the early-deployment phase is more readily available 
because venture capital (VC) and private equity investments, asset finance 
projects, and corporate finance deals are announced and tracked (e.g., 











Cumulative GW installed/sold 
Nuclear US: Average and Minimum/Maximum 1971-1996
Nuclear US: Single Reactor (No Range) 1971-1996
Nuclear France: Average  and Min/Max 1977-1999
Offshore Wind: All EU project prices 1999-2008
Onshore Wind Denmark: Average costs 1981-2009
Onshore Wind US: Capacity weighted average price 1984-2010
Solar PV Modules:  World average prices 1975-2007
PV Si Modules: World average prices (IPCC SRREN) 2003-2010
PV Systems US: Average installation price +/-SD 1998-2009
Heatpumps Switzerland: Average cost of 7.6 kW unit 1982-2008
Heatpumps Sweden: Average cost of 6.6-8.6 kW unit 1994-2008
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 Figure 24.11 |  Chapter 24 Case Studies summarized: Cost trends of selected non-fossil energy technologies (US 2005 $/KW installed capacity) versus cumulative deployment 
(cumulative GW installed). Source: Chapter 24 case studies. 
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 There are reasons to believe that the private sector probably under-
invests in ETI, both in comparison to historical R&D investment levels 
and in view of the social and environmental challenges related to the 
energy sector. First, what data exist indicate that investments are declin-
ing. According to one analysis of the US private sector using data from 
the National Science Foundation’s annual survey of companies, private 
sector ETI investments fell approximately 20% during 1994–2004. The 
US electricity sector’s R&D arm, the Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI), saw its budget decline by a factor of three during that time 
period (Nemet and Kammen, 2007). Also, companies are far more likely 
to invest in short-term RD&D projects that are likely to bear fruit in the 
near term than to invest in longer term, more fundamental R&D. This is 
especially true during times of broader economic turmoil or recession 
and energy price volatility. Such volatility leads to a “lumpy” pattern 
of investment on the part of the private sector, where big investments 
are followed by precipitous declines, and vice versa. Innovation requires 
sustained and steady “inputs” – people who are able to focus over 
the longer term on improving or inventing energy technologies, and 
adequate and stable resources to do so (Gallagher et al., 2006). 
 Turning to the particular rationales for government involvement in ETI, 
the first is to support, complement, and encourage the private sector’s 
efforts because a vibrant energy sector in any economy will contribute 
to economic growth and prosperity. Second, energy services are funda-
mental human needs, and improvement of those services can better the 
human condition. If innovation reduces the costs of those services, con-
sumer welfare and human well-being are improved. In poor countries, 
where millions still lack access to basic modern energy services provided 
by energy carriers such as like electricity, the government has an espe-
cially important role to play in developing appropriate technologies for 
rural energy users, and devising and implementing demonstration and 
deployment programs for better cookstoves, heating and building tech-
nologies, and so forth. 
 Government investment in ETI is also justified to make energy supply 
more reliable and secure; help the energy system emit fewer pollutants; 
and reduce the negative impacts of energy extraction, conversion, and 
use of water and land resources. In other words, market failures to pro-
tect the environment and enhance the security of a country help justify 
government involvement in the innovation process. 
 The last rationale for government policy for ETI is to overcome mar-
ket barriers. Incumbent energy technologies or systems tend to have 
institutions, infrastructures, and policies that support them, providing 
barriers to entry for new technologies (sometimes called lock-in or path-
dependence). There is also a famous valley of death between the inven-
tion phase of innovation and the deployment phase. This valley is really 
two valleys, because there are often difficulties moving from R&D to 
demonstration (which is expensive), and then again difficulties taking 
a proven technology to the marketplace during the early deployment 
phase. Governments can erect bridges across these valleys to reduce 
the barriers and speed the passage of these technologies from the lab 
to the market. In sum, policy can help push and pull advanced, cleaner, 
and more efficient technologies into the marketplace. 
 24.4.3  Models and Instruments of Policy 
 Policies for innovation can directly target the innovation process, sup-
port the innovation system, or unintentionally impact innovation while 
targeting an unrelated concern. 
 Direct policies for innovation vary according to their target and their 
timing during the innovation process. Policy is needed at each stage 
of this process (see the top of  Figure 24.12 for examples). The role of 
government is typically viewed as being most evident at the earliest 
stage of basic science and research. However, together with the private 
sector, governments are also engines of applied energy R&D. But gov-
ernments must also play an important role in leveraging private sector 
investment at the early commercialization stages by supporting demon-
stration activities (to reduce risks) and market formation (to underwrite 
demand). Finally, through regulations and other policies, including tax 
and fiscal policies, governments also strongly influence the diffusion of 
energy technologies. 
 There is often an intermediate stage between demonstration and dif-
fusion that can be considered a market formation or early deployment 
stage. Here, government can play a critical role because policies are 
often needed to create an initial market to ease the passage of new 
energy technologies into the marketplace. First-of-a-kind technologies 
are often more expensive, and governments can create niche markets 
through procurement and other policies (e.g., feed-in tariffs or tech-
nology portfolio standards) to create demand for advanced or cleaner 
 Figure 24.12 |  Overview of policies for innovation systems. 
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energy technologies. With this support, entrepreneurs can experiment 
and test the market. Technological learning occurs through experience. 
Even after the niche market has been exploited, policy intervention may 
be needed to broaden and deepen the market through the elimination of 
market hurdles, provision of information, tax incentives, or low- interest 
loans. At some point, a given technology becomes competitive in the 
marketplace, and the government can exit the market-formation stage. 
For new, cleaner energy technology to be competitive in the broader 
market, government policies are also needed to correct for market exter-
nalities and define the rules of the game (e.g., through a carbon tax). 
Because there are so many market distortions, technologies cannot be 
assumed to freely compete in the global marketplace. 
 The innovation process is situated within an overarching system com-
prised of the actors, institutions, and networks involved in develop-
ing and commercializing a technology (see  Section 24.2 for details). 
Innovation policies must therefore also target the smooth functioning 
of the innovation system (see bottom of  Figure 24.12 ). Although govern-
ment policy affects all stages of innovation, rarely do we see evidence of 
comprehensive government strategies to optimize the efficiency of the 
ETIS. Instead, government policies persistently aim at isolated compo-
nents of the system, such as support for R&D without regard to which 
policies are needed to maximize feedbacks in the system, or which 
market-formation policies will be needed if and when the technologies 
emerge in the demonstration phase. 
 Policies on issues such as education, taxes and subsidies, and market 
regulation can exert an important but indirect influence on innovation 
supply and demand. This reinforces the need for consistency, not just 
between direct innovation policies but also between the broader regu-
latory and institutional environments for innovation. 
 Policies supporting the supply of innovations or the development of tech-
nologies include investments in R&D, intellectual property protection, 
laboratory and testing infrastructure, training and skills development, 
university-industry collaborations, formal and informal mechanisms 
of knowledge exchange, technology roadmaps to guide the direction 
of innovation, and financial incentives such as tax credits for private 
investments. Not all innovation, however, derives from formal research 
and development activities. Problem solving and incremental improve-
ments in existing technologies are also of importance and can be stimu-
lated and supported by public sector policies that lead to the creation of 
outreach, extension, and technical support programs. Policies support-
ing the demand for innovations as commercialized technologies include 
demonstration projects, public procurement, market niche creation (e.g., 
supply obligations), and the creation of appropriate market incentives. 
Market incentives may be created via changes in relative prices (e.g., 
environmental taxes or feed-in tariffs), standards, and regulations. These 
supply-push and demand-pull policies are context-specific comple-
ments rather than substitutes. Innovation success stories are typically 
characterized by comprehensive and consistent policy support through 
the entire innovation process (see  Figure 24.12 ). Particular innovation 
policies must account for specific local conditions or be otherwise tai-
lored to the technological or market characteristics of an innovation. 
 24.4.4  International Dimension to Energy Technology 
Innovation and Policy 
 International energy technology spillovers and feedbacks will depend 
on both local and global factors, and policy at both these levels is 
crucial. Energy systems and technologies are highly internationalized, 
and knowledge and learning in the energy sector has an intrinsic inter-
national dimension. Moreover, as shown in some of the case studies 
and the quantitative ETIS investment analysis ( Appendix I ), non-OECD 
countries have progressively invested in and developed capabilities in 
earlier stages of development of new technologies (e.g., China in coal 
gasification, India in wind turbines, and Brazil in biofuels). The globaliza-
tion of technology has the potential to significantly increase the rate of 
energy innovation if international feedback and learning are properly 
enhanced. 
 The majority of energy technology is diffused through private means; it 
routinely flows through foreign investment, licensing agreements, and 
international trade. Each channel implies different modes of technology 
transfer and, depending on the effectiveness of local learning invest-
ment, different levels of local assimilation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). 
Many of these flows are actually intra-firm technology transfer, since 
energy firms are counted among the largest multinational corporations 
in the world, with very high indexes of internationalization (measured 
as share of affiliate sales on total sales; see UNCTAD, 2002). But this is 
not exclusive to the fossil energy industries: PV and wind turbine tech-
nologies were also developed as a result of experience and learning that 
crossed borders. But international inter- and intra-firm transfer do not 
occur without the appropriate systemic incentives, including subsidies, 
public R&D investment, tariffs, standards, resource mobilization, and the 
guiding action of policies and institutions. 
 Incentives for technology diffusion in general include market condi-
tions and government policy, but cleaner energy technologies require 
normally explicit incentives. While the existence of more advanced and 
cleaner energy technologies has led many to believe that latecomer 
countries will leapfrog to such technologies (Goldemberg, 1998), this is 
by no means an automatic process. Rather, the process is predicated on 
developing technological capabilities (absorptive capacity) and appro-
priate market incentives for technology diffusion. 
 National policy incentives, coupled with either the financial resources to 
buy and/or the indigenous technological capabilities to make or assimi-
late advanced technologies, are required in this situation. Local policy 
incentives and institutions are crucial to overcome adoption hurdles, 
especially for cleaner technologies. The development of China´s automo-
bile industry is one example. The Chinese government supported its firms 
to purchase automotive technology through licensing and joint venture 
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arrangements, but for a long time failed to elicit pollution-control tech-
nology adoption due to the lack of pollution control standards until 
2000. A lack of leapfrogging was observed with respect to pollution-
control technology, but rapid leapfrogging occurred during the 1990s 
for automotive technology more generally in China (Gallagher, 2006). In 
the case of ethanol in Brazil, the government employed a comprehen-
sive strategy involving standards, market incentives, RD&D investments, 
and human resource development to create a sugarcane-based ethanol 
industry (see the Brazilian Ethanol case study). In Mexico, opportunities 
were missed to cultivate a local wind industry and accompanying cap-
ability accumulation. Although the Instituto de Investigaciones Electricas 
(a public R&D center) had made the first steps toward developing wind 
turbine technology, the government failed to create incentives at the 
manufacturing stage, and opted for turn-key plant technology transfer 
(Borja-Diaz et al., 2005; Aguayo, 2008). 
 International policy also creates incentive frameworks for the diffusion 
of energy technologies. This includes treaties (e.g., Kyoto Protocol), 
norms (e.g., technical standards), and institutions regulating trade, 
finance, investment, environment, development, security, and health 
issues (e.g., IEA, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and United 
Nations Development Programme). However, most of these are not 
oriented specifically to foster energy technology innovation. A cur-
rent research gap is the dearth of studies examining the impact of 
these international policies and institutions on energy innovation. The 
effectiveness of international schemes like the Clean Development 
Mechanism and offset markets as energy innovation mechanisms 
remains unclear. 
 Adoption of energy innovations tends to proceed faster in late-adopting 
countries, but achieves lower technological levels than in inventor coun-
tries, as shown in the Scaling Dynamics case study. This is true also for 
traditional, carbon-intensive technologies. Most developing countries 
are currently experiencing a rapid transition into energy- and carbon-
intensive modern energy infrastructures and fossil-fuel dependent end-
use technologies, most notably the private automobile. Augmenting 
international spillovers and knowledge flows at early phases of scaling 
up could enable scope and scale economies in the formative phases 
of technology, accelerating technology improvement and pulling new 
technologies from their initial niches of application. 
 International knowledge spillovers through government-sponsored col-
laboration efforts seem weak compared to what is needed to foster a sig-
nificant global energy transition. Perhaps the most prominent example of 
international energy technology collaboration among governments is the 
implementing agreements of the IEA. The IEA provides support for numer-
ous international cooperation and collaboration agreements in energy 
technology R&D, deployment, and information dissemination (IEA, 2010). 
These agreements cover a broad range of technologies, but they strongly 
differ in the scope, stage, and level of commitment of the R&D process. 
Moreover, many are not really R&D collaboration projects, but simply 
institutional arrangements for information exchange or standardization. 
While non-member countries and international organizations may par-
ticipate, OECD members’ presence dominates (see  Figure 24.13 below). 
There are other examples of government-supported international collab-
oration (e.g., the fusion reactor project ITER, or the Carbon Sequestration 
Leadership Forum), but their effectiveness remains to be assessed. 
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 Figure 24.13 |  Examples of international technology cooperation via IEA agreements, by participating countries (IEA members and non-members), number of agreements 
covered (left panel) and number of participating countries (right panel). Note in particular the relative sparse participation from developing countries, which is less surprising 
considering the exclusive OECD membership of IEA. Source: based on IEA, 2010. 
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 Another potentially important channel for international spillovers 
and technology transfer is government bilateral agreements. Their 
real impact on technology spillovers and advancement has not been 
assessed and will probably remain constrained by national interest 
issues and disagreement. These bilateral agreements are predomin-
antly North-North, but there are examples of North-South cooper-
ation, and most recently South-South energy technology flows, such 
as Brazil’s set of agreements with 12 African and Caribbean coun-
tries for transferring sugar-based ethanol technology. Given their 
growing importance as both energy consumers and as energy tech-
nology providers, India and China have attracted most of the atten-
tion, spurring a constellation of binational dialogue and exchange 
programs such as the new United States-China Clean Energy 
Research Center, agreed to in November 2009 by President Barack 
Obama and President Hu Jintao. Again, these programs’ effective-
ness in fostering innovation and technology transfer remain to be 
evaluated. 
 24.4.5  Policy Design Guidelines/Criteria 
 24.4.5.1  Introduction 
 The previous sections have outlined the main drivers of technological 
change embedded in a  systemic conceptual perspective of the ETIS. The 
systemic perspective highlights that drivers and policies to stimulate 
technological change (innovation and diffusion) are closely interre-
lated. This section summarizes the main findings from the technology 
policy case studies of  Chapter 24 that can guide the design of tech-
nology innovation and diffusion policies. In the view of the authors, 
these guiding principles for policy design carry more weight than the 
choice of particular policy instruments (including, e.g., externality pri-
cing, preferential feed-in tariffs for emerging technologies, or various 
forms of subsidies or quantitative regulations such as technology per-
formance standards) that are discussed in the various case studies. 
In other words, while the policy guidelines outlined below are con-
sidered generic and applicable across  all technology fields and adop-
tion environments, the choice of individual technology-related policy 
instruments needs to be tailored to technology- and locality-specific 
circumstances, but are invariably guided by the overarching general 
policy principles. 
 Ignoring the systemic characteristics of technological change often 
leads to a partial view and fragmented (even contradictory) policy 
frameworks. Although it is well understood that technology is funda-
mental to solving the energy challenges of our time, including climate 
change, energy security, and economic growth, what remains less clear 
is how to most effectively create and deploy new and improved tech-
nologies. There are no simple answers; innovation systems are highly 
complex and interconnected, meaning that decision makers must guard 
against overly simplistic responses that hide the need for flexible and 
broad policy approaches to meet energy innovation challenges. Included 
as boxes within the following sections are several stylized examples 
of these simplifications – or “policy myths”– and brief explanations of 
how such simplification might lead policy makers to actions that will not 
achieve their goals. 
 24.4.5.2  Create Knowledge! Or: How to Enable Technological 
Learning while Learning about Technologies Yourself 
 One cannot influence the creation of technological knowledge in an 
effective way without knowledge of how the ETIS operates (and its 
institutions), the inputs it requires, and how to assess the effective-
ness of innovation policies (outputs and “outcomes”). A special need 
in knowledge development relates to data on innovation activities 
themselves, which for the most part are poor, scattered, and incomplete. 
Informed innovation policy cannot be created in a knowledge vacuum. 
It needs to rely on data and appropriate metrics and indicators that can 
guide adaptive innovation policy design. For instance, our knowledge on 
technology-specific private sector energy R&D is woefully inadequate, 
implying that public and private sector innovation priorities risk being 
misaligned or even contradictory. 
 Research on energy innovation requires consistent, long-term, com-
parable, and more detailed data on innovation inputs and outputs, 
including information disclosure on policy programs. This information 
is critical for assessing not only the direction and rates of techno-
logical change and identifying needs in different areas of the innov-
ation process, but also for evaluating society’s response to energy 
challenges, including policies themselves. Policy makers need to com-
municate clearly strict quid pro quo conditions for policy support. For 
instance, direct subsidies on nascent technologies such as demon-
stration projects and niche market deployment need to be contingent 
on public disclosure and documentation of successes and failures in 
the deployment and performance of new technologies, in order to 
enable learning and the preservation of technology experimentation 
knowledge. 
 Decisions and choices that policy aims to influence depend on the struc-
tures in which actors are embedded. As technology systems develop, 
vested interests emerge, not only in the private sector and intermediate 
institutions but also in the policy-making realm itself. The risk of moral 
hazard and a poor ability to learn from mistakes can introduce rigidity 
and biases within the innovation system. This is why societies require 
reassessment and institutional learning at higher levels of the innov-
ation system, in order to be able to learn and readjust policy objectives, 
priorities, and instruments. The need for independent and stable institu-
tions that act as intermediaries between the twin vagaries of the policy 
and market environments, e.g., in the form of technology assessment 
institutions, cannot be stressed enough. Innovation policy needs institu-
tional capacity for designing, implementing, and monitoring innovation 
policies, which is lacking in almost all countries, as well as at the inter-
national level. 
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 24.4.5.3  Assure Feedbacks! Or: How to Create/Enable 
Knowledge Flows for Technology Learning 
and Spillovers 
 Formal and informal information feedback processes are essential for 
sustained and successful innovation. This is well known and well cited 
in the literature, yet it has proven virtually impossible to institutionalize. 
Even this recommendation has sometimes been seen as an excessive 
burden on already over-worked public officials, NGOs, and contrac-
tors who have little interest in long-term monitoring (PCAST, 1997). 
Government can support these essential feedbacks in a variety of ways, 
but can also hinder – or even block – essential information and know-
ledge flows. 
 For instance, governments can support knowledge feedback between 
demonstration projects and niche market applications back to R&D 
by providing facilities where new technology options are tested and 
results communicated back to developers/manufacturers. The  Wind 
Power case study illustrates the success of test stations in Denmark 
to support knowledge feedback and quality assurance. The results 
were widely spread, as networking between actors (i.e., manufac-
tures) was also supported. The test station establishment resulted in 
essential knowledge and technology development. However, the case 
study of wind energy also illustrates the negative experience in the 
Netherlands, where the government supported competitiveness rather 
than networking. In the Netherland case, the test station environ-
ment did not support essential feedbacks and information exchanges 
between Dutch manufactures. 
 Niche markets and early market deployment can also provide essen-
tial feedbacks. For many new energy technologies, early experience in 
production and use, including experience in operation and mainten-
ance (O&M), have been essential for successful development because 
experience is fed back into R&D and design changes. For example, wind 
turbines developed in the early 1980s were assembled from standard 
components, and feedback in use and O&M were essential for the devel-
opment and tailoring of specialized wind turbine components; this in 
turn supported the development of specialized suppliers. Moreover, high 
costs related to production and O&M are important drivers for feed-
back and improvements of products and production processes. Another 
example for this type of essential market feedback is provided in the 
 Kenyan PV case study of PV applications in rural Kenya (see  Appendix II ). 
Problems with quality in the PV systems were only revealed through 
extensive market deployment (and not in earlier demonstration stages 
or via traditional manufacturing quality control) and led to the subse-
quent improvement of the technology. Governments or NGOs can assist 
in this feedback process by providing documentation and public disclos-
ure of market deployment experiences with novel technologies. 
 Feedback from niche markets and early markets are also important 
for the formation of the entire innovation system, taking into account 
not only the technology itself, but also actors and legal and economic 
frameworks. Essential feedback can be provided by evaluating the proc-
ess of market formation. By evaluating how the system of innovation 
is evolving, e.g., the development of knowledge and actor networks, 
ongoing policy programs can be redesigned to improve in effectiveness 
and efficiency. 
 For both technology and market development, extended feedback 
loops could be achieved through international cooperation and 
experience sharing. Reporting is essential to overcome any discon-
tinuities (for longer or shorter periods) in the support of technology 
and market development. Such international knowledge exchange 
initiatives (e.g., through some IEA programs) remain in their 
infancy. 
 24.4.5.4  Globalize! Or: How to Devise Local Policies to 
Productively Harness the International Flow of 
Energy Technologies 
 Energy technologies are intrinsically international. They constantly 
flow in the private sector through international licensing agreements, 
joint ventures, direct investment, and trade. Feedbacks in the energy 
innovation process can and should occur across national borders. 
To encourage the development and deployment of advanced/new 
technologies, policies are often needed to create a coherent incen-
tive structure. Local policies are also necessary to foster absorptive 
capacity to take advantage of technology and knowledge produced 
abroad. 
 Protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) is an important aspect of 
knowledge exchange, but not a sufficient condition – nor even the most 
important factor – for enabling the transfer of technologies and know-
ledge (see  Box 24.1 ). Technology diffusion, both across industries as 
well as across countries, consists fundamentally of adapting existing 
solutions to new environments through an iterative process of know-
ledge exchange, revision, reconstruction, and improvement. Setting 
up the conditions for accessing and assimilating foreign technologies 
necessarily implies building a local system to produce and reproduce 
this knowledge. 
 Developing countries can access new energy technologies through 
external technology sources like specialized suppliers and multinational 
firms, or they can support indigenous development of advanced tech-
nologies by implementing a comprehensive strategy that includes pol-
icy support for human resource development, investments for RD&D, 
and market formation. Simply buying technologies from abroad is often 
insufficient because developing countries assimilate these technologies 
but not the related knowledge about how to adapt, reproduce, and 
improve upon them. 
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 Naturally, the financial requirements for acquiring hardware, machinery, 
and equipment are a central aspect of international technology diffu-
sion, especially in capital-intensive, large, and embodied energy tech-
nologies. International financial schemes and institutions play a role in 
the current technological lock-in to the extent that they tend to screen-
out investment allocations to cleaner energy sources, local R&D efforts, 
and knowledge infrastructures. Local and global efforts to mobilize the 
appropriate financial resources and schemes must be aimed at reducing 
the valley-of-death transit of clean, advanced, new energy technologies 
to enable technology and knowledge flows across borders. 
 Efforts to align national policies toward more effective technology 
transfer mechanisms must take into account both the predominance 
of private channels of technology transfer, as well as the role of public 
investment and incentives needed to provide a level playing field for 
advanced new clean technologies. 
 Box 24.1 |  How can we ensure that all regions and sectors have access to, and are using, 
the best technology? 
 Myths:  “You can just buy (transfer), whatever technology is needed.” 
 “If we just ﬁ x IPR issues, technology will transfer seamlessly.” 
 “If developing countries only had strong IPRs, technologies would transfer to their countries.” 
 “If only international IPRs were weaker, developing countries would rapidly adopt new technologies.” 
 Technological capabilities and technology levels vary widely across regions. Given that the non-OECD regions will represent an increasing 
share of the global energy system, effective technology deployment within and to those regions will lay the foundation of growth that is 
consistent with energy-related objectives. 
 Patents and other Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) instruments are not a sufﬁ cient condition for innovation or technology transfer. 
Technology is much more than the “blueprints” of information disclosed in a patent. There are plenty of other conditions and investment 
needs to be met. Income thresholds set up limits to the scale to which technologies can be applied, limiting their attractiveness. 
Specialized inputs and infrastructures must be timely and effectively supplied. Skills in operating and integrating complex systems need 
to be developed. Moreover, many innovations are not patented, and in many industries ﬁ rms rely on other means for seizing technology 
advantages (Levin et al., 1987). This means that simply adjusting intellectual property rights will prove far from sufﬁ cient to bring about 
the necessary technology transfer. 
 The literature discussing the impact of IPR on energy technology transfer is scarce. There is a dearth of empirical or literature evidence 
that lacking IPR protection is a strong barrier to technology diffusion. In fact, there is emerging evidence to the contrary, i.e., other 
barriers such as capital costs, lack of infrastructure, lack of local policy incentives like performance standards, feed-in tariffs, and 
subsidies, and lack of ﬁ nancial resources are more important. In the case of PV and biofuels, for example, the high number of supplier 
ﬁ rms and ﬂ exibility of sources will most likely reduce the space for monopolist practices in technology contracts. The same seems to be 
true in the more concentrated wind turbine industry, where developing countries’ ﬁ rms have developed local industries through licensing. 
However, IPR protections may be a barrier to industry entry for developing countries in the future (Barton, 2009), even when other entry 
barriers (manufacturing experience) may play a much larger role. 
 Patents build up incentives for innovation by providing means to control and shape technology transfer. The current global context is 
already one in which IPRs have been considerably strengthened by prohibiting or restricting compulsory licensing, reversing of burden 
of proof, and extending of patenting dimensions (Maskus, 2000). Many models on patents show that balancing a patent’s dimension 
can actually reduce the social costs of IPRs, depending on the structure of demand (Nordhaus, 1969; Klemperer, 1990; La Manna, 1992). 
The resulting trend to maximize all dimensions of patents in TRIPS (Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues) and other trade related 
IPR frameworks have limited the scope for IPR policies to more rationally foster innovation and transfer by customized IPR systems that 
properly balance private and social costs. 
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 24.4.5.5  Be Stable! Or: How to Create Policy Stability and 
Credible Commitments on which Innovation Depends 
 Governments need to create expectations for actors in the innovation sys-
tem that are stable and consistent over a multi-year period. Uncertainty 
in expectations about future policies increases the risk of investing in 
innovation for energy technologies. Because externalities are pervasive in 
the clean energy sector – due to both knowledge spillovers and environ-
mental externalities – these distant payoffs rely heavily on policy instru-
ments. However, if expectations about the level or existence of these policy 
instruments several years in the future are uncertain, firms will discount the 
value of future policies and under-invest in innovation. Because technology 
development is in itself a risky endeavor, private sector energy companies 
will only respond to policies that are credible, last more than a few years, 
and have a reasonable degree of stability. Moreover, volatility can accel-
erate knowledge depreciation and loss. Technology policy can be dynamic 
and flexible to reflect new information, but broad goals must be consistent 
and funding levels for support of the various stages of the innovation life 
cycle need to be predictable for the private sector to engage and invest in 
the creation of new technological knowledge. For energy problems that 
cannot be solved quickly, patience and predictability are needed. 
 The case studies make clear the adverse effects of policy volatility and 
rapidly shifting priorities among policy makers, as well as successes that 
have resulted from a more recent shift to longer time horizons. R&D 
budgets have been notoriously volatile. The history of US energy R&D 
funding is not characterized by stable budgets, but by changes that 
are much larger than annual changes in economic activity and overall 
research spending. More than half the time, annual program budgets 
rose or fell by more than 10% (Nemet, 2007). Wind power, solar ther-
mal electricity, and solar water heaters boomed in the early 1980s and 
then the industries were devastated by dramatic program cuts in the 
mid-1980s, even if partially restored soon thereafter. Innovation, job 
creation, and manufacturing dropped in the United States, and even 
25 years later, the focus of activity on these “abandoned” technologies 
remains outside the country. 
 A more recent policy innovation has been the shift to policies that ensure 
stability by including time horizons that set expectations about the 
intensity of government activity, for example, over ten year periods. The 
Japanese New Sunshine Program in the 1990s set declining levels of sub-
sidies over ten years. The California Million Solar Roofs Bill set subsidies 
for 10 years. Renewables obligations in many US states set levels 15–20 
years in the future, usually with annual interim targets. An important cau-
tionary note is that long term commitments like these often include clauses 
that allow loopholes for governments and actors to avoid meeting these 
commitments should compliance become more difficult than expected, for 
example through the ability to pay low penalties. A “safety valve” clause in 
cap and trade has a similar effect if not paired with a symmetric price floor. 
While the flexibility to change targets may have social benefits, it is import-
ant to understand the price paid in terms of reduced incentives for invest-
ment for private actors. The shift to longer time horizons for policy making 
has been an important development, but can also be undermined by imple-
mentation details allowing excessive flexibility in cases of nonattainment. 
 Box 24.2 |  How quickly can we move the energy innovation system? How long of a commitment 
to energy innovation is needed? 
 Myths:  “If we throw enough money at this, we can make it happen quickly.” 
 “This is a man-on-the-moon project.” 
 There is no doubt that today’s energy challenges call for quick action, and increases in government funding may play a key role in the 
strategy for solving these problems. In framing the energy challenge, many have evoked the memories of rapid, focused projects to 
achieve single national goals, such as the Manhattan Project in the United States to develop nuclear weapons, or the US effort to put a 
man on the moon in less than 10 years. 
 Although there is a need to pursue energy innovation more aggressively, energy embodies a far broader range of technologies and actors 
than a Manhattan Project. Virtually every citizen of the globe is an energy user, and therefore has the ability to choose technologies to 
deploy and fuels to purchase. Energy supplies are produced and provided by a vast range of actors and there is a wide range of supply 
sources: fossil fuels, bioenergy, nuclear power, solar power, wind power, and others. Each of these involves multiple technology competitions 
and opportunities for improvements. Historically, accelerated technology deployment programs relied on “selected” single-mission driven 
technology winners. Meeting future energy needs likely beneﬁ ts by bringing multiple, competing technology options to the market. 
 Further, the challenges that face the energy system over the coming century will not be met within a decade. For example, climate change 
research indicates that the carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions reductions required to stabilize CO 2 concentrations will be more stringent in 
the longer-term than in the shorter-term and reductions must continue indeﬁ nitely. The challenge for decision makers is to develop the 
support for a sustained, long-term effort to enhance energy innovation. 
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 24.4.5.6  Align Incentive Structures! Or: How to 
Avoid Confusing the Market 
 To maximize the effectiveness of ETIS, it is essential to align incentive 
structures and employ consistent policy signals. These alignments should 
be durable so that there is predictability over time for the ETIS. When 
there is inconsistency or lack of alignment, the efficiency and effective-
ness of the system is undermined. 
 There are two types of alignment that must be considered: (1) align-
ment of incentives within a given innovation system; and (2) alignment 
of incentives for different innovation systems to encourage spillovers. 
To illustrate how to align a particular system, we can utilize the model 
of the growth phase of the technology life cycle. Aligned policies would 
include the development of an explicit strategy for supporting technolo-
gies that are invented through demonstration and testing, and formation 
of larger-than-niche markets to facilitate the transition of technologies 
across both “valleys of death” (from R&D to demonstration, and dem-
onstration to early deployment). Government often must also estab-
lish policies that create incentives for technologies to be pulled into 
the marketplace. Throughout the growth phase of a technology (or set 
of technologies), governments need to elicit information from actors 
and devise mechanisms for feeding that information to other actors 
and other stages of the innovation process. In other words, government 
often must facilitate the integration of supply and demand and over-
come barriers to sharing information essential to the good functioning 
of energy markets. 
 When government fails to align the incentive structures for achieving 
desired outcomes, contradictions emerge and perverse outcomes flour-
ish. Three examples are helpful to illustrate these contradictions. 
 The  US Vehicle Efficiency case study on the CAFE standard and the 
 Hybrid Cars case studies (see  Appendix II ) show that the main pol-
icy incentive for the development and deployment of energy-effi-
cient vehicle technologies in the United States is the CAFE standard. 
However, the United States does not impose significant fuel taxes or 
any fees on the purchase of inefficient vehicles (though it provides a 
subsidy in the form of an income tax credit for the purchase of certain 
advanced technology vehicles like plug-in hybrids). As a result, manu-
facturers are encouraged to innovate only as much as the standard 
implies, and consumers have virtually no incentive to drive less or to 
purchase more efficient vehicles. The CAFE standard thus creates a 
floor for minimum levels of innovation, which implies that the policy 
mix is incomplete. As one would expect, vehicle miles traveled have 
steadily grown in the United States (especially because the cost per 
mile of driving is lower with the fuel efficiency standards), and there 
was an explosion in the purchases of large passenger cars and light 
trucks, which had a weaker standard. If the US government added a 
tax to the price of gasoline, it would help create consumer demand 
for more fuel-efficient vehicles, thereby facilitating the integration of 
supply and demand. 
 The large government investments into RD&D of fossil, fission, fusion, 
efficiency, and renewable energy technologies can be charitably labeled 
uncoordinated, and possibly characterized as completely at odds with 
the much larger government subsidization of the deployment of fossil-
fuel technologies. In 2008, IEA member countries invested US$14 billion 
in energy RD&D, and US$1.6 billion in total for fossil energy technolo-
gies (IEA, 2009b). While fossil fuel subsidies may support the fossil 
fuel RD&D investments, they strongly distort the market for nonfossil 
energy technologies. US fossil fuel subsidies alone are at the level of 
approximately US$10 billion/year for traditional fossil fuels, according 
to a recent report (Adeyeye et al., 2009). Fossil fuel subsidies in the 
non-OECD countries are estimated to be approximately US$170 billion/
year (IEA, 2006). Globally, subsidies to fossil fuels may be on the order 
of US$500 billion/year, of which about US$100 billion is estimated to be 
provided to producers (GSI, 2009). 
 For an example of the lack of policy coordination, consider the United 
States. There is little evidence in the United States of bureaucratic coord-
ination at the federal level. R&D strategies and decisions are largely made 
by the Department of Energy in the Federal Executive Branch (although 
appropriation decisions for R&D are made by Congress, often in contra-
diction to the R&D strategies set forth by the Department of Energy). 
Congress, however, establishes the market formation policies – the sub-
sidies, loan guarantees, tax credits, carbon taxes, and cap-and-trade sys-
tems. Sometimes the Environmental Protection Agency establishes the 
market formation or deployment policies (e.g., sulfur dioxide emission 
trading system; performance standards for power plants), but Congress 
usually confers this authority. In this system, it is difficult to map out 
and implement an efficient innovation strategy, much less insure that 
feedback loops are established and maximized. 
 Alignment of incentives for ETI probably cannot be achieved without 
an explicitly designed and implemented innovation strategy for energy 
technologies. Even with such a strategy, multiple objectives in a coun-
try’s energy policy can cause a misalignment of incentives. A common 
misalignment is government making RD&D investments in energy effi-
ciency while simultaneously subsidizing the price of retail fuels. Another 
example of misalignment is the government encouraging RD&D invest-
ments in wind energy when local planning and zoning laws prohibit the 
installation of wind turbines. 
 24.4.5.7  Be Systemic! Or: How to Address Innovation in a 
Comprehensive Way 
 Innovation policies tend to focus on specific technologies. A narrow 
technology focus runs counter to the systemic view of energy technology 
innovation developed throughout this chapter. As well as technology-
 specific innovation processes, the innovation system is comprised of 
actors, organizations, infrastructure, and institutions. Relationships and 
feedbacks between these various components of the innovation sys-
tem underpin the drivers and mechanisms of innovation discussed in 
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 Section 24.2 . Taken together, these components comprise the selection 
environment that shapes the outcomes of the innovation process. 
 A systemic approach to innovation policy requires a package of policy 
instruments that should adapt to changes and be geared toward trig-
gering changes over time in the innovation systems. Policy packages 
may also differ from one innovation system to the next. Within these 
packages, policies must be aligned and consistent in their targets and 
objectives, as discussed above. Policy packages must also be broad 
in their coverage, supporting the successful functioning of the whole 
innovation system. A good example is the cooperation and knowledge 
feedbacks between different actors and institutions furthered by 
incentives for collaboration and mandates of information disclosures. 
Overall, the policy package needs to support knowledge development, 
feedback processes, and learning for the entire – or at least for the 
essential parts – of the innovation system. The  Wind Power case study 
discusses the development of wind energy in Denmark and shows the 
success of a systemic approach that includes several actors (energy 
companies, wind turbine producers, smaller wind turbine owners) and 
the relationships between those actors, as well as essential institu-
tional features (connection to the grid, spatial planning and permit-
ting process). The  Japanese Efficiency case study also illustrates this 
point nicely. 
 In the case of end-use technologies, actor-networks within innov-
ation systems are often more complex, involving end-users, local 
authorities, wholesalers, retailers, branch organizations, consultants, 
installers, energy companies, architects, etc., as well as socially con-
structed norms, habits, routines, and values. Although these social 
institutions may play an important part in the success or failure of 
innovation processes, innovation policies tend to focus on technolo-
gies. The broader dynamic between technological change and social 
change is either sidelined or framed as a simple push-pull relationship 
with technologies driving responses in social institutions. As a result, 
social innovation, referring explicitly to changes in the adoption, use, 
and adaptation of technologies in a social and institutional context, is 
marginalized as a target for innovation policy. This can be attributed 
in part to the deep ideological, conceptual, and analytical differences 
between social innovation and technological innovation, which extend 
into the policy domain. 
 Myriad forms of social innovations include participatory planning proc-
esses, community-based initiatives, social learning, normative messag-
ing on utility bills, information provision (to change attitudes), educative 
initiatives (to change values), supply chain alliances and pressures, new 
business models, and reporting and disclosure requirements. The pack-
age of instruments developed to support innovation systems should 
include policies targeting social innovation as well. 
 The interdependence of innovation outcomes with social change also 
highlights the limitations of innovation policy, even when designed 
within this systemic perspective. Even comprehensive, aligned, and 
stable policy packages can never guarantee successful innovation out-
comes due to irreducible uncertainties. 
 Box 24.3 |  What mix of policy instruments would most effectively spur innovation? 
 Myths:  “The solution is a massive ramp up of R&D expenditures.” 
 “If prices are right, innovation will take care of itself.” 
 It is well established that innovation takes place through a system of complementary actors and processes. Each or any of these 
processes may prove to be a choke point in the innovation system. Government-supported R&D is a core element of the innovation 
system, and many argue that government R&D expenditures should be increased in the face of our current energy challenges. However, 
government R&D is far from the only component of the energy innovation system. 
 Internalizing the costs associated with climate change and energy security to the feasible extent would provide more appropriate signals 
for technology deployment and private-sector innovation and investment activities. However, a wide range of market failures exist that 
prevent the private sector from investing in innovation in ways that are consistent with social needs, even if prices are right. Effective 
pricing is far from sufﬁ cient for a robust energy innovation system. 
 Decision makers ﬁ nd themselves in a situation where there is no single policy mechanism that will support a robust energy innovation 
system. The system must include a well-functioning and well-targeted government R&D program, but appropriate incentives through the 
pricing of externalities is also critical for producing demand signals that will induce learning and create incentives for private-sector R&D. 
A wide range of policy challenges remain regarding other core elements of a robust innovation system, including intellectual property 
rights and institutional structures to support widespread deployment of new technologies. 
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 24.4.5.8  Experiment! Or: How to Stop Worrying about Failure 
 The formative phase of a technology’s life cycle concerns the transition 
from development to diffusion. The dynamics of energy technologies 
that have successfully diffused historically indicate the importance of 
building out large numbers of units as a key feature of this formative 
phase. (A unit refers to a steam turbine in a coal or nuclear plant, a wind 
turbine, a photovoltaic module, and so on.) From the perspective of 
governments, experimentation, debugging, improvements and learning 
possibilities are all proportional to the number of units built during the 
formative phases of a technology’s life cycle. Granularity is therefore a 
key variable determining innovation and investment risks, as well as the 
extent of possible experimentation, improvements, and learning favor-
ing smaller, unit-scale, MW-scale projects over larger, “lumpy” GW-scale 
projects. 
 The demonstration and early deployment of many units is a natural fea-
ture of modular, distributed technologies like residential solar hot water or 
PV systems, with relatively low capital requirements per unit (even if costs 
per unit of energy output/capacity might be high). The unit costs of modu-
lar technologies may be driven down during the early deployment and dif-
fusion phases by manufacturing scale economies in addition to learning 
effects. However, the same tendency to focus initially on building out unit 
numbers is also observed in the histories of large, centralized supply-side 
technologies. Despite the apparent availability of unit scale economies 
(i.e., falling unit costs at larger unit capacities), formative phases were his-
torically characterized by only incremental increases in unit capacity over 
an extended, decadal period. Considerable experience was gained with 
smaller scale units before significant jumps in unit scale were successfully 
attempted (e.g., coal power, jet aircraft, and wind turbines). 
 The consistency of this pattern points to the importance of experimen-
tation with many different units as a precursor both to widespread dif-
fusion and to up-scaling (i.e., pushing technologies up the unit scale 
frontier). The hallmark of this approach to innovation is granularity: indi-
vidual eggs in many small baskets. Note that granularity here refers to 
the formative phases of a given technology; design criteria for portfolios 
of technologies are addressed below. 
 Promoting substantial one-off increases in unit scale prior to numer-
ous formative experiments in both precommercial (demonstration) and 
commercial contexts should therefore be considered a high-risk strat-
egy. The comparative histories of wind power in Denmark and Germany 
support this cautionary note. Experimentation to generate knowledge 
on a technology’s performance, efficiency, reliability, and other service 
attributes enhances the required capacity for capturing unit-scale econ-
omies. The design, construction, and operation of many different smaller 
scale units not only leads to incremental improvements and learning-
related cost reductions, but also would appear to underpin the success 
of subsequent larger-scale units. 
 The importance of these formative experiments helps explain why the 
time period over which unit scale economies are captured does not 
appear to accelerate from early to late markets. Although large scale 
units may be transferable from early to late stage markets, the late stage 
markets need time to form the requisite institutional capacity to sup-
port these increases in unit scale. A context of international cooperation 
and knowledge transfer would, of course, support the aggregation of 
learning from experimentation processes running concurrently around 
the world. 
 Experimentation can and also perhaps should be multifarious, involving 
an array of different actors, forms, and stages of the technology’s life 
cycle. In practice, many smaller scale variants of a technology may be 
pursued on parallel tracks by competing and heterogeneous commercial 
interests. This granular approach to innovation policy diversifies risk and 
reduces the consequence of failure. 
 Government’s role should be to fill in the gaps by, for example:
 underwriting small-scale demonstration projects for socially robust  •
innovations with less immediate or higher risk private returns; 
 supporting variety in the early deployment phase by creating and  •
protecting differentiated niches; 
 reducing upfront capital barriers;  •
 Box 24.4 |  Is innovation policy exclusively concerned with technologies? 
 Myths:  “The problem is technological. If we solve that, social change will follow.” 
 “Technological change only arises in response to social needs.” 
 Technological and social change are interdependent. The success of technology-focused innovation processes, as well as the effectiveness 
of these policies, is conditional on supportive and adaptive social institutions. Participatory planning processes to foster the scaling-up 
and diffusion of wind power, and community-based organizations that promote energy efﬁ cient behaviors and technology adoption, are 
two current examples. Policies to support social innovations should be considered an integral part of an innovation system approach. 
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 managing the natural commercial tendency to rapidly confirm a  •
dominant design that confers market advantages and potential cost 
benefits through scale economies; and 
 avoiding over-emphasis on rapid unit scaling.  •
 Failure is an inherent feature of a multifarious and granular portfolio of 
innovation experiments. Venture capitalists may build energy technol-
ogy portfolios with an expected nine-in-ten failure rate, knowing that the 
one in 10 breakthrough will support returns for the portfolio as a whole. 
Accountability for taxpayer dollars and the associated political risks of 
funding failures (among other things) makes public innovation policies 
less tolerant. A shift in mindset is needed to recognize that perfect fore-
sight and innovation are awkward bedfellows, not just in the early R&D 
phase, but also during the early deployment phase of experimentation with 
many unit numbers. Learning what does not work supports learning about 
what does work, and this in turn supports both diffusion and unit scaling. 
Building diverse portfolios of modular or smaller-scale technologies helps 
spread this risk of failure. Conversely, concentrating public resources on the 
scaling up of a particular technology (be it fusion power or GW-scale CCS 
projects) reduces portfolio diversity and magnifies the risk of failure. 
 24.4.5.9  Focus on Technology Portfolios! Or: How to Not Pick 
a Winner, but to be Picky on your Picks 
 The broad range of necessary ETIs combined with inevitable innova-
tion uncertainty suggests that innovation policies must consider not 
a random collection of innovations, but rather a wide portfolio of 
technologies. 
 Innovation portfolios reflect the combination of technology options pur-
sued within the innovation system that reflects both their respective 
option value (i.e., societal/ environmental/ economic benefits in the case 
of successful development and diffusion) as well as their associated 
risks (e.g., innovation failure or investment risks). 
 In designing innovation portfolios, a number of basic criteria need to be 
taken into account:
 1.  The portfolio needs to reflect a blend of options comprising the 
entire energy system and spread the investments across many 
technologies and projects. 
 2.  The innovation portfolio should encompass all salient elements 
of the technology development cycle and all different channels of 
technology knowledge creation, such as R&D. demonstration, niche 
market deployment incentives, and market creation measures. 
 3.  Given inevitable resource constraints, the design of diversified portfo-
lios is more feasible when focusing on granular, less capital- intensive 
technologies such as end-use innovations and smaller-scale supply 
options. Conversely, large-scale, capital-intensive, high-risk innova-
tions can meaningfully only be considered in global innovation port-
folios. A common thread in case studies on both historical as well as 
current energy technologies (compare the studies on  Hybrid Cars, 
Solar Water Heaters, Heat Pumps, Japanese Efficiency, Wind Power, 
 Box 24.5 |  Are the technologies available that would be necessary to take action today? 
 Myths:  “No innovation is needed; all that’s required is political will.” 
 “We can’t take action now because the needed technologies are not available . ” 
 The full suite of technologies that will ultimately be deployed to address the energy challenges in the coming century is not currently 
available. Technology continues to advance and redoubled efforts to spur innovation will certainly lead to improvements in technologies 
over the coming decades. At the same time, there are numerous reasons to take action to deploy currently available technologies 
today: innovation systems are most effective when there is communication between technology users and developers; a range of 
non-technology factors are associated with the broad deployment of many technologies, and these can take years to develop; capital 
investments today may preclude effective action in the future; and in many applications, there exist technologies that could have 
dramatic near-term effects, such as end-use technologies. 
 Decision makers ﬁ nd themselves in a situation where a wide range of beneﬁ cial actions are possible today to deploy existing 
technology, yet not all technologies are ready for deployment. The challenge for decision makers is to implement policies that will allow 
some technologies to develop further before moving from the laboratory to the ﬁ eld, and experimentation and feedback with other 
technologies at a small scale. These policies should support the private sector’s role in deploying still other technologies at a large scale if 
they are clearly proven at smaller scales. 
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Solar PV, and  Kenyan PV with the  US Synfuels and  French Nuclear 
case studies) is the importance of granularity. Smaller unit scales of 
energy technologies (e.g., the size of a one MW wind turbine com-
pared to 1000 times larger typical size of a one GW nuclear reactor) 
not only result in lower innovation failure risk 16 for a given project, 
but also in lower barriers to innovation adoption in case of successful 
demonstration. Technology policy can also profit from granularity, as 
enabling the spreading of innovation risks across a broader range of 
a multitude of smaller-scale innovations without requiring the pre-
mature selection of few capital intensive innovation projects, pre-
emptying decentralized market-based decision processes. It is not 
coincidental that granular, smaller-scale innovations in energy end-
use technologies have been the dominant source of technological 
advance in energy systems historically and will likely remain so in 
the future. 
 4.  In portfolio design, the inherent tension between the desirable 
goal of maintaining technological diversity and the equally desir-
able goal of improved economics through standardization and 
technology focus needs to be considered. 
 5.  The core element of a broad-based innovation portfolio is that pol-
icy makers need to be pickier with their technology picks. On one 
side, innovation policies need to avoid preempting the outcome of 
decentralized market-based technology innovation, experimenta-
tion, and early market deployment decisions that are key in tech-
nology development. On the other side, public sector innovation 
policy legitimately needs to complement private market technol-
ogy innovation biases against large-scale, investment-intensive 
technologies that might be crucial in addressing broader social and 
environmental goals. While resource limitations inevitably require 
focus on a few strategic technologies, there is a downside: decision 
makers need to be aware of the pressures to concentrate capital-
intensive, high-risk innovation projects (potential innovation “lem-
ons”) in the domain of public sector innovation portfolios, implying 
higher risks that the public sector disproportionally shoulders. The 
result is an invitation for public support for high-risk innovations 
or bad business practices (e.g., according a quasi-monopoly to pri-
vate sector-advanced technology options that capitalize on the 
economic rents from lavish public subsidies, without “delivering” 
in terms of much needed technology innovation, such as persistent 
cost improvements of new energy technologies). 
 6.  Innovation portfolio design ideally includes a blend of the respec-
tive options values of technologies, both from a demand-pull and a 
supply-push perspective. Policy makers also need to be explicit on 
their underlying risk measures and criteria that enter innovation 
portfolio design to enhance the legitimacy and transparency of the 
resulting resource allocation across options and measures. 
 7.  The importance and complexity of these portfolio decisions will 
require more expertise within governments, as not all technology 
decisions can (or should) be made by the private sector. Fortunately, 
formal scientific tools for innovation portfolio design and analysis 
are becoming increasingly available (cf. the  Technology Portfolio s 
case study). These tools can help move the discussion on innova-
tion portfolios to more rational ground, but the further develop-
ment of these tools requires continued policy and funding support 
much like energy technologies themselves, as well as an institu-
tional locus for their application. 
 24.4.6  Conclusions: Generic Characteristics for Energy 
Technology Innovation Policies 
 Energy systems consist of interconnected technologies, knowledge bases, 
and practices that are interdependent and operate in dynamic ways. 
They are simultaneously embedded into prevailing economic incentive 
structures and broader social contexts. To be effective, innovation policy 
must be conscious of these interdependencies across time, space, and 
actors, and act coherently. Isolated policies acting in only one realm of 
the market (for example, by stimulating niche markets through tariff pol-
icies under a cost buy down paradigm) will not yield strong innovation 
if not accompanied by coordinated and aligned support for R&D and 
demonstration projects. Likewise, an isolated technology push focused 
on R&D without regard to the economic and institutional incentive struc-
tures and barriers prevailing in energy markets will be counterproductive 
for innovation, effectively curtailing the essential feedback and learning 
from market deployment on which R&D so critically depends. 
 The changing nature of technology should also be reflected in policy 
design. Instruments and incentives have to be adapted to the particular 
problems, tensions, and bottlenecks that characterize each stage of a 
technology’s innovation life cycle. Resource and financial hurdles are, for 
example, of a very different type in R&D phases than in demonstration 
and early deployment stages; as market formation advances, the need 
for agents’ coordination also changes in nature and degree. Policies for 
preserving variety or accelerating standardization are extremely sensi-
tive to the state of development of the technology. 
 The dynamics of technology over time require the attention of innov-
ation policy to development times and feedback processes. Technology 
research and development is a time-consuming activity that requires 
patient funding and active networking. Policy design must therefore 
be sensitive to the timing of investments and returns. Since knowledge 
development on suitable solutions and technology improvement takes a 
long time – and knowledge rapidly depreciates under erratic policy sig-
nals – early and persistent policy actions are very important. Long-term 
planning and policies that persist before being able to reap economic, 
 16  Given equal probability of failure of two innovation projects, the one with smaller 
unit scale and hence lower total costs (millions as opposed to billions of dollars) 
results in lower innovation risk (deﬁ ned as failure probability times [economic] con-
sequences, i.e., loss of investment). 
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social, and environmental returns are key to ETI. To be consistent in time, 
policies should be adaptive, flexible, and patient during the early phases 
of technology development to preserve technological variety, with effi-
ciency assessments and selection of programs/projects in later stages. 
 The inherent, strong uncertainty that characterizes early phases of 
innovation calls for flexible institutional mechanisms that are able to 
actualize expectations regularly. However, as the technology life cycle 
advances and uncertainty about technical features decreases, capital-
intensive investments demand long-term policy stability. Institutional 
design aimed at accelerating innovation must be aware of this trade-
off between maintaining experimentation and technological variety 
and the economic drive towards standardization, and be able to switch 
policy priorities over time, but in a predictable, consistent manner. 
 Knowledge is a crucial factor in innovation, and its nature critically influ-
ences policy outcomes. Systemic approaches particularly emphasize the 
fact that learning processes in innovation occur at many different levels 
and flow in multiple directions. Knowledge develops and accumulates 
through a range of complementary processes and activities, which in 
turn condition the future absorptive capacity for new technological 
knowledge. Supporting and facilitating these complementary learning 
processes is a crucial complement for innovation policy, unfortunately 
too often ignored. The quasi-public and distributed nature of know-
ledge, together with the strong positive feedbacks between different 
knowledge bases, call for adequate, timely policy support to these activ-
ities, which are easily screened out by market processes. At the same 
time, policy design should reflect the understanding that knowledge 
can become obsolete and experience can be lost. Innovation policy is 
incomplete if it does not adequately address the conservation of mem-
ory and a continuous renewal of the knowledge base, which is particu-
larly threatened by stop-and-go erratic policy support. 
 24.5  Conclusions 
 24.5.1  Research, Data, and Information Needs 
 A number of important gaps in data, information and research were 
identified in the above assessment. Addressing these issues is not only 
of academic interest but equally critical for improved technology innov-
ation policies, and hence is of greater societal relevance. Ten important 
 Box 24.6 |  How should policy focus and resources be allocated across technologies? 
 Myths:  “All technological options will be needed everywhere.” 
 “We need a balanced portfolio.” 
 “Technological failures are a sign that mistakes have been made.” 
 “We’ll need as much diversity as possible.” 
 “Technology X is the answer.” 
 There is a strong tendency for decision makers and technology advocates to focus on a single technology as being the key to meeting 
energy challenges – the “silver bullet” approach. This single technology focus is a result of both a lack of understanding of the 
complexity of the global energy system and the tendency of technology experts to support the continued expenditures on single 
technologies. However, research has consistently indicated that a broad and diversiﬁ ed portfolio is critical to provide options throughout 
the energy system, to allow for experimentation, and because history has shown that technological expectations are often wrong. A 
necessary condition for a successful innovation system is the exposure of nonproductive avenues for innovation and the ability to drop 
these avenues from the portfolio. 
 At the same time, a diversiﬁ ed portfolio is not necessarily an effective portfolio. There exist a wide array of possible diversiﬁ ed portfolios, 
and the need for diversity does not obviate the need for decision makers to identify avenues that are most promising and or lacking in 
effort and adjust the portfolio appropriately. Further, there are many avenues of investment for which increased effort is an obvious need. 
 The challenge for decision makers is the management of diversiﬁ ed portfolios. This requires institutional structures that are capable of 
effectively collecting and synthesizing information, robust in the face of necessary technological failures, and capable of adjusting as 
information changes. 
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areas are summarized here, regrouped into two broad categories: data 
and information, and research needs. A central theme is the need to 
develop better indicators and quantitative data as well as operational 
models and criteria to answer the core questions of technology innov-
ation policy regarding effectiveness, i.e., what is the most appropriate 
policy instrument for a particular purpose, what resources are required, 
and what are the likely response times of the innovation system to pol-
icy interventions? 
 24.5.1.1  Data Needs 
 In terms of data, four areas stand out where the gap between data 
needs and availability is particularly large:
 data on innovative activities (R&D) pursued by private firms;  •
 data on technology specific investments, particularly in end-use  •
technologies; 
 data on knowledge spillovers across different innovation fields and  •
at the international level including, in particular, technology-specific 
trade data and on joint technology development collaborations; 
and 
 systematic and up-to-date data on performance and economic  •
characteristics for energy technologies that are internationally 
comparable and widely available for technology studies and policy 
assessments. 
 24.5.1.2  Information Needs 
 Information needs include the following areas:
 identification of a limited set of appropriate and manageable criteria  •
and metrics for the assessment of innovation systems in terms of 
inputs, outputs, and outcomes that can be matched with available or 
to be developed data sets; 
 operational measurement models that describe knowledge depreci- •
ation in R&D and LbD processes; and 
 criteria for the selection of technology specific case studies especially  •
in a comparative context across countries and across technologies. 
 24.5.1.3  Research Needs 
 In terms of research, this assessment has identified the following 
areas:
 the development of conceptual models that answer the question of  •
how measurable inputs and outputs of innovation systems relate to 
each other; 
 the development of a “meta-theory” of technological change that  •
enables to establish appropriate  ceteris paribus conditions to be 
able to compare and assess the dynamics of change and of policy 
effectiveness across different technologies and development/adop-
tion environments; and 
 comparative assessments of the effectiveness of alternative policy  •
instruments aiming at influencing individual components or the 
entirety of ETIS. 
 24.5.2  Conclusions on Energy Technology Innovation 
 Substantial and accelerated innovation is essential to respond to the 
sustainability challenges of energy systems at all levels, including the 
local, national, regional, all the way up to the globe scale. Further, a 
coordinated approach is needed that works within and between indus-
trialized and developing nations. 
 Such innovations will comprise a combination of both incremental, 
cumulative changes and radical, discontinuous changes that can only 
emerge if the various innovation dimensions are nurtured simultane-
ously. Innovation entails technological, social, and institutional, as well 
as economic, driving and embedding factors that need to work hand in 
hand in the development, testing, and ultimate selection and adoption 
of new innovations. 
 A core message of this chapter is that the drivers of innovation, as well 
as the policies that support it, are complementary rather than substitut-
able for each other. This requires attention to fundamental innovation, or 
technology push, which needs to be coordinated with efforts to facilitate 
the expansion of the market opportunities – demand pull – that move 
innovations from laboratory to cost-effective deployment. As such, the 
energy sustainability challenge requires changes in whole innovation 
 systems rather than simply more independent, individual innovations. 
 The synthesis of the available literature and case studies suggests that 
successful innovation systems and their supporting policies are charac-
terized by three main features: alignment, consistency, and patience. 
 Alignment (i.e., comprehensive and contradiction-free) means that the 
various forces and policies that drive innovation are considered holistic-
ally and not from the perspective that any single driver can substitute 
for the (lack of) other drivers. Accelerated R&D in new energy technolo-
gies without economic incentives for ultimate adoption of the innova-
tions will not yield the much needed change to redirect energy systems 
toward sustainability. 
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 Likewise, consistency of policies and drivers is key. Incentive structures 
need to remain stable and not at odds with each other. All innov-
ation actors (researchers, industry suppliers, and customers, the end 
consumers) rely on predictability and consistency of the innovation 
environment; otherwise the costs of taking the inevitable innovation 
risks become prohibitive. An important task for research is to provide a 
framework that can be used to examine energy and carbon outcomes 
of innovation policies, including the relative benefits and costs of pol-
icy tools aimed at the expansion of the low-carbon energy sector. 
 Finally, patience is needed. The time lags between basic and applied 
research, development and testing, market introduction, and ultimate 
diffusion and the required feedbacks to earlier innovation stages in 
the process are substantial. Joint expectations (or visions) need time to 
emerge and accommodating social and institutional settings need time 
to develop. The international dimension in the development and diffu-
sion of innovations also requires patience. 
 Innovation and technology policies also can no longer remain frag-
mented,  ad hoc , and concentrated on individual technological options. 
A much more strategic and long-term approach is required to harness 
the potentials of well-functioning ETIS. Goals and objectives, weight-
ing of different (sometimes conflicting) objectives, strategies and 
implementation plans to be followed, evaluation criteria for contin-
ued reassessment, etc., all need to be formulated to involve relevant 
stakeholders and take account of international developments. Above 
all, this requires institutional innovations as, at present, correspond-
ing institutional frameworks and learning capabilities are insuffi-
ciently developed. Successful examples such as the Japanese national 
system of innovation can provide inspiration, but institutional solu-
tions need to be custom-tailored to their specific national or regional 
circumstances. 
 A paradigm for a strategic and long-term approach to ETIS is the 
concept of adaptive/policy learning. Strategies and policies need 
built-in mechanisms to assure flexibility and the ability to adjust 
courses of actions and policies to reflect new developments, in order 
to be able to react to and correct for unanticipated outcomes and 
surprises. There is an inherent tension between the desired criteria 
of flexibility/adaptability on one hand, and the equally desirable 
criteria of alignment, consistency, and patience on the other. These 
seemingly contradictory objectives can and should be reconciled, 
but it will involve an open institutional and policy architecture that 
can mobilize collective learning processes and widely shared stra-
tegic goals. 
 Openness implies increased sharing of data and experience and non-
exclusive networks of actors, nationally as well as internationally. In 
short, much higher levels of cooperation and knowledge exchange 
are needed to address the potential tensions between national 
policies and an increasingly globalized ETIS landscape via formal 
and informal information sharing, cooperation, and coordination 
agreements. Existing institutional solutions such as the IEA or the 
International Renewable Energy Agency can serve as useful entry 
points, but must be expanded to become both truly international 
and comprehensive in terms of their energy systems perspective, in 
particular in moving away from the traditional energy-supply bias 
to include energy efficiency and conservation in a more integrated 
way. 
 As daunting as the agenda for a systemic, consistent, and aligned long-
term technology policy framework may appear, improvements can be 
implemented gradually. An illustrative roadmap for action over time 
consistent with the dynamics of capital stock turnover rates in energy 
systems is given in  Table 24.9 . 
 Table 24.9 |  Illustrative roadmap for the development of a systemic, aligned, and consistent policy framework for energy technology innovation and diffusion matching 
policy approaches to realistic timescales of outcomes. 
Timescale of Policy Outcome Examples of Policy Approaches
 short term 
 (e.g., to 2020) 
 capital stock additions (some) 
 create, stimulate and protect market niches around performance advantages of new technologies 
 deploy market-ready, clean technologies through credible and stable incentive mechanisms 
 develop long-term technology innovation and market deployment strategies in a consultative process, creating “joint expectations” 
 reduce/eliminate direct or indirect subsidies for technologies not aligned to long-term technology strategy and portfolios 
 use “sunset” clauses for planned retirement of depreciated, inefﬁ cient, or polluting capital vintages 
 medium term 
 (e.g., to 2050) 
 capital stock additions (all), capital stock 
turnover (some) 
 expand public and private R&D investments stably in diversiﬁ ed portfolios designed to manage risks and corresponding with end-use needs 
 underwrite many granular and multifarious technology demonstration and learning cycles 
 support disclosure, interaction, and feedback between innovation system actors 
 engage in multiple international collaborative projects to further knowledge dissemination and technology spillovers 
 align innovation and market deployment incentives (e.g., recycling externality pricing revenues back to R&D and market deployment incentives) 
 long term 
 (e.g., to 2100) 
 capital stock additions (all), capital stock 
turnover (all) 
 set long-term targets with appropriate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to sustain shared technology expectations 
 maintain portfolio diversity to prevent premature lock-in or standardization 
 set technology standards for the gradual phase out of “bridging” technologies 
throughout (present-2100) create and nurture formal and informal institutional settings for technology assessment, evaluation, portfolio design, and knowledge sharing
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 24.5.3  What is New? 
 At the end of any assessment, it is legitimate to ask: what’s new? 
Readers will undoubtedly form their own opinions, but the (subjective) 
perspective of this chapter’s writing team is summarized below. 
 As a first, the chapter provides a synthetic overview of the resource 
requirements (in terms of investments) of the entire energy technology 
innovation and diffusion process. This assessment thus includes new 
data, including R&D expenditures in emerging economies, a summary 
synthesis of diffusion investments, and novel first-order estimates of 
end-use technology investments for which information has been lack-
ing to date. Notwithstanding the key role of innovation in the front end 
of the technology life cycle, the numbers nonetheless confirm the pre-
dominance of assuring an appropriate incentive environment for the 
adoption of innovations, where typically 80–90% of financial resources 
need to be mobilized. The numbers also confirm the critical importance 
of energy end-use and related technologies in ETIS that need to be bet-
ter reflected in R&D and market deployment incentives and new busi-
ness models. 
 The chapter also contains a rich set of new case studies on energy tech-
nological change, which are both novel in their scope and constitute a 
useful resource for research as well as policy learning. The case studies 
represent new, original research and are unusual for a major interna-
tional assessment such as the GEA. However, the fact that they could be 
conducted even under extreme resource constraints points to the wide 
interest and collaborative spirit of the technology community, which can 
be harnessed further to improve knowledge exchange and learning for 
successes and failures, moving technology policy forward. 
 The chapter also opens the “black box” of technological innovation and 
change. It analyzes the “finer grain” underlying the change in the multi-
tude of attributes and drivers of innovation: new knowledge, but also 
knowledge depreciation, economies of scale, linkages and spillovers to 
other sectors, phenomena of increasing returns inherent in knowledge 
generation and in infrastructure-intensive interconnected systems such 
as energy, as well as resource constraints and (relative) input prices. The 
new findings, while tentative, again confirm the importance of align-
ment and consistency under the overall umbrella of the complementarity 
of policies/measures/incentives rather than their substitutability. These 
findings add a new dimension to naive perceptions of the prevalence 
of either supply push (e.g., accelerated, stepped-up R&D programs) or 
demand pull (e.g., “cost buy down” in new technologies) that have 
characterized much of the literature and policy debates to date. 
 Finally, this chapter introduces the novel concept of “granularity.” 
Historically, successful innovations are characterized by a prevalence 
of a multitude and a diversity of “small” (locally adapted) solutions to 
problems that occur even at a global scale, as opposed to singular, large-
scale, planetary solutions (be it geo-engineering, solar power satellites, 
or a single design for a nuclear fusion reactor). “Granular,” small scale 
innovations offer the potential of multiple and repeated experimenta-
tions, learning, and adaptation to diverse adoption environments. An 
example is the dramatic difference in industrial and managerial experi-
ence that stems from building and operating a million wind turbines, 
as opposed to some 1000 nuclear reactors. From that perspective, the 
critical innovations paving the way to energy sustainability will reside 
in energy end-use (e.g., efficiency) and locally adapted supply options 
(e.g., in smaller-scale renewables) that are in stark contrast to the preva-
lence of a uniform, global technology landscape that has characterized 
the fossil fuel age. 
 24.6  Appendix I: Investments into ETIS 
 24.6.1  RD&D Investments 
 R&D expenditures at the macroeconomic level are routinely collected 
by national and international statistical agencies (see OECD, 2007). 
The data usually differentiate by funding source (public versus private 
sectors); by R&D performing institution (government laboratories, uni-
versities, or by private firms); and, finally, by broad economic sector. 
Methodologies, data collection, and compilations are well established 
(OECD, 2002). 
 Energy-related or technology-specific RD&D data are not reported 
separately in these macroeconomic statistical frameworks, creating 
formidable data challenges. For a concise review of data sources, meth-
odological issues, and limitations of energy RD&D data, see Dooley 
(2000). Energy- and technology-specific RD&D data are available for 
public sector expenditures in member countries of the IEA (IEA, 2009b), 
but information on non-IEA countries (Brazil, China, and India, or 
Russia, to name the most important ones) and especially for private 
sector energy RD&D are extremely fragmented and sparse. Evidence 
suggests that the IEA public sector energy RD&D statistics may cover 
only about a quarter of all energy-related RD&D globally, where private 
sector RD&D and increasingly non-IEA countries substantially contribute 
to energy RD&D. This assessment therefore includes an effort to com-
pile national energy RD&D data on the emerging economies of BRIMCS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico, China, and South Africa), conducted by 
a team of researchers at Harvard University (Kempener et al.,  2010b ; 
see the  Emerging Economies R&D case study summarized in  Section 
24.7.8 ) that also includes (albeit incomplete) coverage of private sector 
RD&D in these countries. For private sector energy RD&D in OECD coun-
tries, this chapter could only draw on the survey conducted by the World 
Energy Council in 2001 (WEC, 2001) for a sample of OECD countries. 
More recent international comparative data are simply unavailable. 
 24.6.1.1  Public Sector Energy RD&D 
 Figure 24.14 summarizes the trends in public sector energy RD&D since 
1974 in IEA member countries and contrasts it with total public RD&D 
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expenditures. While total reported energy technology RD&D expendi-
tures by definition include demonstration investments in addition to 
R&D expenditures, little detailed data are available. IEA (2009b) reports a 
total of some $550 million 17 at purchasing power parities (PPP) for seven 
countries for which such data are available. The United States represents 
the bulk of this figure, with approximately $444 million development 
expenditures, corresponding to some 4% of total public energy technol-
ogy RD&D in all the IEA member countries in 2008. Hence, it is fair to say 
that public energy RD&D expenditures are in fact mostly R&D expendi-
tures with little expenditure on technology demonstration proper. 
 A defining characteristic of energy RD&D is both its comparably small 
magnitude (5% of total government RD&D), as well as its boom and bust 
cyclical nature, characterized by rapid expansion in the wake of the oil 
crises of the 1970s, its subsequent collapse (with corresponding impacts 
on knowledge depreciation), and only gradual recovery after the year 
2000. This is in stark contrast to the continually expanding overall R&D 
budget in IEA member countries. These trends are extensively discussed 
in the literature (Dooley and Runci, 2000; Doornbosch and Upton, 2006) 
and have been referred to repeatedly as “R&D under-investment” by 
researchers (e.g., Nemet and Kammen, 2007) and business executives 
(e.g., AEIC, 2010). 
 Figure 24.15 summarizes the historical evolution of IEA member coun-
try energy RD&D by broad technology class, illustrating a third area of 
concern: asymmetries in public energy RD&D portfolios (see  Box 24.7 
on RD&D Portfolios). Total public sector RD&D in IEA member coun-
tries in 2008 amounted to some $12.7 billion (PPP). Close to $5 billion 
was spent on nuclear (fission and fusion), $3 billion on “other” energy 
technologies (hydrogen; electric power outside renewables, fossils, and 
nuclear; electricity transport and distribution; as well as basic energy 
research), and about $1.5 billion on fossil fuels and energy efficiency, 
respectively (for a tabular overview for IEA countries see  Box 24.7 . For 
BRIMCS countries, see overview in  Section 24.7.7 ). 
 As discussed above, comparable internationally comprehensive energy 
RD&D statistics for non-IEA member countries are lacking. This results 
in the (incorrect) perception that energy RD&D and technology devel-
opment is primarily performed in OECD countries. Given that this is 
no longer the case, enlarging global energy RD&D reporting systems 
remains a critical task. The Kempener et al. ( 2010b ) energy RD&D sur-
vey on BRIMCs countries, suggests that public energy RD&D in the six 
BRIMCS countries amounted to some $2.7 billion dollars 18 in aggregat-
ing national data sources, compared with US$4.4 billion public energy 
R&D in the United States in 2008 (IEA, 2009b). The case of BRIMCS 
countries also illustrates the fact that the traditional distinction between 
public (i.e., government) and private (privately-owned companies) sec-
tors as sources of RD&D funding becomes increasingly blurred. Whole 
or partially state-owned enterprises (e.g., national oil and gas compan-
ies, utilities) constitute an important part of the energy sector in devel-
oping and emerging economies and also in many OECD countries. The 
RD&D expenditures in state-owned enterprises are strongly determined 
by national governmental policies. Combining public and semi-private 
energy RD&D, BRIMCS countries have a total current energy RD&D 
budget of some $15 billion (PPP), about equal to the entire public sec-
tor energy RD&D expenditures in IEA member countries ($13 billion, 
PPP) and still about half of the combined public and private energy 
RD&D in OECD countries (estimated here at approximately $25 billion). 
A commonality in the energy RD&D budgets of IEA member countries 
and BRIMCS countries is the dominance of fossil fuel and nuclear tech-
nologies, which currently receive some $11 billion (PPP) in total RD&D 
funding, or some 75% of total energy RD&D in BRIMCS countries. IEA 
member countries invest close to 50% of their public energy RD&D 
investments in these technologies (>$6 billion; $10 billion when private 
RD&D investments are included). 
 24.6.1.2  Private Sector Energy RD&D 
 The situation with respect to data availability of private R&D expen-
ditures is dire. The Directorate General for Research of the European 
Commission states, “Despite the growing need, statistics on energy R&D 
expenditures in the private sector remain a problem” (EC, 2005).  17  2008 International $. The R&D expenditure data in this section are expressed 
throughout in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) in order to improve compar-
ability across very different economies. One drawback of PPP is, however, that simple 
ex post adjustments to a common base year (2005 in GEA) are not possible for inter-
national, cross-country statistics. Differences to 2005$ PPP should however be minor. 




















































 Figure 24.14 |  OECD public R&D expenditures (US 2000 $ PPP) versus public sector 
energy R&DD in IEA countries (us 2008 $ PPP). Note the factor of 10 difference in the 
scale of the two expenditure categories and the opposing time trends since 1985. 
Source: Doornbosch and Upton, 2006 (in US 2000 $ PPP); IEA, 2009a (in US 2008 $ PPP). 
 18  Data limitations preclude a comparison for an identical base year. Instead, the totals 
reported aggregate national statistical data for reporting years that vary between 
2004 (China) to 2008 (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa). Numbers are expressed 
in terms of PPP. 
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 Macroeconomic RD&D statistics by broad economic sector are avail-
able for a sample of 19 OECD countries in the OECD Structural 
Analysis database (OECD, 2009). However, the latest year reported 
is 2002. Data for other countries are not collected and available in 
any internationally comparable form. In 2002, business enterprises 
excluding extractive industries (coal mining; oil and gas extraction) 
performed R&D equivalent to $433 billion (PPP in 2000$) in the sam-
ple of 19 OECD countries provided. The only sectorial breakdown 
available that bears directly on the energy sector are “coke, refined 
petroleum products and nuclear fuel” ($2.7 billion) and “elec-
tricity, gas, and water supply” ($2 billion), with an OECD total of 
energy-related private sector RD&D of less than $5 billion (PPP). Of 
course, RD&D performed in the manufacturing sector has a bear-
ing on energy use, e.g., such as in electrical machinery ($13 billion), 
motor vehicles 19 ($50 billion), or aircraft ($20 billion; see NSF, 2010). 
How much of the RD&D performed in these sectors is energy-related 
remains unknown. 
 The only available survey of private sector RD&D specific to the energy 
sector is the study conducted by the World Energy Council (WEC, 2001), 
covering the period 1997–2000 for a sample of seven OECD countries, 
which are summarized in  Table 24.10 . In addition to the WEC survey, 
the most recent private sector RD&D data for the United States for 2004 
(NSF, 2009) are listed for comparison. 
 The information available on total OECD private sector energy RD&D 
from 1993–2000 amounted to some $12 billion annually. The tech-
nology-specific breakdown is too incomplete and the data too old to 
warrant a detailed discussion. However, it is noteworthy that with the 
exception of Japan, private sector R&D on energy efficiency appears 
either to be unrecorded or, when subsumed under the “other” (or unac-
counted for) category, remains extremely small outside Japan. Thus, the 
sparse available data suggest that also private sector energy R&D seems 
to follow the supply side (fossil and nuclear) over-emphasis apparent in 
public sector R&D in OECD countries. 
 For non-OECD countries, the Kempener et al. ( 2010b ) survey on BRIMCS 
puts the OECD numbers in perspective (for a detailed breakdown, see 
the table in  Section 24.7.7 ). The information available on investments in 
energy RD&D in the BRIMCS countries by the private sector and state-
owned enterprises also amount to about $12 billion (PPP 2008), albeit 



























































 Figure 24.15 |  Public sector energy RD&D in IEA member countries by major technology group 1974–2008 (in US 2000 $ million PPP). Source: data based on IEA, 2009a. 
 19  The six automobile manufacturers listed among the top 25 global corporations in 
2006, performed between US$4.6 billion (Honda) to US$7.5 billion (Toyota) in R&D, 
with a total of some US$39 billion. Other corporations, whose R&D is likely to include 
an important energy component are Siemens (US$6.6 billion), Samsung (US$5.9 bil-
lion) Matsushita (US$4.9 billion), Sony (US$4.6 billion), and Bosch (US$4.4 billion) 
(NSF, 2010). This listing alone suggests that in terms of private energy-related RD&D, 
energy end-use technologies are most likely to be of much greater importance than 
energy supply. 
Policies for the Energy Technology Innovation System (ETIS) Chapter 24
1716
 Box 24.7 |  R&D Portfolios 
 How can we assess current energy technology R&D portfolios, i.e., the technologies we invest in, with the technology investments needed 
for an energy sustainability transition? 
 One way is to describe alternative futures through the scenario technique and use models to calculate the future market potential of 
speciﬁ c energy technologies. This potential can be contrasted with public sector energy R&D spending (see the  Technology Portfolio case 
study based on Grubler and Riahi (2010) and summarized in  Appendix II below). 
 Given that the future is inherently uncertain, one needs to explore a wide range of possibilities, i.e., a reasonable number of scenarios. 
The results of these scenarios can be analyzed to derive “need-based” technology portfolios that can guide RD&D allocations across 
technology ﬁ elds. A large-scale scenario study (Riahi et al., 2007) explicitly addressed the question of how the portfolio of GHG 
mitigation technologies changes as a function of the representation of salient uncertainties including energy demand, resource 
constraints, availability and costs of technologies, and the magnitude of GHG emissions constraints. For the quantiﬁ cation of the 
respective role of individual groups of technologies in the entire GHG emission reduction portfolios, the concept of mitigation “wedges” 
(Pacala and Socolow, 2004) was used. A mitigation wedge as deﬁ ned in Riahi et al., 2007 is simply the contribution to the cumulative 
emissions reduction over the period 2000–2100 that a particular option provides compared to a baseline scenario. First, three baseline 
scenarios without GHG emissions constraints were compared to corresponding hypothetical baselines that assume a “frozen” state 
of technology in the year 2000 (i.e., no technological change/improvements). Then, for each baseline scenario a range of increasingly 
stringent GHG emissions constraint scenarios are calculated (constraints vary from as low as 450 ppm CO 2 -equivalent GHG concentration 
by 2100 all the way up to 1390 ppmv-equivalent). Additional model sensitivity analyses then explored the impacts of the unavailability 
of particular technological options (e.g., nuclear or CCS). The calculated aggregated technology speciﬁ c GHG mitigation “wedges” are 
summarized in  Figure 24.16 , showing mean as well as minima/maxima across all scenarios explored. The ranking of different mitigation 
options is quite robust across the scenarios explored, with energy efﬁ ciency and conservation being the single most important option 
with typically >50% contribution and nuclear with a typical 10% contribution to cumulative 2000–2100 emission reduction. The results 
are representative of other modeling studies, e.g., as reported by the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF-22) where the maximum share of 
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 Figure 24.16 |  Distribution of past (1974–2008) and current (2008) public sector 
energy technology R&D portfolios in member countries of the IEA (right) versus port-
folios of future GHG mitigation needs (min/mean/max, left) derived from an extensive 
scenario uncertainty analysis. Source: adapted from Grubler and Riahi, 2010. 
 It is also instructive to compare the calculated future mitigation 
potentials of technologies with RD&D expenditures, summarized for 
the total of all IEA countries above. A  signiﬁ cant mismatch in R&D 
portfolios in favor of nuclear and to the detriment of energy efﬁ ciency 
and conservation emerges. Nuclear received well above 50% of all 
cumulative (1974–2008) R&D expenditures, with energy efﬁ ciency 
receiving less than 10%, whereas their respective role in the GHG 
mitigation portfolios is exactly the inverse. To put these numbers into 
an absolute perspective: cumulative public R&D into energy efﬁ ciency 
totaled some 38 billion $ 2008 (in purchasing power [PPP] terms), which 
is lower than total cumulative expenditure into fusion energy ($41 
billion PPP). Current R&D levels into renewable and CCS (which is 
subsumed in the “other” category above that includes  inter alia also 
hydrogen, fuel cells, and basic energy research) are also much lower 
than a future “need-based” analysis suggests, albeit the mismatch is 
less striking than the one comparing energy efﬁ ciency to nuclear. 
 Were current energy technology R&D portfolios to represent the 
respective “option value” of alternative technologies in a climate-
constrained world, one would have to increase current R&D into 
energy efﬁ ciency by at least a factor ﬁ ve or by some $6 billion 
PPP per year (thus not proposing a reduction in nuclear R&D). 
Given that improved energy efﬁ ciency has multiple public beneﬁ ts 
beyond climate change (e.g., less energy use, reduced local air 
pollution, and lessened import dependence) even more ambitious 
increases in public energy R&D budgets for energy efﬁ ciency 
would be justiﬁ ed. 
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 There is evidence from the United States that private sector energy RD&D 
appears to follow comparable trends as public R&D ( Figure 24.17 ), as 
both are influenced by rising and falling oil prices. One interpretation 
of these joint trends is “that the signal of commitment that a large 
government initiative sends to private investors outweighs any crowd-
ing-out effects associated with competition over funding or retention 
of scientists and engineers” (Nemet and Kammen, 2007). By analogy, 
the same influences also appear at work in periods of declining pub-
lic R&D budgets. The available empirical evidence at present appears 
insufficient to support the often advanced argument of “crowding-out” 
effects, i.e., expanded public sector R&D would substitute (crowd-out) 
private sector R&D (e.g., Popp, 2006). 
 24.6.1.3  Total Energy RD&D 
 Based on the limited data available, the order of magnitude estimate 
of global energy RD&D amounts to some $50 billion (PPP) with some 
$15 billion in public sector RD&D and up to $35 billion by the private 
sector. About half of all energy RD&D is spent on fossil fuels and nuclear 
according to this assessment. The Sustainable Energy Finance Initiative’s 
(SEFI) estimate (UNEP/SEFI/NEF, 2009 21 ) of global RD&D into sustainable 
energy of some $12.4 billion for the year 2005 (including $6.8 billion pri-
vate and $5.6 billion public sector RD&D) is insufficiently documented 
to allow a more in-depth comparison, but are likely to represent an opti-
mistic estimate. 
 24.6.2  Market Formation Investments 
 Market-formation investments include public and private investments 
in the early stages of technological diffusion and are sometimes also 
referred to as “niche market” investments. In the energy domain, these 
investments include government subsidies for certain technologies (e.g., 
feed-in tariffs or production tax credits) and public procurement. They 
also include private investments that may take advantage of markets 
created by government policies, such as renewable performance stand-
ards or price instruments like carbon taxes. 
 Market-formation investments in the energy sector as a whole are diffi-
cult to track, because many transactions are unreported, ways of measur-
ing market-formation investments are not yet harmonized internationally, 
and efforts to track such investments are only relatively recent. 
 24.6.2.1  Analysis of Market Formation Sustainable 
Energy Investments 
 Market formation investments in sustainable energy (solar, wind,  •
biofuels, biomass and waste-to-energy, marine and small-hydro, 
geothermal, efficiency, and other low-carbon technologies/ser-
vices) can be measured by activity in three main asset classes: 
venture capital/private equity; new listings on public markets; and 
asset finance.  Figure 24.18 shows the distribution across the three 
asset classes with total investments across all regions growing 
 Table 24.10 |  Private sector energy RD&D, selected OECD countries from WEC (2001) survey (in billion US 2001 $ 22 ). Also, for the US latest available data for 2004 (NSF, 2009) 
are shown for comparison. 
Billion US$ US  US Japan Korea Sweden France Denmark Spain  Total 
in year 2000  2004 1997 1998 1997 1998 1993 1998 ~2000
Efﬁ ciency 6.10  6.1 
Fossil fuels 0.81  1.04 0.84 0.03 0.56  2.2 
Nuclear 0.03  0.03 1.00 1.17  2.2 
Renewables 0.29  ? 
Other or non-spec. 0.36  1.21 0.03 0.05  ? 
 Total  1.20  2.28  8.6  0.06  0.1  1.78  0.08  0.08  11.9 
 20  To convert to US 2005 $ multiply by 1.09. 
 21  The Sustainable Energy Finance Initiative is convened by UNEP, with participation 
from Bloomberg New Energy Finance (NEF): www.seﬁ .unep.org/. 
 Figure 24.17 |  Trends in US public and private energy RD&D (billion us 2002 $ 20 ). Source: 
Nemet and Kammen, 2007. 
 22  These rather outdated (but only available) data are presented here mainly for illus-
trative purposes. In order to avoid confusion, currencies have not been converted to 
the more recent GEA base year of 2005. 
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at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 63%/year between 
2004 and 2008. 
 The largest asset class within market formation investments is asset  •
finance, which includes the building of new assets financed via either 
project finance or balance sheet/syndicated equity. While often 
investing in quite large and more mature technologies, asset finance 
investments in sustainable energy are counted here as part of “mar-
ket formation” because they are highly dependent on governmental 
subsidies and incentives such as tax equity credits or feed-in tariffs. 
The amounts also include estimated investments for small-scale and 
residential installations of sustainable energy technologies such as 
biodigesters, micro-wind turbines, and solar hot water systems. 
 Brazilian ethanol was excluded from market-formation investment  •
totals, as these investments are no longer substantially supported 
by government subsidies (see the  Brazilian Ethanol case study). The 
net effect of doing so was to reduce the total amounts invested by 
US$17.2 billion for 2004–2008 and US$8 billion in 2008 across all 
asset classes. (These investments are included in the diffusion invest-
ment category in this assessment, summarized in  Section 24.6.3 
below.) 
 The technology sector attracting the most investment for 2004–2008  •
is wind. Wind-related investments grew at an AGR of 51%/year in 
this period. 
 Investments into energy efficiency are small (~2%).  •
 The regions that saw the most investment were OECD countries,  •
notably Europe, at 45%, and North America, at 30%, of total invest-
ments for the 2004–2008 period. 
 24.6.2.2  Spotlight on Venture Capital and Private Equity 
(VC/PE) Energy Investments 
 While often characterized as investing in highly risky assets, VC/PE inves-
tors typically invest after a good deal of technology risk has already 
 23  “Sustainable energy,” according to UNEP/SEFI/NEF, includes: solar, wind, biofuels, 
biomass and waste to energy, marine and small-hydro, geothermal, efﬁ ciency, and 
other low-carbon technologies/services. It excludes large-scale hydro (>50MW) and 
all nuclear power. 
 24  Figure 24.18 includes both project ﬁ nance for large scale installations and small 
scale and residential installations as estimated by UNEP/SEFI/NEF. 
 Box 24.8 |  How large are the investments in sustainable energy? 
 It has been reported that over US$200 billion in investments have 
been made into sustainable energy, 23 and in 2008, this grew to 
US$223 billion (UNEP/SEFI/NEF, 2009). However, as a leading 
indicator for the growth of sustainable energy infrastructure, the 
total US$223 billion is misleading because it includes a number 
of transactions – a full 30% – that are purely ﬁ nancial, such as 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), reﬁ nancings, and buyouts. These 
transactions represent changes in ownership rather than input 
investments into energy technologies. 
 Figure 24.18 shows a breakdown of the US$223 billion in 
investment transactions in 2008 for sustainable energy as 
tracked by UNEP/SEFI/NEF, 24 and maps them against the 
categories of RD&D and market formation used in this chapter. 
By doing so, a clearer picture of the scale of input investments 
into the sustainable energy technology system emerges. 
Technology-speciﬁ c (as opposed to ownership changes 
represented by some US$67 billion for mergers and acquisitions) 
investments amounted to a total of some US$ 2008 160 billion. 
RD&D (public and private) made up US$18 billion, with the 
bulk of the investments (US$141 billion) classiﬁ ed as market 
formation investments into sustainable energy technologies. 
67bn: M&A, Refinancing, Buyouts 
117bn: Asset/Project Finance 
11bn: Public Markets, New Equity 
7bn: Private Equity 
6bn: Venture Capital 
8bn: Government R&D 





 Figure 24.18 |  Investments into sustainable energy in 2008. Data source: SEFI/UNEP/
NEF, 2009. 
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been mitigated, when markets for the new technologies are somewhat 
defined, and when the entrepreneurial company is formed and function-
ing. VC/PE investors hope to profit from the rapid scaling up of the tech-
nology in formative markets, at which point they can sell their equity 
stake at a high multiple on what they initially invested (see also the 
 Venture Capital case study summarized in  Section 24.7.8 ). 
 Compared to coal, oil and gas, and nuclear energy, sustainable energy 
technologies are less mature technologies, and VC/PE capital and skill can 
help accelerate the transition from demonstration to market adoption. 
 The following investment amounts build upon the UNEP/SEFI/NEF data 
presented above by adding fossil-fuel technologies and installations 
with data gathered from the Thomson/Reuter’s VentureXpert database 
(Thomson Financial, 2009). Total amounts and numbers of investments 
are likely to be higher than what is listed here because investments 
made by VC/PE funds into energy technology companies forming new 
markets are often not publicly reported, and investments made by angel 
(individual) investors are also not reliably reported, even if such invest-
ments serve as an important source of capital for both very new and 
later stage venture companies with energy technologies. 
 There has been a dramatic growth of investment by VC/PE investors into 
energy – and specifically into clean energy technologies – since the mid 
to late 2000s.  Figure 24.20 illustrates the recent growth of VC invest-
ment into both fossil and non-fossil energy technologies following the 
regional disaggregation given in the original data source. 
 Between 2002 and 2008, at least US$40.88 billion was invested by  •
VC/PE investors into energy technology firms; in some 2,375 
transactions. 
 In 2008, the total amount of energy (fossil and non-fossil) invest- •
ments made by professional VC/PE investors worldwide was US$14.6 
billion. This grew from some $1.14 billion in 2002. 
 The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for the 2002–2008 period  •
is 53%/year for the total amounts invested and 26%/year for the 
number of investment rounds (“deals”) made. 
 The bulk of the investment went into North American and European  •
companies with non-fossil-based energy generation technologies. 
This uneven distribution reflects both the limited availability of data 
outside North America and Europe, and the limited availability of pro-
fessional VC/PE in some regions of the world with other forms of finan-
cing more common such as family-firm or investments made by large 
corporations. 
 Figure 24.21 shows that the majority of investments made by VC/PE 
investors are in sustainable/renewable energy generation and end-use 
efficiency technologies over fossil fuels and power generation technolo-
gies. Specifically: 
 solar energy-related technology companies have attracted the high- •
est amounts of investments overall, representing some 30% of global 
energy VC for the whole period. Solar investments grew particularly 
rapidly between 2005–2008 in terms of numbers of deals and total 
amounts invested; and 
 “end-use efficiency” (such as smart energy metering in buildings,  •
demand response software systems, high efficiency lighting, etc.) 



































Asset Financing VC/PE Public Markets
 Figure 24.19 |  Yearly investments in market-formation for sustainable energy tech-
nologies 2004–2008 (total transaction/year in billion US 2008 $). The total market for-
mation investments in 2008 exclude US$8 billion in Brazilian ethanol (classiﬁ ed here 
as diffusion investments) from the total of US$141 billion reported in Figure 24.18. 
Source: O’Rourke, 2009; UNEP/SEFI/NEF, 2009; bloomberg new energy ﬁ nance data-



























Africa Asia/Paciifc Europe & Middle East Americas
 Figure 24.20 |  Total amounts of VC/PE in energy by year and region (in 1000 US 2008 $). 
Sources: O’Rourke, 2009; Bloomberg New Energy Finance database (courtesy of ERD3 
project harvard; NEF/SEFI, 2009); Thomson Reuters Venturexpert Database (Thomson 
Financial, 2009). 
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 24.6.3  Diffusion Investments 
 Energy sector diffusion investment data are sparse and not collected 
systematically nationally or internationally. Modeling studies, as well 
as limited survey data, allow estimates of energy-supply investment 
levels, but energy end-use investment data are almost entirely lacking. 
Instead of concluding with the simple statement of data unavailability, 
this assessment explores some of the reasons for the lack of data and 
aims to provide at least some plausible estimates of orders of magni-
tude to provoke discussion and subsequent research in this extremely 
under-researched and under-reported area. 
 24.6.3.1  Energy Supply Investments 
 Data on energy supply investments are extremely limited, so the lit-
erature typically relies on model estimates (multiplying statistical data 
and/or estimates on capacity expansion with average technology-
specific investment costs to derive total energy supply investments) 
or limited surveys. Energy supply modeling studies have become avail-
able since the mid-1990s in academia (e.g., Nakicenovic and Rogner, 
1996; Naki ć enovi ć et al., 1998; Riahi et al., 2007), as well as from the 
work of the IEA, particularly the World Energy Investment Outlook (IEA, 
2003); the Energy Technology Perspectives (IEA, 2006; 2008b); and the 
recurrent projections of IEA’s World Energy Outlook (e.g., IEA, 2006; 
2007; 2008a; 2009a), which also contain unique survey data on energy 
supply investments, particularly in the oil and gas industry. A common 
feature (and drawback) of all modeling studies is that energy sector 
investments are not reported for their corresponding base year values, 
but instead as cumulative totals of the projection horizon of typically 
30 years. The absence of published base year input data for energy 
sector investment projections not only reduces the credibility of the 
modeling studies, but also makes an assessment of current investment 
levels and structure and a comparison among the different studies 
an almost impossible task. 25 In the assessment below, we summarize 
available information by drawing on the only modeling study that has 
disclosed its underlying base year energy investment numbers (Riahi et 
al., 2007) 26 and the surveys reported in IEA’s WEO (IEA, 2006; 2008a; 
2009a). Because of the significant price escalation observed for energy 
sector investments (particularly for oil and gas since 2004), the Riahi 
et al. (2007) estimate (that refers to year 2000 investments and price 
levels) can be considered a lower bound, assuming recent price escala-
tions will not remain permanent. Conversely, the IEA numbers can be 
considered as an upper-bound estimate of investments in energy sup-
ply (see  Table 24.11 ). 
 Despite differences in estimated supply-side investments per category, 
the available data suggest a likely order of magnitude of energy-supply 
 25  Therefore wherever possible, underlying investment numbers of modeling studies 
should be made publicly available. 
 26  Numbers have been published in an interactive web-based database. Base year data 
refer to capacity additions and price levels for the year 2000 but were expressed in 
US 1990 $. These were converted to the GEA standard of US 2005 $ using the US GDP 
deﬂ ator multiplier of 1.4. However, despite being expressed in US 2005 $, price levels 
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 Figure 24.21 |  VC/PE investments in energy technologies by technology cluster between 2002–2008 in billion US 2008 $. (“Biofuels” category excludes investments made into 
Brazilian ethanol companies, accounted for diffusion investments in  Section 24.6.3 below.) Source: O’Rourke, 2009; Bloomberg New Energy Finance database (courtesy of 
ERD3 Project Harvard; NEF/SEFI, 2009); Thomson Reuters Venturexpert Data Base (Thomson Financial, 2009). 
Chapter 24 Policies for the Energy Technology Innovation System (ETIS)
1721
side investment of some US 2005 $700 billion/year that could extend to 
some US$840 billion in 2007/2008, considering the higher ranges 
reported in the literature. Investments are dominated by electricity gen-
eration and transport and distribution (T&D), with some US 2005 $500 
billion. Fossil fuel supply, particularly the “upstream” component (i.e., 
exploration and production), accounts for US$250 27 -400 billion, mostly 
for oil and gas. 
 Renewables that figured prominently in market formation investments 
discussed above are minor players under the market conditions char-
acterizing current diffusion investments. Liquid and gaseous biofuels 
account for US$20 billion, including US$8 billion for Brazilian ethanol 
(UNEP/SEFI/NEF, 2009). Large-scale hydropower (<US$100 billion for 
annual capacity additions of between 25–30 GW) make up a maximum 
of 17% of current supply-side investments. 
 Major uncertainties include the accounting for oil and gas exploration 
activities (at some US$40 billion) that are, strictly speaking, not energy 
technology investments. When categorized as RD&D activity for future 
oil/gas reserves – as is the practice by some companies – oil and gas 
exploration would represent the single largest RD&D spending in the 
energy technology field. Major differences also exist for electricity trans-
port and distribution infrastructure investments for which only model-
ing study data are available and estimates differ by about a factor of 
three. The IEA WEO 2008 projection of average annual electricity T&D 
infrastructure investments of US$230 billion over the period 2007–2015 
appears extremely high, and is comparable to the corresponding electri-
city generation capacity expansion investments. Lastly, it is interesting 
to note that no studies available report actual data for current invest-
ments in nuclear energy (even though nuclear figures prominently in 
future projections). According to IEA (2002; 2009a), installed nuclear 
capacity expanded by 20 GW between 1999 and 2007. IEA (2008a) 
reports an increase from 358 to 376 GW between 2000 and 2006, which 
yields an average annual net increase in nuclear capacity of between 
2–3 GW, mostly in Asia where investment costs are comparatively 
modest at an estimated 1500–2500 $/kW (see  Chapter 14 ). This sug-
gests current investments of between US$3–7.5 billion/year for nuclear 
 Table 24.11 |  Range of energy supply investments in Billion US 2005 $. (T&D: transport and distribution of electricity). 
LOW 1 HIGH 2 
2000 prices & activity 2005–07 prices & activity
FUELS
UPSTREAM:
Exploration fossil fuels n.a. 40
Extraction fossil fuels 180 180–360
DOWNSTREAM † : n.a. 100–140
Synfuels, fossil 1 7
Biofuels 20 n.a.
Other 20 n.a.







TOTAL POWER >500 450–520*
TOTAL SUPPLY INVESTMENTS >720 750–840*
 *  Total minima/maxima ranges are not additive from (sub-)component min/max ranges. 
 ** Mimima excludes exploration while maxima includes exploration. 
 † Downstream includes reﬁ ning, pipelines etc. 
 1  Riahi et al., 2007. 
 2  IEA, 2006; 2008a; 2009a. 
 27  Taking the Riahi et al. (2007) estimate of US$220 billion, complemented by not 
reported investment categories, the estimated grand total includes US$230 billion 
for fossil fuels and US$20 billion for biofuels. 
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reactors, which makes this the only technology in which RD&D invest-
ments  exceed diffusion investments. (Given its technological maturity of 
over 40 years since its first market introduction, nuclear can reasonably 
not be considered a technology in its market formation stage, where 
such an investment pattern would be both possible and plausible.) 
 The assessment of the nuclear industry in terms of technological and 
investment risks by markets, as reflected in actual technology invest-
ments, departs markedly from the overemphasis of nuclear in public 
RD&D portfolios. This misalignment suggests two critical questions for 
technology policy. First, is the public sector energy RD&D confined to 
investments in innovations that ultimately find little market appeal? 
Alternatively, given the heavy emphasis of public RD&D on nuclear, 
is the public sector providing sufficiently consistent market deploy-
ment incentives so the heavily subsidized technology finds market 
applications? 
 Evidence regarding the time trend of supply-side energy investments 
is scarce in the literature. An intriguing empirical finding from the 
United States, however, shows a significant decline in energy supply-
side investments as a share of sector revenues for electricity gener-
ation in the second half of the twentieth century ( Figure 24.22 ). The 
declining investments (as a share of revenues) in the US electricity 
sector suggest a substantial thinning of resources available for capital 
turnover and diffusion of new technologies as a twin result of slowing 
demand growth and energy sector deregulation and liberalization. At 
present, it remains unclear if this trend is a specific phenomenon of 
OECD countries or of US electricity supply (an increasingly deregulated 
sector). However the example supports the conclusion that better cur-
rent and longitudinal data on energy sector investments are needed for 
improved decision-making. 
 This assessment of diffusion investments has focused on the global 
level for the simple reason that regionally disaggregated investment 
survey data are lacking. Modeling studies suggest that current (year 
2000) energy supply-side investments are distributed about 60:40 
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries, as defined by the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992). 
Short-term projections (e.g., to 2030 by IEA, 2009a) suggest roughly a 
50:50 split between energy supply investment needs between Annex I 
and non-Annex I countries, for a global total of cumulative energy sup-
ply investments 2008–2030 of some US 2008 $25 trillion. 
 24.6.3.2  Energy End-use Investments 
 The decentralized nature of these investments by private households 
(and their corresponding classification as consumer expenditures rather 
than investments) and by firms (whose energy-specific investments go 
unrecorded) explains the absence of energy end-use investment num-
bers in the literature. The small-scale nature and formidable definitional 
challenges 28 of these numbers also contributes to their absence. This lack 
of data, even model estimates, 29 introduces a serious challenge in both 
energy modeling and policy, because the potentially largest source of 
energy demand (and emissions) reduction is either entirely ignored or 
assumed to cost nothing. Customary energy and climate policy models 
deal with energy end-use costs by either “assuming away” missing data 
by exogenous (and policy independent) autonomous energy efficiency 
trends or by considering investment costs for the incremental component 
of energy end-use investments related to improved energy efficiency, 
which in itself provides a formidable definitional and data challenge. 
 To address this gap,  Chapter 24 presents the first global, bottom-up 
estimate of total investment costs in energy end-use technologies. 
Volume data (production, delivery, sales, and installations) and cost 
estimates to approximate total investment costs in 2005 are esti-
mated in both end-use technologies and their specific energy-using 
components. 30 Low and high sensitivities around central estimates are 
included, taking into account uncertainties in both volume and cost 
assumptions. The intention is to provide a first order, educated guess 
point of comparison with supply-side investments. Supporting data 
and a discussion text are posted on the GEA  Chapter 24 website 31 
 28  For instance, it is far from trivial to discern the energy component in the total invest-
ments of a new building. Depending on where the systems boundary is drawn, one 
could look at the heating and air conditioning system, including that part of the 
building structure that determines its energy use (insulation, windows). Indeed, the 
entire building structure may be considered. 
 29  Some studies include incremental energy end-use technology investments associated 
with additional energy efﬁ ciency gains above a typical “business as usual” scenario 
(e.g., IEA, 2009a). Apart from introducing additional deﬁ nitional ambiguities (i.e., 
what constitutes incremental investments), the modeling is usually only done for a 
few technologies (e.g., transport), which limits its usefulness to inform policy. 
 30  Available data do not allow a further disaggregation into those subcomponents of 
investments on energy efﬁ ciency improvements, which remains an important future 
research task. 
 31  See www.globalenergyassessment.org. 
 Figure 24.22 |  Declining investments (as share of revenues) in the US electricity sec-
tor, 1925–2000. Source: modiﬁ ed from EPRI, 2003. 
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to document the assumptions underlying the estimates below, solicit 
feedback and comments, and invite further research in this critical 
area (See also Wilson and Grubler, 2011). 
 To ensure comparability between supply-side and demand-side invest-
ments, a common definition of the unit of analysis is needed.  Supply-
side investments are quantified at the level of the power plant, refinery, 
or liquefied natural gas terminal. These are complex, integrated techno-
logical systems with energy conversion technologies at their core. These 
energy-converting components are configured within their correspond-
ing technological system to provide a traded energy carrier to intermedi-
ate users (utilities, fuel distributors, pipeline, or shipping companies). 
 The logical demand-side analogues of these technological systems are 
the aircraft, vehicle, refrigerator, and home heating system. Although 
generally less complex, each of these technological systems similarly 
has an energy conversion technology at their core (i.e., the jet engine, 
internal combustion engine, compressor, boiler). In addition, each is con-
figured to provide a useful service to final users. 
 With demand-side technologies, however, this definition of the unit 
of analysis is problematic. Investments in (and performance of) 
end-use technologies are dependent on investments in associated 
infrastructure such as airports, roads, and buildings. Is it meaning-
ful to quantify the investment cost of a home heating system with-
out quantifying the investment cost of a home and the insulation 
level that determine the dimensioning of the home heating system 
in the first place? Is the end-use technology to consider a boiler or 
a building? 
 Although the same issue exists on the supply-side, it is largely 
addressed by additionally quantifying investment costs in associ-
ated transmission and distribution infrastructures in policy models, 
as comprehensive statistics are also lacking on the supply side. The 
problem on the demand side is that the same approach would result 
in a sum of the total investment costs in all building structures, 
roads, railways, ports, airports, industrial machinery, equipment, 
and appliances. Such an exercise would amount to a  reductio ad 
absurdum. 
 A pragmatic pathway out of this system boundary ambiguity is to 
provide a range of estimates for a range of system boundaries of 
energy end-use technologies. An initial broader definition and data set 
describes end-use technologies as the smallest (or cheapest) discrete 
purchasable units by final consumers. This implies boilers and air con-
ditioning units not houses, and dish washers and ovens not kitchens. A 
second, narrower definition and data set describes the specific energy-
using components of these end-use technologies. This implies engines in 
cars, and light bulbs in lighting systems.  Table 24.12 summarizes these 
distinctions for the technologies analyzed. In some cases (e.g., industrial 
motors, mobile heating appliances), a distinct energy-using component 
was not identified. 
 The investments in 2005 in end-use technologies are estimated to be 
on the order of US$1–3.5 trillion; the estimate in 2005 in the energy-
using components of these end-use technologies is on the order of 
US$0.1–0.7 trillion. The breakdowns of these totals by technology are 
given in  Table 24.13 and  Table 24.14 . 
 It should be emphasized that these investment cost ranges are rather 
 underestimates , as many end-use technologies are omitted from the 
analysis. Although the principal end-use technologies in terms of the 
costs of their energy-using components (not the technologies them-
selves) are captured, investment costs in many technologies cannot 
be quantified. These include all propeller-based and noncommercial 
aircraft; helicopters; all military technologies; mass transit systems 
(whose costs are extremely site specific); heating and cooling systems 
in commercial and institutional buildings (new build and retrofits); 
water heaters; information and communication technologies; small 
appliances; other consumer electronics; and all industrial equipment 
and processes other than motors (e.g., blast furnaces, pulp mills, 
cement kilns). With the exception of industrial plants, the inclusion 
 Table 24.12 |  Summary of technologies and components included in estimates of energy end-use technology investments. 
End-Use Service End-Use Technology Energy-Using Component
mobility commercial jet  aircraft jet engine
mobility  vehicles (cars and commercial) internal combustion  engine 
space conditioning  central heating systems (boiler/furnace, ducts/pipes, radiators, controls, energy supply 
infrastructure network connections for new systems)
 boiler or furnace
space conditioning  air conditioning systems (AC unit, ducts, controls, energy supply infrastructure network 
connections for new systems)
air conditioning unit
space conditioning  mobile heating appliances (e.g., portable convection / fan heaters) same deﬁ nition as technology
lighting  lighting (light bulb and ﬁ xture) light bulb
food storage and cooking large  household appliances (fridges, freezers, clothes washers and dryers, dish washers, 
cookers)
compressors, motors, fans, heating elements
various (e.g., processing) industrial motors same deﬁ nition as technology
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of these categories should not substantially increase the investment 
cost range for energy-using components, as suggested by back-of-
the-envelope sensitivity analyses; however, they would substantially 
increase the investment cost range for end-use technologies in their 
broader definition. 
 Given the definitional problems described above, the appropriate 
point of comparison for estimates of supply-side investment costs is 
a range spanning the narrow category of “energy-using components” 
at the lower end, to the broader category of “end-use technologies” 
at the upper end. Taking also into account the extent of end-use 
technologies missing from this analysis,  the range of demand-side 
investment costs is conservatively in the order of US$0.3–4.0 trillion. 
This compares with supply-side investment costs on the order of 
US$0.7 trillion/year. 
 Although the two ranges span the same orders of magnitude, the 
upper bound of demand-side investment costs is four times higher 
than its supply-side equivalent, recalling also that this is likely a 
(potentially substantial) underestimate. Interestingly, this result aligns 
with the IEA’s estimation that demand-side investment needs exceed 
supply-side investment needs by a factor of 4 to 5 in the IEA climate 
policy scenarios (IEA, 2008b). Disaggregating the data by region 
shows that approximately two-thirds of the end-use investments in 
2005 are in Annex I countries; the remaining one-third are in develop-
ing economies. 
 Table 24.13 |  Estimated investment costs in selected end-use technologies (in billion US 2005 $). 
 End-Use Technologies in 2005 low sensitivity central estimate high sensitivity
 in billion US  2005  $ 
Commercial jet aircraft 12 28 50
Cars 540 758 1194
Commercial vehicles 270 427 672
Buildings (retroﬁ ts) – central heating systems 47 250 979
Buildings (new) – central heating systems 33 93 248
Mobile heating systems 2 4 5
Buildings (retroﬁ t) – air conditioning systems 9 42 137
Buildings (new) – air conditioning systems 7 20 41
Lighting 17 38 83
Large household appliances 45 75 124
Industrial motors 2 6 16
 GRAND TOTAL COSTS  984  1741  3549 
 Table 24.14 |  Estimated investment costs in “energy-using components” of selected end-use technologies (in billion US 2005 $). 
Energy-Using Components of End-Use 
Technologies in 2005
low sensitivity central estimate high sensitivity
 in billion US  2005  $ 
Commercial jet aircraft 3 7 13
Cars 36 76 159
Commercial vehicles 27 57 119
Buildings (retroﬁ ts) – central heating systems 13 52 158
Buildings (new) – central heating systems 9 20 41
Mobile heating systems 2 4 5
Buildings (retroﬁ t) – air conditioning systems 5 21 69
Buildings (new) – air conditioning systems 4 10 20
Lighting 12 27 59
Large household appliances 11 18 53
Industrial motors 2 6 16
 GRAND TOTAL COSTS 124 298 712
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 24.7  Appendix II: Summaries of Case Studies 
of Energy Technology Innovation 
 24.7.1  Grand Designs: Historical Patterns and Future 
Scenarios of Energy Technological Change 32 
 The case study reviews patterns, drivers, and typical dynamics (rates of 
change) in energy systems from a historical as well as futures (scenario) 
perspective. From a historical perspective, two major energy transitions, 
each of which took up to a century to unfold, can be identified: the phase 
of growth in coal-fired steam power, and its subsequent displacement 
by oil and electricity-related end-uses and technologies (Figure 24.23). 
Similar far-reaching future transitions are also described in the scenario 
literature as a function of alternative assumptions on rates and direction 
of inventive activities and performance and cost improvements of new 
energy technologies. 
 Summary Points 
 Technological and social innovations have been core drivers of his- •
torical energy transitions and remain so in future scenarios. 
 Energy history and future are characterized by four “grand” patterns  •
of technological change in energy systems: 
 clustering and spillover effects dominate over singular technologies;  •
 performance dominates over costs in the early phases of technol- •
ogy development; 
 end-use applications dominate over energy supply; and  •
 time constants of change are substantial, spanning from many  •
decades to a century. 
 There is evidence that, contrary to the historical evidence and popu- •
lar conception, rates of systems transitions have substantially slowed 
since the 1970s. 
 24.7.2  Historical Scaling Dynamics of Energy 
Technologies 33 
 The twentieth century has witnessed extensive diffusion of many 
supply-side and end-use energy technologies as part of a wholesale 
transformation of the energy system. Entire industries have grown, 
but so too have the size of technologies at the “unit” level (e.g., 
the rated capacity of a steam turbine or a car engine). Analyzing 
these historical growth dynamics at both the industry and unit level 
reveals some general patterns that appear robust across very differ-
ent energy technologies. First, increases in unit size generally follow 
a period of experimentation with many smaller-scale units. This is 
particularly the case for technologies like nuclear or wind power with 
clear economies of scale at the unit level. Second, the extent to which 
an energy technology industry grows is consistently positively related 
to the time duration of that growth. These and other findings have 
important implications for policy, not least in striking a cautionary 
note on pushing for significant jumps in technology unit size before a 
formative phase of experimentation and learning with smaller-scale 
units has been completed. 
 Summary Points 
 Growth of energy technology industries comprises a   • formative phase, 
then a  scaling phase that precedes or is concurrent with an  industry 
growth phase. 
 The formative phase involves many smaller-scale, granular units  •
with only small increases in unit size. The scaling phase sees large 
increases in unit sizes, particularly at the scale frontier, and a large 
increase in numbers of units. The industry growth phase is driven by 
large numbers of units at larger unit sizes and describes the matur-
ing industry. 
 Experimentation with many smaller-scale units tends to precede  •
substantive increases in unit size. The formative phase following an 
energy technology’s introduction into the market is an often lengthy 
process of testing and experimentation with many small-scale units, 
which allows technologies to be “debugged” through a process of 
“designing-by-experience” (Ruttan, 2001). Successful experimenta-
tion, improvements, and learning appear to be critically determined 
 32  Arnulf Grubler. 


























 Figure 24.23 |  Two “grand” transitions global energy systems measuring market 
shares in total primary energy use, 1850–2007 (preliminary data) of biofuels, coal, 
and modern energy carriers (oil, gas, electricity). Note in particular the long period of 
initial slow market penetration of new technologies and the signiﬁ cant slow-down of 
historical technology dynamics after 1975. 
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by the granularity and the associated smaller financial and innovation 
failure risks of smaller-scale unit projects. Resulting learning effects 
lead to cost and performance improvements, but also facilitate the 
subsequent capture of unit scale economies as the industry matures. 
 The relationship between the extent and the time duration of an  •
industry’s growth is consistent for different energy technologies. 
It is intuitively obvious that the extent of growth should correlate 
positively with the time period over which that growth occurs (not-
withstanding the many factors that affect diffusion rates). However, 
the consistency of that relationship for very different energy tech-
nologies is surprising. The case study also identifies an important 
learning externality for later adopting regions that achieve generally 
faster diffusion compared to leading innovation centers. Compared 
to historical dynamics, future scenarios reviewed were generally 
found to be conservative in their technology scaling and market 
expansion assumptions. 
 24.7.3  Technology Portfolios 34 
 The case study reviews a range of methodologies and model-based 
applications that can assist policy decisions under (inevitable) technol-
ogy innovation uncertainty. 
 One possible approach is based on scenario analysis. As an example of 
that method, a detailed scenario exercise performed at IIASA explores 
uncertainties in main scenario drivers of future greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions (energy demand, resource and technology availability, etc.) 
and extent of future climate constraints (represented through a range of 
stabilization targets). The study identifies energy efficiency and conser-
vation as the single most important, and also the most robust, technol-
ogy option across all scenarios. This result is in stark contrast to past and 
present public sector R&D portfolios, which continue to be dominated 
by nuclear R&D at the expense of energy efficiency. 
 A second analytical approach is based on a portfolio theory that helps 
capture the benefits from (technology) portfolio diversification in the 
framework of risk-averse decision-making. An example modeling study 
suggests that risk aversion leads to higher adoption rates of currently 
higher-cost energy technology options such as modern biomass and 
renewables, but also CCS. The modeling study also suggests higher 
short-to-medium term investments into advanced technologies under 
risk aversion. It is also possible to not only consider variance as a risk 
measure, but take into account the risk of high impact tail events. For 
example, a risk premium of only about 1% of total energy expenditures 
was found to decrease the value of the 99 th percentile extreme event 
by more than a factor of two. Diversification thus not only reduces the 
mean of risk exposure but drastically lowers the tails of extreme and 
undesirable outcomes. 
 Portfolio theory and scenario analysis can also be used in combination, 
where scenario analysis provides the basis for describing the uncertainty 
space and portfolio-based approaches then help to identify optimal risk 
hedging strategies and resulting technology portfolios. 
 Summary Points 
 Formal tools, e.g., scenario analysis and portfolio theory, are increas- •
ingly available to move technology policy decisions (e.g., R&D, or 
early niche market investments) onto a more rational ground. 
 A generic pattern from modeling studies that applies these methods  •
to the field of energy technologies involves  portfolio diversification 
and  enhanced experimentation with earlier niche market invest-
ments, the extent of which depends on the (user specified) degree 
of risk aversion in addition to the underlying innovation uncertainty 
distributions. 
 A comparison of technology portfolio scenario studies with past  •
and current energy R&D portfolios reveals that the latter are highly 
biased, with energy efficiency/conservation underrepresented and 
nuclear R&D overrepresented in comparison to their respective 
option values in a climate-constrained world. 
 24.7.4  Knowledge Depreciation 35 
 The case study first reviews the sources of knowledge depreciation that 
consist of knowledge lost (e.g., due to staff turnover), as well as know-
ledge made obsolete (e.g., due to rapid innovation). The literature of typ-
ical knowledge depreciation rates is reviewed and the limited examples 
related to energy technologies are discussed in more detail. Illustrative 
calculations show the implications of knowledge depreciation for two 
groups of energy technology innovations: nuclear power and energy 
efficiency based on public energy R&D statistics of IEA member coun-
tries (Table 24.15). 
 Summary Points 
 Knowledge depreciation rates – characterized by high staff  •
turnover – can be substantial, reaching 100%/year in service 
industries. In the energy technology field, knowledge depreci-
ation rates range from 10%/year (wind turbines) to 30%/year 
(solar PVs) due to technological innovation-induced knowledge 
obsolescence. 
 34  Sabine Fuss and Arnulf Grubler.  35  Arnulf Grubler and Gregory Nemet. 
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 With knowledge depreciation, continuous knowledge recharge  •
through sustained and stable R&D and niche market deployment 
efforts becomes critical. 
 The   • pathway (stable, gradually rising) of policy support is as – if not 
more – important than the  absolute level of policy support when 
characterized by “boom and bust” innovation investment cycles. 
 Erratic policy support leads to substantially higher knowledge depre- •
ciation, even under otherwise high support levels. Estimates of the 
energy technology R&D knowledge stock for IEA member countries 
suggest that nuclear has suffered substantially more from know-
ledge depreciation than energy efficiency, which is characterized by 
much lower but more stable R&D expenditures. 
 24.7.5  Metrics for Assessing Energy Technology 
Innovation 36 
 Assessing the performance of energy technology innovation processes 
or systems is complex. There are different assessment methods or 
approaches – both qualitative and quantitative – as well as many dif-
ferent assessment metrics, which are reviewed in more detail in the case 
study. These metrics are proxies for innovation inputs, outputs, and out-
comes that are either intangible (e.g., knowledge stock, practical prob-
lems and solutions) or tangible (e.g., scientists, laboratories, installed 
technologies).  Input metrics describe financial and labor inputs to the 
innovation process (e.g., R&D investments).  Output metrics describe 
defined products of the innovation process (e.g., cost reductions). 
 Outcome metrics describe broader energy sector or economy-wide 
impacts of the successful diffusion of innovations into the marketplace 
(e.g., reduction in emissions intensity). 
 Energy technology innovation is characterized by a mixed, staged involve-
ment of both public and private resources, and an interdependent set 
of time-lagged processes linking innovation inputs to outputs. In other 
fields, econometric techniques are commonly used to evaluate outcome 
metrics such as net social returns on R&D. However, their application to 
date in the energy field has been limited due to data constraints, as well 
as the lack of consensus on objectives. Unanswered questions include: 
does successful energy technology innovation reduce energy or carbon 
intensity? Reduce unit costs? Reduce the cost of final service provision? 
Improve security, reliability, and flexibility? Increase option value? 
 Cross-country comparisons using both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches are complicated by the absence of standardized data, local 
specificities in energy technology innovation systems, and confounding 
factors such as labor cost differentials, intellectual property rights sys-
tems, and economic structure. 
 Summary Points 
 Assessments of energy technology innovation can be qualitative,  •
quantitative, or a combination of both. Qualitative assessments 
often complement the analysis of time series data by adding analyt-
ical rigor and depth. 
 Assessments typically center on a particular technology within a  •
national context, and/or focus on the effectiveness of innovation 
policies. 
 Metrics of energy technology innovation relate to either   • inputs ,  out-
puts, or broader  outcomes of the innovation process. With the partial 
exception of technological learning rates, there are no metrics that 
comprehensively link inputs to outputs and outcomes. 
 The lack of available and reliable data on innovation inputs and outputs  •
hampers standardized and cross-comparable assessments of energy 
technology innovation systems across technologies and countries.  36  Charlie Wilson. 
 Table 24.15 |  Current (2007) and cumulative (1974–2007) R&D expenditures of IEA member countries in US 2007 $ billion and estimate of remaining knowledge stock, 
assuming an average knowledge depreciation rate of 20%/year.  
current R&D cumulative R&D remaining knowledge capital stock
10 9 US 2007 $ % 10 9 US 2007 $ % 10 9 US 2007 $ as % of cum. R&D
Energy efﬁ ciency 1.6 13.1% 38 8.8% 7 18.4%
Fossil fuels 1.4 11.5% 55 12.8% 6 10.9%
Renewables 1.5 12.3% 37 8.6% 6 16.2%
Nuclear ﬁ ssion 3.7 30.3% 194 45.1% 18 9.3%
Nuclear fusion 0.9 7.4% 42 9.8% 4 9.5%
Others 3.1 25.4% 64 14.9% 13 20.3%
Total 12.2 100.0% 430 100.0% 54 12.6%
Source: IEA, 2008b and authors’ calculation.
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 24.7.6  China: Energy Technology Innovation 
Landscape 37 
 The case study provides a first-time comprehensive (even if in some 
aspects, incomplete) overview of the entirety of the energy technology 
innovation landscape in China. Major programs, institutional actors, 
funding sources, and R&D allocation by broad technology groupings are 
outlined and draw on data for the year 2004 (Table 24.16). Mechanisms 
for setting innovation and R&D priorities as well as strategic and priority 
areas for China’s ETIS are outlined. 
 Summary Points 
 Energy technology R&D in China is both substantial and expanding  •
rapidly. The survey is partially incomplete, as it does not cover R&D 
in the automotive and other end-use technologies (e.g., appliances) 
industries. Nevertheless, the survey indicates a total resource mobil-
ization of greater than RMB29 billion in 2004 for energy technology 
R&D. This translates to either $3.5 or $9.4 billion, based on either 
market or purchasing power exchange rates, respectively, and com-
pares to a total public energy R&D budget of the United States of 
US$5.6 billion in the same year. 
 Despite its unique feature as a largely centrally planned economy,  •
energy technology R&D in China (not unlike in OECD economies) is 
dominated by industry, which performs 88% of R&D. Largely gov-
ernment owned enterprises also provide for some 85% of all energy 
technology R&D funding in China. 
 The energy technology portfolio (again, not unlike in OECD coun- •
tries) is dominated by supply-side options, even considering 
incomplete data available for end-use technologies such as the 
automotive sector. Within energy supply technologies, fossil fuel-
related technologies account for more than 50% of all energy R&D, 
followed by electric power and T&D with more than 30% of all 
energy R&D. 
 24.7.7  Energy R&D in Emerging Economies (BRIMCS) 38 
 This case study provides an overview of energy RD&D expenditures 
of six major emerging economies referred to as BRIMCS: Brazil, the 
Russian Federation, India, Mexico, China, and South Africa. For com-
parison purposes, corresponding US data are also included. The data 
summarized below synthesizes a wide array of sources that have to 
date not been compiled in a consistent fashion. RD&D expenditures 
are differentiated by broad technology group as well as by funding 
source based on the most recent published data available in each 
country (Table 24.17). Funding sources include (federal) government 
or 100% state-owned enterprises (SOE), as well as other sources such 
as local governments, partially-owned SOEs, private industry invest-
ments, or NGOs. 
 37  Kejun Jiang.  38  Ruud Kempener, Laura Diaz Anadon, and Kelly Sims Gallagher. 
 Table 24.16 |  Energy Technology R&D in China in 2004 (in million Yuan) by institutional actor, performer, and funding source (> symbols indicate incomplete reporting). See 
also Table 24.17. 
R&D performed by
Technology Areas













Nat’l Program Energy Research  Government 1274 785  2059 
Institutions of Higher 
Education
 Government 744 187  931 
(Public) R&D Institutions  Government 21 199  220 
 Enterprises 78 127  205 
 Total 99 326  425 
 Subtotal (R&D performed by 
public sector) 
 1274  99  1070  972  3415 
R&D by Industry  Government 78 878 146 83  1185 
 Enterprises >>1873 14382 5092 2753  >>22227 
 Total >>1951 15260 5238 2836  23334 
 Grand Total  2548  >>1951  15359  6308  2836  972  >28700 
 incl. Gov’t 
funded 
 2548  78  899  1089  83  972  5669 
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 Summary Points 
 Public energy RD&D in BRIMCS countries is substantial and amounts  •
to some $14 billion in PPP terms, slightly above the entirety of the pub-
lic energy R&D budget of all IEA member countries combined (some 
$13 billion in PPP terms). Including non-governmental R&D funding 
sources, total R&D in BRIMCS countries is estimated to total nearly 
$19 billion. 
 The significance of energy RD&D expenditure in BRIMCS countries  •
challenges the traditional view that new energy technologies are 
predominantly developed within OECD countries and points to the 
need to include the BRIMCS countries in regular international stat-
istical reporting and in a comprehensive global strategy to promote 
energy technology innovation. 
 BRIMCS countries’ energy RD&D data show that fossil fuel and  •
nuclear energy receive the highest level of RD&D support, with 
renewables and energy efficiency highly underrepresented both in 
expenditures and statistical reporting. 
 24.7.8  Venture Capital in the Energy Industry 39 
 Access to capital is a major enabler to the scale and speed of technological 
innovation as produced by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial firms face a 
multitude of risks and barriers. For those working with new technologies, 
technological, market, and financing risks are paramount. Venture capital 
(VC) is a source of capital that is willing to finance companies in this risky 
 Table 24.17 |  Energy RD&D in BRIMCS countries (Million US$ at PPP).  


















United States – Gov’t 659 770 319 699 525 1160 4132
United States – Other** 1162 34  no data  no data  no data 1350 2545
Brazil – Gov’t 79 8 122 46 46 12 313
Brazil – Other 1167  no data  no data  no data  no data 1844 1351
Russia – Gov’t 20  no data 22 14 25 45 126
Russia – Other 411  no data  no data  no data  no data 508 918
India – Gov’t 106 965 35 57  no data  no data 1163
India – Other 694  no data  no data  no data  no data  no data 694
Mexico – Gov’t 140 32 79  no data  no data  no data 252
Mexico – Other 0.1 1  no data  no data  no data 263 3 19 4 282
China – Gov’t 6755 12  no data  no data 136 4900 11803
China – Other 289 7  no data  no data 26 985 1307
South Africa – Gov’t  no data 133  no data  no data  no data 9 142
South Africa – Other 164 31 2 26 7  no data  no data 229
BRIMCS – Gov’t 7100 1149 > 259 > 117 > 208 >4966 > 13799
BRIMCS – Other 2724 >> 38 >> 26 >> 7 > 289 > 1696 > 4781
BRIMCS – Grand Total 9824 > 1187 > 285 > 497 > 497 > 6662 > 18580
 * Data from United States, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are based on 2008, data from Mexico is from 2007. 
 ** United States data on industry expenditure is from 2004 (NSF, 2009). 
 1 Based on PEMEX’s fund for Scientiﬁ c and Technological Research on Energy. 
 2 Based on total non-governmental investments into PBMR Ltd. 
 3 Based on 2005 R&D expenditure in car manufacturing industry (CONACYT, 2008). 
 4 Based on 2005 R&D expenditure in utilities sector (CONACYT, 2008). 
 > These cumulative values are based on data from only three to four BRIMCS countries, so actual expenditures are likely to be higher. 
 >> These cumulative values are based on data from two BRIMCS countries or less, so actual expenditures are expected to be much higher. 
Source:  Chapter 24 case studies and Kempener et al.,  2010a . 
 39  Anastasia O’Rourke. 
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stage of the technology life cycle. By investing equity in such risky com-
panies, VC investors are often considered “technology gatekeepers” who 
have helped to select and create “waves of technological innovation” 
that have transformed industries (Florida and Smith Jr., 1990). 
 The case study reviews recent trends in energy VC investments by cat-
egory and region, drawing on and synthesizing a large body of literature 
and statistical information that has to date not been available in the 
public domain. There has been a dramatic growth of VC investment in 
clean energy technologies since the mid to late 2000s. Detailed statis-
tical trends are presented in the VC case study. 
 Summary Points 
 In 2008, the total amount of energy (fossil and non-fossil) invest- •
ments made by professional VCs worldwide was US$15.5 billion. 
 The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for the period 2004–2008  •
is 22%/year of the number of investment rounds (deals) and 45%/
year CAGR for the total amounts invested. 
 The bulk of the investment went to North American and European  •
companies with non-fossil-based energy generation technologies 
(solar; biofuels and biomass) and to storage technologies (particu-
larly batteries). Significant investments were also made in end-use 
energy technologies such as smart energy metering in buildings, 
demand response software systems, or high-efficiency engines. 
 While growth in VC investments has been dramatic, VC makes up  •
only a comparatively small portion of all the capital employed to 
launch energy technologies into the market worldwide. 
 Other niche-market investments in energy are needed as well. These  •
include investments made at a very early stage by private individuals 
(angel investors); large company internal investments; investments in 
late-stage growth and private equity (primarily using debt instruments); 
project finance (also debt, often used to build larger-scale energy pro-
duction facilities such as wind farms); and finally, investments in energy-
technology firms that are listed on various public markets. 
 The contribution of VCs to all private investments in energy com- •
bined sits at approximately 10%, according to data from New Energy 
Finance (IEA, 2009a; UNEP/SEFI/NEF, 2009). 
 24.7.9  Hybrid Cars 40 
 This case study reviews the available literature on the development 
and deployment of hybrid-electric vehicles (HEVs), and particularly 
examines the role of government in this history. Three country-specific 
case studies are provided for Japan, the United States, and China. Key 
factors in the development and deployment of HEVs are identified and 
discussed. 
 Some governments are interested in promoting HEVs and other alterna-
tives to conventional internal combustion (IC) engines because of con-
cerns about oil security, air pollution, and global climate change. HEVs 
achieve greater fuel efficiency than conventional IC vehicles, although 
the extent of improvement in efficiency depends greatly on the config-
uration of the specific HEV system. 
 The three case studies below show that the drivers of invention did not 
substantially differ among the three countries, but the policy mecha-
nisms and incentives for deployment diverged significantly. In all three 
countries, the governments originally pushed harder for alternative 
automotive technologies other than hybrids, such as pure electric vehi-
cles or hydrogen-fuel-cell vehicles. In some cases, private firms made 
R&D choices that do not appear to have been strongly influenced by 
public policy, other than to provoke the firms to explore fuel-efficient 
technologies. In other cases, government policies appear to actually 
have turned firms away from HEVs. Once HEVs emerged in the mar-
ketplace, however, the government response was completely differ-
ent in the three countries, especially in terms of the extent to which 
each government was prepared to support their transition through the 
“early deployment” phase of innovation to facilitate widespread market 
diffusion. 
 Summary Points 
 Policy for government investments in the RD&D of advanced- •
vehicle technologies was initially poorly coordinated, with pol-
icy for the early deployment of these technologies in all three 
countries. Japan and the United States reactively established 
policies to support the early deployment of HEVs once they were 
introduced to the market, but Japan implemented much more 
effective policies to support commercialization than the United 
States. 
 Hybrid car consumers are clearly responsive to increased gas prices  •
and other fiscal incentives, including sales tax reductions or exemp-
tions and feebate schemes, and they also appear to buy hybrids out 
of concern for the environment or energy security. 
 Leadership within firms appears to have been a major factor in  •
explaining the relative success among the firms in developing and 
commercializing HEVs. 
 Political and economic factors, most prominently the concern about  •
energy security, were initially the main drivers for government tech-
nology policy and investments in advanced vehicle technologies in 
Japan, the United States, and China.  40  Kelly Sims Gallagher. 
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 24.7.10  Solar Water Heaters 41 
 The experience of innovation policy related to solar water heaters 
in the United States is a story of policy intermittency. A key general 
finding is that bad outcomes are often not easily forgotten, and can 
have substantial spillover effects on other technologies. This presents 
a challenge to the need to support experimentation and intelligent 
failures. 
 Solar water heaters (SWH) use a working fluid to absorb sunlight and 
provide heating and hot water in residential and commercial settings. 
The technology is currently cost effective, especially in large installations 
with high demand for hot water. Real-time electricity pricing is consid-
ered a potential boost to SWH. China is by far the world’s largest market 
for solar water heaters. An important historical episode for this technol-
ogy was the programs in the United States in the late-1970s and early 
1980s. The biggest technical improvement was the advent in the 1970s 
of selective coatings, which would absorb more sunlight. Since then, the 
technology has been rather stable, with some improvements in lifetime 
and reliability. The key period of R&D investment was in the 1970s at 
national laboratories and universities. The subsidies in the 1980s were 
not monitored. There was rampant abuse of subsidies in the 1980s, and 
many installations leaked and caused extensive damage to structures 
far in excess of the cost of the water heater itself. The response was to 
avoid the technology for many years; the US industry went from US$1 
billion/year in 1982 to US$30 million/year in the late 2000s. Hundreds 
of firms went out of business. As a result, much of the learning gained 
in the period of rapid deployment was lost. The perception of poor reli-
ability persists and has proven difficult to overcome – bad news lasts. 
An exception to this general policy failure has been a program in Hawaii 
that makes consumer rebates contingent on an inspection that occurs 
one year after installation. 
 Summary Points 
 A large, high-profile failure in the early stage of the US SWH industry  •
has proven extremely difficult to overcome. 
 For several years after this failure, the technology was not trusted.  •
 Experience was lost with the collapse of the industry.  •
 Verification is essential and not expensive.  •
 Inspection and verification have proven successful in Hawaii.  •
 Both R&D and incentives placed excessive focus on collector units  •
rather than on system integration. 
 Lack of involvement of utilities and builders appears to have hurt  •
the industry. 
 24.7.11  Heat Pumps – Innovation and Diffusion Policies in 
Sweden and Switzerland 42 
 Innovation and diffusion policies for the development and introduction 
of heat pumps provide an interesting case study on policy learning. Heat 
pumps have been supported by several countries since the 1970s as a 
strategy to improve energy efficiency, support energy security, reduce 
environmental degradation, and combat climate change. Sweden and 
Switzerland have been essential to the development and commercial-
ization of heat pumps in Europe. In both counties, numerous policy 
incentives have lined the path of technology and market development. 
Early policy initiatives were poorly coordinated but supported technol-
ogy development, entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge devel-
opment, the involvement of important actors, the formation of essential 
associations and organizations, and early market formation. The market 
collapse in the mid-1980s could have resulted in a total failure – but did 
not. The research programs continued in the 1980s, and a new set of 
stakeholders formed – both publicly and privately funded researchers, 
authorities, and institutions – and provided an important platform for 
further development. In the 1990s and 2000s, Sweden and Switzerland 
introduced more coordinated and strategic policy incentives for the 
development of heat pumps. The approaches were flexible and adjusted 
over time. The policy interventions in both counties supported essen-
tial learning, successful development and diffusion processes, and cost 
reductions of the heat pumps. The assessment of innovation and diffu-
sion policies for the heat pump systems can be used to illustrate some 
general policy conclusions. 
 Summary Points 
 The assessment shows the need for strategic,   • long-term , and  con-
tinuous support. First attempts to introduce a new technology failed, 
and continuous support was needed to overcome initial shortcom-
ings. Technological change takes considerable time. 
 The combination of policy instruments may have to change and the  •
government’s approach should be  flexible . The policy intervention 
may initially allow uncoordinated intervention to support entrepre-
neurial testing, but then should be developed into credible, stable, 
and transparent strategies that allow industry to make long-term 
investments. 
 The policy interventions need to be   • system-oriented and consider 
both the development of the technology and its emerging market. In 
 41  Gregory Nemet.  42  Lena Neij, Bernadett Kiss, and Martin Jakob. 
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other words, R&D is important as a part of the policy strategy, but 
not enough. 
 The assessment indicates a need for   • testing and certification proc-
esses to support technical quality and create credibility and legitim-
acy. R&D initiatives and subsidies require testing and certification to 
support a stable market development. 
 The support of networking to improve strategic integration and the  •
use of learning and to ensure feedback and spillover effects seems 
essential. 
 24.7.12  Role of Standards – The US CAFE Standard 43 
 In 1975, the US government passed the Federal Automotive Fuel 
Efficiency Standards, which specified mandatory levels of miles per gal-
lon of gasoline consumed for new vehicles averaged across each manu-
facturer’s vehicle fleet. The required Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency 
(CAFE) standard increased from 18 miles per gallon (13 liters/100 km) 
in 1978 to 27.5 miles per gallon (8.6 liters/100 km) in 1985. The stand-
ard was effective in meeting its goals; actual fuel efficiency has never 
fallen below the government requirement. In fact, actual fuel efficiency 
has almost always exceeded the mandatory level. This over-compliance, 
combined with the collinear rise in the price of gasoline during the 
period of escalating standards, suggests that prices have played a role 
in motivating efforts to improve fuel efficiency, not the CAFE standard 
alone. The standard for passenger cars has remained the same since 
1985, while actual efficiency has improved slightly. The standard will 
rise to 30 miles per gallon (7.8 liters/100 km) in 2011. Standards also 
exist in Europe, China, Japan, Australia, and Canada, and are well in 
excess of US requirements – by nearly 100% in the cases of Japan and 
the European Union. 
 The CAFE standard has affected the rate and direction of technological 
change in vehicles. End-use efficiency has improved almost continu-
ously for the past 30 years. This rise in efficiency was used to accomplish 
different ends during the period of policy escalation (1975–1985) and 
after it (1986-present). In the first period, efficiency improvements were 
directed toward improving miles per gallon. After 1985, almost all of the 
efficiency improvements were used to increase other attributes, includ-
ing acceleration, towing capacity, and vehicle size. Energy conversion 
efficiency has improved in drive trains, engines, drag, and rolling resist-
ance. Drive train and engine energy conversion efficiency improved from 
1975–1985; efficiency improved at the rate of 2–3%/year. After 1985, 
efficiency improvement slowed to about 1%/year, although that rate 
has increased since 2000. The continuity of this improvement makes it 
difficult to attribute to CAFE. However, consideration of what end-use 
characteristics these efficiency gains were used for is revealing; from 
1975–1985, vehicle weight dropped by about one-third and acceler-
ation remained the same. After 1985, when CAFE standards stopped 
rising, efficiency improvements were used to power increasingly heavier 
vehicles that could accelerate considerably faster. It needs to be noted 
that the CAFE standards did not apply to all road vehicles, excluding in 
particular light duty trucks, which incentivized a change in the compos-
ition of the road vehicle fleet towards pick-up trucks and, later on, Sport 
Utility Vehicles (SUVs) with much higher gasoline consumption CAFE 
regulated passenger cars. 
 Summary Points 
 CAFE standards had a real effect on technological change.  •
 The improvement in miles per gallon was accomplished not only by  •
a shift to lighter, less-powerful vehicles, but also by the adoption of 
new energy-efficient technologies. 
 Attribution of these changes to the regulations, rather than to gas- •
oline prices, is less clear since the two are so well correlated. 
 Standards that apply only to parts of the technological artifacts in use  •
risk behavioral responses from manufacturers and consumers that 
can go against the original intention of the efficiency regulation. 
 The effectiveness of CAFE may actually have been important after  •
1985 when it served as a fuel economy floor in the face of persist-
ently low gasoline prices. 
 24.7.13  Role of Standards – The Japanese Top Runner 
Program 44 
 In 1998, Japan initiated a unique program – the Top Runner Approach – 
to improve the energy efficiency of end-use products and to develop 
“the world’s best energy-efficient products.” Under this program, the 
most energy-efficient product on the market during the standard-setting 
process sets the Top Runner Standard for all corresponding manufactur-
ers and products. 
 The Program started with nine products: room air conditioners, fluores-
cent lighting, television sets, copying machines, computers, magnetic 
disk units, video cassette recorders, refrigerators, passenger vehicles, 
and freight vehicles. The scope was reviewed every two to three years 
and gradually expanded to include 21 products by 2009. It is now con-
sidered one of the major pillars of Japanese climate policy. The case 
study examines 12 years of the program’s experience. It first reviews the 
structure of the Top Runner Approach and then illustrates its impacts. It 
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also discusses issues associated with the approach, and concludes with 
some implications. 
 Summary Points 
 Dynamic, continuously adjusted standards have been successful in  •
accelerating the trend of energy efficiency improvement in many 
end-use products, such as room air conditioners and passenger 
vehicles. In these cases, the standards provided a clear direction for 
product development by aiming at higher energy efficiency and elim-
inating low-efficiency products from the market. 
 The case study illustrates that ambitious policies that match mar- •
ket conditions and technological conditions can work well to induce 
remarkable energy efficiency improvements. Because such conditions 
depend on the country and the phase of technological development, 
careful design and adjustment are required for effective policy making. 
 Some preconditions may be necessary for success of the Top Runner  •
Approach. One is the Japanese market structure, which is dominated 
by a limited number of domestic producers. Another precondition is 
the existence of cost-effective potentials for efficiency improvement. 
Last, the specifics of the Japanese systems of innovation, in which 
public and private sectors cooperate largely through informal net-
works in the dynamic standard setting and implementation process, 
may be a further precondition for success. When these conditions 
were met, the Top Runner Approach resulted in a substantial out-
come in terms of efficiency gains. 
 Although the achievement of the Top Runner Approach is remark- •
able, there remain some issues for policy consideration. The largest 
one is the lack of explicit consideration of potential impacts on con-
sumers in the standard setting process. Because the approach is 
based on the Top Runner products on the market, price increases due 
to energy efficiency improvements are not explicitly considered. This 
might lead to product prices too high for consumers to achieve pay 
back within the lifetime of the product. 
 24.7.14  Comparative Assessment of Wind Turbine 
Innovation and Diffusion Policies 45 
 Wind turbines have become a mainstream technology – a first choice for 
many when investing in new electricity generation facilities. This com-
parative case study addresses how governmental policy has been formu-
lated and formed to support the wind turbine innovation process. Three 
innovation stages and corresponding innovation strategies are identified. 
First is the stage of early movers in the 1970s and early 1980s, cover-
ing pioneer countries such as Denmark, the United States, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Great Britain, and Sweden. Second, the stage of booming 
markets in the 1990s, guided by the successful Danish innovation path 
of the 1980s, is described. Third is the stage of emerging markets in the 
1990s and 2000s, including countries such as India, China, and Korea. 
Within these different periods, common key elements in governmental 
policy strategies can be identified as essential for a sustainable and suc-
cessful innovation process. 
 Summary Points 
 Support for diversity in technology and market formation is essential.  •
The experience of wind turbine policy intervention shows the import-
ance of applying a diversified technology portfolio. Moreover, the 
study illustrates the difficulties in foreseeing the drivers and trends 
of any given technology and the need to provide subsidies for imple-
mentation to many actors. 
 RD&D is fundamental but not enough. In many countries, wind  •
energy innovation was initially supported through RD&D only and the 
innovation process was envisioned to be linear. However, the RD&D 
funding alone did not bring about any commercial applications. 
 To support technology innovation, quality assurance is essential. An  •
important component of the innovation path of wind turbines was 
the development of a certification process. 
 Support for innovator interaction and networking is essential. However,  •
models for interaction and networking have only gradually developed 
over time and have been designed differently in different countries. 
 Support requires a systemic approach. The case of wind energy  •
shows that governmental policy needs to support the development 
of the entire innovation system, i.e., the development of the turbines 
and its infrastructure, but also the involvement of actors, necessary 
networks, and institutions. 
 Support needs to be stable and continuous. The history of wind tur- •
bines development is long; it started in the 1880s. Many failures have 
occurred over time. The continuous support allowed knowledge cre-
ation and learning, as well as essential market formation that paved 
the successful innovation path of onshore wind energy and that now 
is the basis for the development of offshore wind energy. 
 24.7.15  Comparative Assessment of Photovoltaics (PV) 46 
 A variety of factors, including government activities, have enabled the 
two order-of-magnitude reductions in the cost of PV over the past five 
decades. Despite this achievement, the technology remains too expensive 
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compared to existing electricity sources in many applications, such 
that widespread deployment depends on substantial future improve-
ments. No single determinant predominantly explains the improvement 
to date; R&D, economies of scale, learning-by-doing, and knowledge 
spillovers from other technologies have all played a role in reducing sys-
tem costs. Moreover, interactions among factors that enable knowledge 
feedbacks – for example, between demand subsidies and R&D – have 
also proven important. 
 Conversion efficiency, economies of scale, and the emergence of 
sequential niche markets have been important factors accounting for 
the impressive cost reductions in PV. Improvements in electrical con-
version efficiency have been important to cost reductions, accounting 
for about one-third of the decline in cost over time. R&D, especially 
public sector R&D, has been central to this change. Deployment of 
PV has benefited from a sequence of niche markets where users of 
the technology were less price sensitive and had strong preferences 
for characteristics such as reliability and performance, which allowed 
product differentiation. Governments have played a large role in cre-
ating or enhancing these niche markets. Increasing demand for PV 
has reduced costs by enabling opportunities for economies of scale 
in manufacturing. Japan’s program was especially innovative in that 
it took not only a long time horizon but also set a declining subsidy 
such that it fell to zero after the 10 years of the program. This pro-
vided not only expectations of demand, but also clear expectations 
of future levels of subsidy. The Renewable Energy Law in Germany 
in the 2000s successfully replicated many of the features of Japan’s 
program. 
 Summary Points 
 An array of supporting policy instruments is required: R&D, demand  •
subsidies, etc. 
 Timing matters: the question of when to switch from a focus on R&D  •
to deployment is important. 
 Much of the success of multiyear demand-side programs (in Japan  •
and Germany) is because these programs created long-term expec-
tations of future demand that enabled large investments in manu-
facturing facilities, which brought down costs through economies 
of scale. 
 R&D support also needs a long-term commitment, whether through  •
budgets or grants spanning multiple years, or supporting policies. 
Examples of supporting policies include Japan’s Sunshine Program 
and the United States’ Project Independence, which demonstrated 
commitment by making this area of work a serious national 
priority. 
 Niche markets have been crucial, although they are most effective  •
when not government supported. 
 The success of new technological generations may require renewed  •
R&D support even while markets for the existing technology are 
expanding. 
 24.7.16  Solar Innovation and Market Feedbacks: Solar 
PVs in Rural Kenya 47 
 The solar PV market in Kenya is among the largest and most dynamic 
per capita in the world. Over 30,000 systems are sold each year. Much 
of this activity is related to the unsubsidized, purely free market sale of 
household solar electric systems, which account for an estimated 75% 
of solar equipment sales in the country. Solar is the largest source of 
new electrical connections in rural Kenya. 
 Despite this undisputed commercial success, product quality has been 
a significant concern (Jacobson and Kammen, 2007). Quality problems 
emerged first with the amorphous silicon solar modules that entered 
the Kenyan market in the early 1990s. This situation created a serious 
problem in the market, as many potential solar customers were unable 
to determine which brands performed well and which did not. Through 
independent testing in 1999, underperforming suppliers and models 
were identified and consequently withdrawn from the market, but qual-
ity problems resurfaced after 2004. 
 In response, the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KBS) moved to formu-
late and enforce quality standards for both amorphous and crys-
talline silicon PV modules. Currently, the KBS requires that import 
companies secure a certificate that validates their product conforms 
to the respective Kenyan standards prior to bringing the modules 
into the country. This certificate of conformity must be issued by an 
accredited laboratory. No such facility exists in Kenya, so this testing 
needs to take place in laboratories in Europe, North America, and 
Asia. 
 Summary Points 
 Product quality assurance and standards constitute an important  •
element for the diffusion of new energy technologies, particularly for 
decentralized systems like solar PV that are installed at residential 
sites by local businesses relying on imported modules. 
 The recurrent emergence of quality problems in the Kenya PV market  •
confirms that the issue of product quality control cannot be solved 
decisively by one-time testing efforts or focusing on the improve-
ment of individual low-performing brands. Rather, institutional solu-
tions that persistently require high performance for all brands are 
needed to ensure quality. 
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 The formulation, implementation and enforcement of product qual- •
ity standards requires appropriate local institutional capacity, which 
needs to be developed and maintained for each market. 
 The potential market feedbacks between end-users and suppliers of  •
energy technologies can be weakened when testing stations are only 
available overseas. 
 24.7.17  Solar Thermal Electricity 48 
 Solar thermal electricity (STE) production technology has improved 
through a combination of learning-by-doing and R&D investments. 
Even though R&D levels for this technology were small (even declin-
ing) relative to other energy technology programs, these programs 
played an important role in making full use of the knowledge gained 
through experience in manufacturing, installation, and operation 
of these facilities. R&D helped codify and document the often-tacit 
knowledge that accrued to operators through experience. As a result, 
this knowledge could be shared across firms and even across coun-
tries. It also preserved at least some of the value of the knowledge 
over time – especially during more than a decade of stagnation in 
the 1990s, when essentially no large plants were built worldwide. The 
rebirth of the STE industry during the 2000s indicates that at least 
some of this knowledge accumulated in the 1980s informs current 
designs and operation. 
 Most of our historical knowledge about technical change in STE comes from 
the 350 MW (mostly troughs) systems that were deployed in California in 
the 1980s. Since the mid-2000s, a new round of installations has begun, 
primarily in Spain and the southwestern United States. These installations 
encompass all three types of STE systems: troughs, concentrators, and dishes. 
By the end of 2010, total STE capacity neared 1 GW, and several additional 
GW (>2 in Spain, >3 in the United States) are likely to break ground in 2011. 
A distinguishing feature of STE, relative to other renewables, is that STE 
requires big, risky investments. Early investors may have to “eat between 
one and three US$200 million plants” before improvements enable profit-
able operation. A policy implication is that the scale of technology requires 
different types of incentives from smaller-scale renewables such as PV. Two 
policy instruments are driving a resurgence in STE installations over the past 
10 years: (1) California’s aggressive renewables obligation, possibly increas-
ing to 33% by 2020; and (2) Spain’s feed-in tariff. Complementary policies, 
such as loan guarantees and tax credits, have driven investment as well. 
 Summary Points 
 Interaction between learning-by-doing and public R&D investment –  •
even if small – was important for the substantial decline in operating 
costs of STE systems. 
 This technology appears to be one for which higher R&D could not  •
have substituted for deployment; learning by doing was essential. 
 Initial investments required were large, and chunky, due to scale. Firms  •
knew they would need to absorb losses on the first few plants – a 
classic valley of death problem that was eventually overcome by the 
alternative energy bubble on Wall Street in the 1980s. As a result, early 
plants needed both guaranteed tariffs and capital cost subsidies. 
 Part of the value of the R&D investment was the formal documenta- •
tion of cost improvement efforts, which was publicly available and 
nonproprietary. 
 Technically, the 1980s California (solar energy generating system)  •
plants have been successful. They steadily improved their per-
formances, are still providing power two decades after they were 
installed, and provide the basis for newly designed plants in Spain 
and California. The failure of the company that built them was due 
to falling energy prices and consequent changes in policy rather than 
technical problems, illustrating the substantial market risks associ-
ated with policy intermittency. 
 24.7.18  The US Synthetic Fuels Program 49 
 In response to the drastic oil price increase in the wake of the oil crises 
in 1979, subsidies for the demonstration and deployment of synfuels – a 
supply-side technology – received a rare confluence of support from the 
US government and energy experts (Deutch and Lester, 2004). The policy 
objective was to ameliorate the energy-security consequences and mac-
roeconomic effects of the US dependence on imported oil by using the 
country’s extensive coal, heavy oil, and oil shale deposits. Given estimates 
that synfuels would cost only US$60/barrel against the backdrop of (erro-
neously) projected rapid further increases in oil prices, the demonstration 
and deployment of synfuels production capability was seen as a major 
backstop or insurance policy (Deutch, 2005). The US Congress created 
the Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) in 1980 and gave it the ambitious 
mandate to achieve production of 0.5 million barrels/day by 1987, and 
2 million barrels/day by 1992. The goal of producing 2 million barrels/
day in 1992 would have replaced over one-quarter of US crude oil and 
petroleum product imports, implying a scaling-up to one-quarter of the 
entire market in only 12 years, which was clearly unrealistic. Five and 
a half years later, and after expenditures of billions of dollars, the pro-
gram was terminated without achieving its production goal (Gaskins and 
Stram, 1991). 
 Summary Points 
 Deterministic cost-benefit analysis should not be the only meas- •
ure used to make policy decisions when there is deep uncertainty 
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associated with market conditions (future oil prices) and tech-
nical feasibility. Policies aimed at providing insurance against a 
risk that does not materialize do not necessarily imply a policy 
failure. 
 The mandate to meet ambitious production targets in relatively short  •
timeframes regardless of market conditions and with little technical 
information was highly risky, partly because of the high expenses 
involved and partly because it was not accompanied by a long-term 
vision and corresponding innovation patience. 
 Deciding when there is enough technical information to move from  •
applied R&D to demonstration and deployment (or, in the SFC case, 
production) is difficult, yet crucial. This is especially the case in a situ-
ation in which the market and political environments change quickly. 
In large technology demonstration efforts, a good management and 
evaluation system is necessary to allow for timely decisions about 
whether and when to redefine program goals. 
 Boom and bust cycles of support should be avoided, as they disrupt  •
the innovation process, result in knowledge depreciation, and deter 
wider engagement in the enterprise. 
 Policy backlash – the risk aversion induced by generalizing the  •
experience of perceived failure of one program to unrelated pro-
grams – can have important and long-lasting effects. 
 24.7.19  The French Pressurized Water Reactor Program 50 
 The case study reviews the French nuclear Pressurized Water Reactor 
(PWR) Program as an example of successful scaling-up of a complex 
and capital-intensive energy technology. Starting in the early 1970s, 
France built 58 PWRs with a total gross installed capacity of 66 GWe. 
On completion in 2000, they produced some 400 TWh/year of electric-
ity, or close to 80% of France’s electricity production. The institutional 
setting is characterized by a number of features. These include a high 
degree of standardization; external learning via the use of proven US 
reactor designs under a Westinghouse license; high regulatory stabil-
ity; the effective absence of any public opposition; and a powerful 
national utility,  É DF ( É lectricit é de France), which acted both as  prin-
cipal and  agent in reactor construction. The case study reviews the 
economics of this successful scale-up of nuclear reactor technology, 
identifying a significant cost escalation in real-term reactor construc-
tion costs, but also a remarkable stability in reactor operation costs. 
This cost stability is particularly noteworthy considering the need for 
load modulation in a system relying as heavily on base-load nuclear 
as in the case in France. 
 Summary Points 
 Even under a most favorable institutional setting, earlier hopes of  •
significant declines in nuclear reactor construction costs did not 
materialize, illustrating a case of negative learning much like the 
example of the United States (although cost escalation in France 
remained substantially below US trends). 
 The case study thus demonstrates the limits of the learning para- •
digm: the assumption that costs invariably decrease with accumu-
lated technology deployment. Not only do nuclear reactors across all 
countries with significant programs invariably exhibit negative learn-
ing (cost increase rather than decline), but the pattern is also quite 
variable, defying approximations by simple learning-curve models. 
 While reactors’ real construction costs increased steadily, their   • oper-
ating costs remained low and flat in France, as well as for many 
reactors elsewhere. Perhaps nuclear’s “valley of death” is its inher-
ently high investment costs and their tendency to rise beyond eco-
nomically viable levels. The success of  É DF in combining principal 
 and agent in the construction process, which limited price escalation 
trends (especially in comparison to the US experience), could be an 
option worth considering for minimizing cost escalation. Conversely, 
this logic may suggest that competitive nuclear power is unlikely 
to be achieved in a private free market, which instead is tending 
to produce the rapid innovations that now competitively challenge 
nuclear power. 
 The case study also provides valuable lessons for energy technol- •
ogy and climate policy. Cost projections of novel technologies are 
an inherent element in any climate change policy analysis. The case 
study confirms the earlier conclusion of Koomey and Hultman (2007) 
that projections of the future need to be grounded much more firmly 
within the historical observational space. Climate policy analysis 
must include a wider variation in cost uncertainties, as revealed by 
past experiences, than has previously been assumed in policy ana-
lysis and models. 
 24.7.20  Ethanol in Brazil 51 
 Brazil’s first ethanol program (PROALCOOL), launched in 1975, was a 
direct response to the dramatic rise in imported petroleum prices in 1973. 
The military government of the time saw this as a challenge to Brazil’s 
financial stability and energy security, since the country imported 80% 
of the fuel used by its transport sector. Moreover, Brazil had extensive 
sugar plantations that were facing increased challenges to their exports 
from European Union trading preferences with the African, Caribbean, 
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and Pacific Associated States – ACP countries – and the emergence of 
corn syrup and other close substitutes for sugar. 
 PROALCOOL was initially a classic import substitution policy. Subsidies 
were used to expand ethanol production, then in its infancy, and to 
induce users to shift to dedicated engines for ethanol that could handle 
a gasoline blend with more than 5–10% ethanol. When gasoline prices 
fell a few years later, those who had shifted were left paying the higher 
costs of ethanol, while the original problem of oil imports remained. 
 In this changed context, the government decided to invest in the 
research needed for Brazil to become a more efficient ethanol produ-
cer and thus be in a position to eventually eliminate subsidies. At the 
core of this process was a research partnership that brought together 
the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation and Copersucar, a 
cooperative of sugar mill and ethanol plant owners. Between 1975 
and 2002, ethanol production increased from 0.6 to 12.6 million cubic 
meters and the price paid to alcohol producers dipped below that 
of Rotterdam gasoline prices (Goldemberg et al., 2004). By early in 
the new millennium, increasing yields and reduced processing costs 
(van den Wall Bake et al., 2009) had eliminated the need for subsid-
ies. The decision to develop flex-fuel engines, in collaboration with 
foreign-owned automobile producers, strengthened the domestic auto 
industry and led to a dramatic shift in consumption habits and prac-
tices, thus further building the market. Introduced in 2003, flex-fuel 
vehicles accounted for 81% of the light vehicle registrations by 2008 
(ANFAVEA, 2008). 
 Five policy lessons emerge from the Brazilian ethanol experience:
 First, developing a portfolio of fuel options was important for  •
Brazilian development more broadly. 
 Second, domestic research was a major contributor to the positive  •
development outcome over the longer term. 
 Third, building coalitions among interested parties helped to sustain  •
long-term development efforts. 
 Fourth, sugar cane was grown on large plantations, concentrated  •
heavily in a single state. This left few opportunities for small holders 
and meant transporting ethanol elsewhere around the country with 
potentially negative effects on net CO 2 benefits. 
 Fifth, ethanol from sugar cane tended to maintain the structure of  •
large-scale, concentrated production. Lessons such as these have 
been applied in the development of the biodiesel sector. A variety 
of inputs have been identified for biodiesel and several of these are 
available in most regions and can be grown by small holders and 
processed and distributed locally. 
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